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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Centuries ago scientists foresaw the age ^ Aien man would free himself 
from his Promethean chains of Nature-bound constraints in pursuing his 
own and his fellowman's happiness* Our present scientific and technical 
revolution has brought science into the range of the most effective 
forces of production* The formula *8cieno@ = production force" applies 
also to the social sciences whose explorations of human relationships 
and drives'have reached previously unsuspected depths* Objectives, sudi 
as higher living standards and fuH enployment, economic growth and 
stability, social equity and security, have both called for and provided 
a basis for the exploitation of possibilities offered by the natural 
and technical sciences* 
In today's agriculture, age-old traditions are in the process of 
disintegration, but the heredity of a century (or that of even a millen­
nium as in my country, Hungary) does not get dissolved without defending 
itself. Technical progress and social restratification, the emergence 
of new scales of values and preferences, the adjustment of the rural 
communities to their new tasks and conditions — all these have trans­
formed farm operations and farming techniques* But agriculture, even 
under its revolutionized surface, still hides deep, almost untouched 
layers* If economists and agriculturists are perplexed by the multitude 
and variety of the visible farm problems, there exist many others about 
lAlch they can only guess, which they must follow up* ]h formulating 
and solving these problems, agricultural economists have professional 
2 
tasks, as pointed out by Heady (42, p. 10); 
(1) helping farmers and farm people to attain their stated, 
socially feasible objectives, and 
(2) facilitating the most efficient use of agricultural resources 
from the standpoint of the national economy. 
Farmere* objectives originated in their motivations, preferences are 
embedded in the system of social and economic interests. In most modem 
societies, interests have a threefold vertical structure. %ere is indi­
vidual, personal interest at the one end. The interest of the community 
as a vhole which in practice appears as a state interest represented by 
the central political organisms (Parliament, i.e. the National Assembly 
in Hungary) is at other end. Between the two ends there exist the in­
terests of groups or collectives such as interests of local communities 
and interests of firms owned by more than one household.^ 
2 
Today the middle of the interest hierardiy is crucially inçortant 
in Hungarian agriculture where large-scale cooperative farms represent 
the predominant organizational form and even larger-scale state farms 
are the second most irçsortant. The interests of collectives used to be 
considered obscure and shapeless, therefore insufficient for properly 
^In Holdren's (50) terminology) if any of the "multi-personality* 
groups behaved as though it were a "single-headed organism," then it 
shall be considered as a "basic decision unit^ having single coherent 
structure* of objectives and interests. Holdren (5Q) also points out 
that the definition of "the household" as the individual consuming unit 
ignores its multi-person nature in almost all cases. 
2 
If we call the two former zones of interests micro-interests and 
macro-interests, respeotivoly, then meso-interest would be a. practical 
term for the latter zone of interests* 
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transmitting society's interests to the individuals and vice versa# In 
the now economic mechanism Introduced in 1968, the vertical structure 
has been modified to the extent that the interests of collectives (firms, 
cooperatives, local communities, etc.) are far more apparent* Fanners* 
interests, however, have remained heavily-weighted and tangible at the 
other two levels as well# 
In the light of Hungary's recent economic problems, many traditional 
concepts appear obsolete; at the same time new ones are emerging# The 
process of revaluating and re-ranking the tasks and methods of economic 
science has begun but only with the theoretical preparation of the new 
economic mechanism# However, one must not neglect to ask whether the old 
barrels are still able to hold new wine* Ih quite a few fields it has 
been found that the new wine of economic theory should not be poured 
into the old goatskins or wooden barrels of methodology# Thus, special 
attention and space have been devoted to utilizing economic functions 
with the aid of mathematical methods and programming models. 
Instead of futile ideological arguments, most of Hungary's conpe-
tent economists^ fully agree with the first Nobel Laureate economist, 
Ragnar Prisch (53, pp# 208, 210)j, who stated while visiting Hungary* 
"It is my deep conviction that mathematical economics and, 
particularly, the various programming procedures will be­
come absolutely indispensable tools of a modem econony ### 
especially In the socialist countries characterized by 
management 'from above# * !5iis obtains even greater ençha-
^Hungarian economists* general response to the "capitalist" origin 
of these techniques seems much like that of Anderson's "Ugly Duckling"* 
It does not matter where one is born as long as one comes from a swan's 
egg# 
This reaction is not equivalent to overlooking the places where 
there is too much smoke for there to be no fire# 
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sis because of the reform of economic control and manage­
ment since in almost all socialist countries the idea of 
management through incentives instead of control by com­
mands is pushed into the fore* ••• To control with the 
aid of incentives requires more mathematics than the 
more primitive system of commands*" 
Instead of direct plan directives, the new economic mechanism oper­
ates by changing 
(1) the budget constraints of firms and individual economic agents 
(consumers, managers« workers; cooperative members); and/or 
(2) the weights attached to the activities of economic units; and/or 
(3) the general envirozment for economic units In such a way that 
2 their decisions are affected in a manner consistent with social goals* 
As a result of numerous research projects during the late fifties, 
the mathematical methods of national economic planning were Introduced 
in Hungary some yaars later* In the beginning, input-output models were 
in the foreground* but not long afterwards research studies based on 
mathematical programming started (among these, Komai's two-level pro­
gramming model was of considerable professional interest abroad)* 
In each part, this study applies the so-called quantitative analysis 
which — as demonstrated by Fox, Sengupta and Thorbecke (31, p* 11) — 
may be operationally divided still further into three interrelated parts# 
(a) Characterizations of the economic problem: specifications of 
the objective (preference) function, the quantitative model and the 
^At the same time Priseh (53, pp* 209-210) repeatedly protested 
against abstract formal mathematization which he called "playometrics*" 
^Similar phenomena are frequently called "spontaneous field control" 
in social psychology* 
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Qonstraints or boundary conditions, 
(b) The selection problem! classification of variables by their 
properties, such as direct or indirect (or lack of) controllability* 
(c) The steering problem: derivation of optimum decision roles 
and optimal decision-making procedures under dianging conditions,, in­
cluding new information and learning processes* 
The "box of analytical tools" in this study contains optimization 
(maximization or minimization) processes which belong to the doaain of 
2 
calculus or mathematical programming* 
With respect to optimization, Tinbergen (79, p* 260), the other 
co-winner of the first Nobel Prize in economics, made a relevant remark; 
"In essence any optimum problem is a problem of welfare economics*" In 
such a problem an ob.ieotive function is given which has to be maximized 
under a number of constraints* Among these, institutional constraints 
may also be applied* 
As the title demonstrates, ^ raw materials" (statistical data, direct 
personal experience and "indirect learning processes") for "manufacturing"® 
this study originated in Hungary while the tools and techniques were 
"made at Iowa State" in almost every case* 2h spite of the geographi­
cally limited scope of the analyzed data, this study definitely aims at 
a feasible level of theoretical generalization and professional synthesis* 
^If a decision unit laams either new goals or new ways of achieving 
goals, its preferences expressed in its objective function change ( jO), 
In the methodological aspects, the author of this study is a "tool-
user" rather than a member of the distinguished grovqp of "tool-makers * " 
j^plyimg international comparisons in Part I and seaz>ching for fonsa* 
latlons and conclusions of vider technical interest in all three parts 
hopefully will contribute to this effort. It is one of the deficienoies 
of econonicK in Hungary that up to the present no detailed description 
of the practical functioning of the national econoiqy has been published 
such as that by Sanuelson (70) on the US econony, or on the French 
economy by Pierre ELeton ( 5 ) and on the German econœny by Reins 
Pentsltn (67) or Walter Wanneaiacher (82)» 
Finally, the aspirant hopes that by the end of this paper the 
readers will at least partially agree with John Knapp (589 p* 95) t 1*0 — 
lAen reviewing a book written by an American author of Hungarian origin 
about Hungary's economic planning ( ^ ) —» politely noted in the Journal 
of Political Sconooiyt "It may be true that economic science has now 
reached a stage of development in v^icho in order to be an economist» 
it is no longer sufficient to be a Hungarian, But it is still a vexy 
great advantage*^ 
Objectives 
The major objectives of this study have been to analyse cooperative 
faiming — its historical development» and socio-economic determinants — 
and to derive optixoum solutions for this specific form of farm organi­
zation in harmony with cooperative economic goals and capacities* This 
study is concerned with the objectives and Interests of the individual 
cooperative members, thooe of the collective enterprise, and the ob* 
^Knapp listed "originality of approach* ••• "the heroic ambition 
to be all-embracing" "the superficially cool elegance of treatment" 
as "the hallmarks of the genuine Hungarian at work*" 
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jeotlves of the cooperative organization (including laembers* hoosplot 
farms and cooperative households)* 
Part I sets the stage by describing the transformation and the recent 
organization of Hungarian agriculture. Part II scrutinizes the socio­
economic eharaoteristics of f aimers' cooperatives and develops various 
models of cooperative farming* Part III applies the optimization tedinique 
of marginal analysis and mathematical programming in accordance with alter­
native objectives of the large-scale cooperative enteiprises as a spe-
cific fona of business firm* %is part also views the economic objec­
tives of the cooperative members as individuals and formulates a unified 
(integrated) objective functim of the collective enterprise and its 
members in terms of a hypothesized cooperative welfare function# PlnalHy, 
the major conclusions of the study are presented mostly from a methodo­
logical point of view* 
Hungarian agricultural economists* sharpest dispute (see 1, p* 98)# 
not yet concluded» centers on the collective interests of large cooperative 
entezprisea* Some of the econc^aists are of the opinion that the main in­
terest of the cooperatives lies in maximizing gross income per member* 
Another group makes the purposeful distinction between a cooperative as 
a firm and its mes^rs as individuals* According to this viewpoint» a 
cooperative as a collective enterprise is interested in maximizing net 
income (profits); the cooperative mendoers as individuals are, however, 
interested in remuneration (wages) for work performed on their own lar.'ge» 
scale cooperative faz^as and in a direct share in the latter*s profit* 
Neither of the two groins has integrated into the fraxcewo^ric ol" its 
argument the specific role of interests and objectives associateti with 
the cooperative mergers* homaplot farming* 
The author believes that the lack of mutual understanding is due 
mainly to the fact that mathematical models and optimization techniques 
had not been incorporated in this debate# 
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la this organisation• the recent study tries to provide an answer 
for soma eoonomio questions iAi<di ar) ourrent in Hungazy* These questions 
have motivated this study* 
9 
PART I. 
TRANSFORMATION AND RECENT ORGANIZATION OF HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURE 
10 
CHAPTER II. THE POSTWAR LAND REFORM 
A quarter of a century ago the socio-economic map of agriculture 
was redrawn in Eastern &irope* %e land of enormous latifundia vas dis­
tributed among a large number of destitute peasants and owners of small 
holdings. As one of the Uhlted Nations' publications (62, p. 72) states* 
^The change has been most ccaqplete in Hungary, affecting nearly half 
the land." 
What was the nature of this reform? What were its effects on the 
economic progress of the country? This chapter atten|>ts to consider and 
1 
answer these questions. 
Historical and Economic Background 
When World War II came to an end, Hungary was far below the European 
average level of econmoic devolopmant. Thus in 19^5 the people and the 
government of the country were faced with the task of creating a society 
of greater equality and abundance. This they did by launching a vigorous 
program of economic development. 
The economic development of the country necessarily started with a 
phase of reconstruction. Di consequence of World War II, matez^lal losses 
amounted to a larger sum than seven years' aggregate national incime. 
About 400,000 people had died. More than half of the livestock and more 
^The original version of the first part of this chapter was written 
for Professor John F. Tlmmons* ^Seminar on Agrarian Reform and Economic 
DevelojBBent" at Iowa State University in 1969. 
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than one-third of the machine and tool equipment were destroyed by the 
war* 
The basic requirement for economic development was the establishing 
of socio-economic conditions i^idi would open the road to reconstruction 
and economic growth* As the very first step it was necessary to evolve 
now social and economic measures permitting the abolition of the feudal 
features of land ownership* 
1%) to 19^5 Hungarian agriculture was, in the main, diaraeteriaed by 
extensive farming on large estates. Technical backwardness, low livestock 
density and the deterioration of soil productivity caused by insuffioient 
fertilization resulted in low yields. All this bore a close relationship 
to the large unemployment of the rural population and the extremely low 
level of labor efficiency* 
About half the population made its living by agriculture, and only 
10 per csnt vorksd in the manufacturing industries prior to 1938* This 
year (which was the last normal prewar year in Eastern Europe) agricul­
ture accounted for 69*9 per cent of Hungary's exports (52# p* 353)* 
Data shew the strategic liqiortance of agriculture in the problem­
atic situation of Hungary at the end of World War II* 
Pre-Refom Conditions î Problematic Gaps between Noras 
and Existing Situations 
Thd problematic situation of Hungarian agriculture had been reflec­
ted in a gap between the actual and the desired situation* Timmons ( 7^ p* 9) 
states "The gap between consequences and goal is the problematic situation 
within lAlch the problem for study la delimited*** 
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The new government of the agrarian oountiy oould not aecoapllah 
political stability without the help of the peasantry* The key to the 
support of land-hungry peasants vas the fulfilling of their desires lAioh 
coincided with the norms and requirements of overall progress* 
Thus we arrive at a quantified type of problematic gap between 
noraCs) and the actual situation in the field of land property distri­
bution. 
Table 2*1. Percentage distribution of land property in some Eastern 
European countries prior to World %ir 11^ 
Country Sise of property in hectares 
below 3 3-5 5-50 50-100 100-500 above 500 
Rumania 12*8 15.2 39.8 9*5 10*6 17*1 
Jugoslavia 6*5 21*5 62*4 3.2 2*8 3.6 
Bulgaria (norm) 5.3 24.7 68*4 1.6 0 0 
Hungary 10.9 9*2 33.5 5.5 17.2 23.7 
Problematio gap 5,6 15.5 34*9 3.9 17.2 23.7 
^Sources (75» p. 24). 
last row in Tabla 2*1 shows the problematic gap between Bulgaria 
and Hungary* Di this comparison Bulgaria Is taken as a norm of equitable 
land property distribution whidi also reflects wealth and income distri­
bution* If equity» i.e* relatively even wealth and incwne distribution 
is considered as "the standard of the nona»" then a quantified problematic 
gap will show up between Bulgaria (as a norm) and Hungary in this respect. 
The definition of problematic gap does not restrain the applied nom 
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to a condition existing elsewhere <-» although the latter may be consid* 
ered as a desired situation or nom* For this reason# the nom used in 
Table 2*1 and later on may be questioned on the valid ground that the 
chosen "bench mark" for oooçarison may Itself not be optimal# all 
means. Table 2*1 and the following tables express problematic gap of some 
sort whidi may serve veil the given analysis# 
In Hungary, 72*4 per cent of the total number of landowners, lAose 
holdings all together made up only 10# 1 per cent of the countryside, held 
very small plots (below 5 cadaster holds, i.e. 2*8 hectares); 21*4 per 
cent of the landowners, whose property made up 21,8 per cent of all land, 
owned small and middle-sized holdings# Large peasant farms (of 20 to 100 
cad# holds, l#e. 11.4 to 57 hectares) were in the hands of 5*4 per cent 
of the landowners, and occupied about 20 per cent of the countryside# 
Middle and large estates (over 57 hectares), whose owners constituted 
only 0#8 per cent of the landowners, held 48.1 per cent of the land* In 
round figures, one per cent of the landowners held half of the land. 
This extremely disproportionate distribution of land property was a 
consequence of the surviving system of large feudal estates, in spite of 
the fact that serfdom had been abolished a century before# At that time, 
the emancipation of serfs, however, had only resulted in the peasants* 
acquiring about 30 per cent of the land, while 70 per cent remained in 
the possession of the big landowners* In the course of a whole century the 
latter proportion -bëoame only to 48#1 per cent of the total area. 
Land ownership concentration vas the strategic issue of the vide 
differences in social status. Fam vorkers with no land or with tiny 
parcels were more numerous In Hungary than in other near-by countries# 
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Another type of measurable probleaatlo gap Is given here* 
•ovjKir 
Table 2.2. The percentage of farm workers in some Eastern European 
countries before World War 11^ 
Country percentage of landless wage* %e number of wage-earners with 
earners in the whole fan labor below 0.57 ha* land as percent* 
force age of the whole eo^loynent 
Romania 8.9 7.6 
Jugoslavia 9.3 6.6 
Bulgaria (norm) 5.1 4*4 
Hungary 38.5 27*4 
Problematic gap 33.4 23*0 
^Sources (75# p. 24). 
Table 2.2 shows another important aspects of wealth and income distri­
bution thus it quantifies a new problematic gap ^  using the same countzy 
in terms of standard as Table 2*1* 
The problematic gap shown in Table 2*2 is the difference between the 
existing situation of Hungary and the Bulgarian data considered as norm. 
D* consequence of the serious inequalities of land distribution 
and chronic unemployment in agriculture, some 2.1 million Hungarian cit­
izens emigrated overseas* 
Another conçarison is given if one looks at farm et^loyaent in 
pr^ortion to the total labor force evsplayed* 
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Table 2,3, Agricultural eiq)lqy@@nt in soma European countries as a 
peroentage of total exqoloyment* 
Country Year(s) Percentage 
Switzerland 1930 21.2 
France 1931 35*6 
Czechoslovakia (norm) 193*^-1938 37*9 
Hungary 193'«-1938 49.7 
Problematic gap — 11,8 
^Sources (25» p, 33 and25, p. 24) • 
Hers the level of industrial development is considered as the stand* 
ard of conparision* A lower proportion of farm en^loyment Kith respect to 
the total labor force eaployed was the sign of a more developed national 
economy as well as that of better income-earning possibilities and living 
conditions in Caedioslovakia* Referring "ia this country as the nom a 
coB^rision vith Hungary will show a problematic gap of 11,8 per cent 
point in Table 2.3* 
order to find still another type of quantified gap one coaspares 
a norm with the existing level of productivity. %e problematic gap vas 
wide and the productivity of Hungarian agriculture was very low mainly 
in the production of ao^oalled intensive cr^s* 
The "standard of the norm* applied in Table 2.4, i.e. average crop 
yields are of crucial nature in Hungary lAere the area of arable land 
cannot be eaqpanded and population density is extremely high. Higher crop 
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yields were usually assoolated with larger Taxa ino«ae and with the 
larger "food-providing oapaoity* of a land unit. These phenomena stress 
the iaportanoe of the probleaatio gap between Hungary and Oenmaric or 
CoeAoslovakia i^idi is quantified in Table 2.4. 
Table 2*4. Average yields of selected European countries in 
years 1934-1938® 
(tons per hectare) 
Country Vbeat Com Sugar beet Potatoes 
Denmar^c 3.04 # 36.2 17.2 
Rp&noe 1.56 1.58 27.6 11.2 
Csechoslovalcia (norm) 1.71 2.11 28,6 13.5 
Hungary 1.37 1.98 20.6 7.3 
Problematic gap^ 1.67 9 15.6 9.9 
Problematic gap° .34 .13 8.0 6.2 
^Source* (25» p. 31)* 
^Between Dsnaark and Hungary. 
^Between Csedtoslovakis and Hungary. 
Hungary's agricultural economy was of an extensive nature. Cereals 
(excluding com) were grown on 52.4 per cent of the entire ploughlaad. 
About 70 per cent of the agricultural exports was Bade of oossodities 
produced by extensive farming. 
Finally one can find a problematic gap between the past agricultural 
policies of the nei^boring countries and that of Hungary. After World 
W&r I in CseAoslovakia, Jugoslavia, and Rumania# a large nundaer of lati­
fundia was distributed among peasants. But the ruling classes of Hungary 
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did not follow this path# Looking at the vide problematic gaps cm# has 
to agree with the conclusion of the previously cited UN publication 
(62, p. 71); "The social effects of land reforms after World War I in 
Eastern Europe were undoubtedly bénéficiai ••• by ooBq)arison with com-
ditions in Hungary» where no significant reform took place till 19^5*" 
The Diagnosis of Failure and Success Elements 
iDa the diagnostic phase» first the failure elements are investi­
gated vhidi were responsible for gaps diaracterised in the previous 
section* Then the success elements are traced, both the actual and po­
tential ones* 
Large estates with extensive cultivation constituted the crucial 
failure element in Hungarian agriculture* The effect of this organisa­
tional form (called latifundia) distorted the agrarian structure* 
In pre-war Hungazy the existence of large feudal property owner­
ship did not result in any of the advantages of large-scale operations 
or investments* The level of productive efficiency was very low* Âgri-
oultuz«l production was not adjusted to the demand for food of hi^ 
nutritional value. Half a million workers, i*e« one-fourth of the total 
agricultural labor force, were permanently uneiq>loyed* 
the latifundia agriculture of Hungary, absentee ownership was 
accompanied by the steady flight of capital out of farming, tâildi 
furtheP hindered technological progress* An enormous share of the land­
lords* income usually found its way into conspicuous cwsuzqition* The 
"objective functions" of the absentee owners of latifundia did not 
stimulate farm reinvestment out of the fabulous land rent since operating 
18 
capital and the lew-level investment vas provided by the tenant-entre-
preneurs «ho also aoted as managers hiring woHcers. 
Ja the shade of large estates, land became relatively more expensive 
for small-scale farming* Mostly because of the different demand condi­
tions# the land price per hectare vas tvice as rnaoh for land units xsp to 
3 hectares as for estates over 570 hectares in years prior to World War H* 
Large uneiqploynent» low product prices and high land prices rs<toced 
the living standard of peasants# and denied them the opportunity to ad­
vance# At the earns tims# Hungary experienced the prevalence of farms 
vhidi vera too large to cultivate intensively and of faxns #ii«& were 
too small to operate efficiemtly. 
In pre-war Hungarian agriculture the only actual success element 
vas the relatively intensive cultivation on small sis® farms. As Easekas 
(25# p» 36) calculated# the agricultural value product of one hectare 
of cultivated land vas 78 per cent greater on peasant owned land vp to 
15 hectares than on large farms ^ ose land area suxpassed 115 hectares# 
This great difference suggests that the level and cosçosition of input# 
namely the oapital-labor-land mix# as veil as the outpat-aisc vere far 
from being optimal or efficient on most large fanos# !Ihe audi poorer 
perfoxnance of larger farms vas also due to the conservative aanW»!* 
ness-like management and feudalistio vage system# 
la such a situation lAen the latiAmdia sjrstem vas the major fail­
ure el^sent and peasant farming vas relatively more efficient# it seemed 
that the redistributi<m of land for smaller-scale operations vould be 
beneficial to the farm population and beneficial also to the people in 
general# In other Eastern European countries (Csedioslovakia# Bulgaria# 
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Poluad)* employment eondltimc Inqsroved and mgrioultural prodaotlon In-
creased and grew more diversified after the land reform following World 
War I. 
The Land Reform Dsoree of 1945 
Land reform appeared as a historical imperative for Rto^ary in the 
spring of 1945» Traditions* eoon<»Dic and social environment, conditioned, 
of course, its significance as well as its take-off. Bat as everyiAere 
else, at the heart of the prsbleas of land reform lay the question of idio 
ONned the land. In common with their fellows abroad, Hungarian peasants 
were emotionally tied to the land whiA they tilled. Dorean Warriner's 
metaphor (83, p. 238) desoribes Hungary's actual situation at that timet 
"the economic sails are filled by a political wind." 
On March 18, 1945, the Land Reform Decree (64) came ont with a modest 
titles No« 600/1945. Decree <m the Abolition of the Latifundia Systsa and 
on the Land Grant for Farm People." 
%e First Article (64, p. 9) summarises the main objectives as folm 
lows* "To abolish the feudal system of latifundia in order to guarantee 
the demooratio transformation and future development of the country." In 
words of the First Artiolet The Land Reform evened the road to the po­
litical, social, economic, and intellectual advance for the Hungarian 
peasantry oppressed for centuries. 
In its Articles 4-24 the Land Reform Decree fixed the maximum sise 
of holdings whidi varied basically according to their owners* oooiqut-
tions. An area of land equivalent to the maximum-size of holding was 
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kept for the owner. 
The maximum size of holdings became 114^ hectares for farmers and 57 
hectares for persons having non-agricultural occupations. The Decree also 
fixed the maximum size of granted land units to 15 cadaster holds (9*55 
hectares)* 
The Decree defined the scope of eligibility in its Articles 35-38* 
Farm hands (permanent workers on latifundia), agricultural workers» and 
dwarf holders (with land property smaller than 2» 85 hectares ) became 
eligible for land grants* They were declared the owners of their granted 
lands* 
According to Article 36» preference rights for obtaining land grants 
shall accrue to those: (1) who gained distinction or died in the fight 
against German fascism and its Hungarian supporters} (2) lAo performed 
19^5 farm work, setting a good example* (3) ^o supported three or more 
children in his household* 
The Decree states that trained specialists like agronomists and 
managers who lost their jobs on the expropriated large estates were also 
eligible for land grants* Vîhero sufficient land was available, forest 
workers and rural craftsmen also obtained eligibility. 
The established maximum size of a land grant was applied in those 
few areas vriiere there was enough land* Each family was allotted 9*55 
hectares creating farming units equivalent to the size of a contemporary 
^In this respect the Dacree made two exceptions * 1* The land prop­
erty of "an active supporter of Gei^nan fascism** was confiscated regard­
less of its size. 2. The whole area of large estates surpassing 570 
hectares was expropriated with compensation. 
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small holding. Where land did not suffice to grant this unit to oacdi 
family, the size of the grants was reduced* Eligible peasants insuf­
ficiently provided for preserved their rights for new grants in othmr 
regions idiere available lands remained* 
The Decree decided on cosçjensation for expropriated lands and also 
on payments for land grants. Article 39 (6^»-, p* 97) states * "The owners 
of expropriated lands i^ill be compensated* The condensation will be paid 
by the government in harmony with its financial capacity." 
According to the Decree; the benefited peasants would have to pay 
an amount — either in cash or in kind — determined by the cadastral 
value of the granted land (Article 40). The declared price of granted 
lands was only a small fraction of its actual value. In the author's 
calculation» the price as required payment for 1 hectare of granted land 
was even less than the value of a crop for an average year on the same 
land.^ 
The 194$ Land Reform expropriated altogether 3*2 million hectares 
of land, i.e. roughly one-third (34.6 per cent) of the territory of the 
According to Article 40 an amount vhicti is twenty times as much 
as the net value in the cadaster records had to be paid as the price of 
granted lands. The net value originally expressed in Crowns (former 
monetazy unit) is to be transferred by multiplier 1.16 in terns of 
Pengoes (the contesçoraiy monetary unit)* The same Article states that 
payments in kind (wheat) will be counted at a price of 400.00 Pengoes 
per tons* 
The average net value of Hungarian lands is 20 Crowns per hectare 
in the cadaster* Following the calculation schedule of the preceding 
paragraph one arrives at a "real price" of l.l6 tons of wheat*(20X20 = 
400; 400 X 1*16 = 464; 464% 400 = 1*16),Table 2*4 shows that average 
yield of lAeat amounted to 1*37 tons in Hungary during the pre-war 
period. 
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country; 75,500 holdings, among thorn 1,069 "mammoth" latifundia, were 
expropriated. Of the expropriated land, roughly 60 per cent (3.2 mil­
lion cad* holds) was granted to the applicants. The remaining area 
consisted of state-owned forests and uncultivable land. In short, the 
19^5 Land Reform Decree resulted in new ownership for one of eveiy three 
hectares of land in Hungaiy. 
Granting land to 6^2,3^2 applicants, the land reform gave rise to 
400,000 new peasant holdings. The average size of land grants was 2.8 
hectares (per benefited family). 
The 19^5 land reform meant much more than a simple shift in land . 
tenure rights. It meant the revolutionary abolition of feudal relation­
ships by way of radical changes in the structure of land title and in 
the status of the working peasantry. 
The 194$ Land Reform as Remedial Action 
Di practice, the 19^5 land reform was a remedial action. An analyti­
cal evaluation can point out its consequences in terms of new success 
and failure elements. 
The 194$ land reform involved the actual division of large estates 
into small holdings» Together with the transfer of land ownership it 
made a substantial change in the scale of farming operations. 
Very few communities were not involved in the land reform, and none 
existed in which inhabitants were not given land. The radical change in 
The whole payment was due in equal annual installments during a 
period of 10 or 20 years. Landless workers and farm hands were given twice 
as long terms as the benefited dwarf holders and other persons. Only 10 
per cent of the declared ''price*' was required as down payment in 1^5* 
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the distribution of land property is reflected in Table 2.5* 
Table 2*5. Distribution of land property before and after the reform* 
Sise of property Percentage distribution of 
in hectares number of all farms ploughland 
1935 1949 1935 19^*9 
Below 0*57 17.6 13.2 1.2 1,4 
0,57 - 2.87 45.6 40,1 11.1 17.9 
2.87 - 5.75 16.7 27,6 12,0 30.2 
5.75 - 11.50 11,8 14,5 16.6 29.3 
11.50 - 57,50 7.3 4,4 24,4 16.7 
57.50 -575 0,9 0,2 14,5 4.5 
Above 575 0,1 0 20.2 0 
Total 100*0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
^Source* (52, p, 413). 
The dominant, almost exclusive, type of farm became the small and 
medium-sized traditional peasant farm based on family labor. In spite of 
the somewhat different scales, comparison between Tables 2,5 and 2,1 
bears witness to the filling of the most inçortant problematic gap. 
The implementation of the land reform lowBi*ed the proportion of 
landless workers within the ;Aole farm labor force from 38*5 per cent 
(in 1930) to 13.2 per cant (in 1949). In comparison with Table 2,2 the 
latter data give evidence of the substantial reduction of problematic 
gap. 
The four years after 19^5 saw the development of a rhythm never 
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before ezparlenoed in Hungary» Bty 19^ livestock generally had reached 
the prewar level* The cattle stock of the country had deteriorated in 
quality and diminished in numbers to less than half its former size 
during World War II# 5y 1949* however, it had regained the peace-time 
level. During the war, over 80 per cent of the sheep stock was destroyed, 
and Hungarian sheep breeding thus had virtually to be started anew# 
"Die structure of field crop production has undergone significant 
(Ganges# The acreage of bread grains (previously the main export crops) 
has considerably diminished# Ih addition to com, the area under sugar 
beet and oil plants has been expanded many times* In 19^9 the territorial 
ratio of vegetables and legumes as well as the whole irrigated area was 
about double the pre-war figure. Thus the structure of field crop pro­
duction has developed in an essentially more intensive direction# Idle 
land was reduced to 1*6 per cent of the whole ploughland in 1949# This 
percentage had been 2*5 in years 1931-1940, and 13*9 in 1945# 
As a result of the land reform the gap regards lower land use and 
the so-called intensity gap disappeared in most fields# (The level of 
productivity will be dealt with shortly.) 
In real life the elimination or reduction of problematic gaps 
reflects the positive consequences of the 1945 land reform on econ«nic 
growth# 
Signals of a New Problematic Situation 
The land reform changed the type of farm organization and created 
new incentives in the fom of peasant ownership* The extent to lAiidi 
this incentive could be effective was, however, limited by the general 
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economic conditions» 
]h most parts of the country there was inatufficient land* Thus 
peasant faims generally remained sm.ill« The production means were also 
insufficient, and technology remained primitive. The scope for possible 
advance through the incentive of peasant ownership in these conditions 
is necessarily narrow* Many disabilities of too small-scale production» 
"the ill effects of minifUndia* (62, p, 10) started to show tqo a coupla 
of years after the land reform. 
On most fan&s the land base was very small (as shown in Table 2o5)* 
The abolition of large estates provided only little capital for the 
newly created faros* The equipment granted per farm had an equivalent 
value of 3*5 tons of wheat (25, p* 44). 
Although to have approached the pre-war level might be considered 
a significant success, the technological backwardness of Hungarian 
agriculture nevertheless persisted, the basic obstacle to further 
development being precisely the small-scale character of production* 
Over one million of Hungary's two million farmers still had fewer than 
three hectares of land* 
The Hungarian land reform affected directly the input combination 
within farms and the resource allocation among farms* The creation of 
small farms resulted in multiple needs for capital equipment* Most fozms 
of this equipment were used only within the boundary of a single farm* 
As Heady (42, p. 163 and p. 149) demonstrated, areas of irrational re­
source combinations are inevitable under the conditions of small-scale 
production. 
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Input of C 
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0 L 
Input of labor 
Pig. 2*1* Isoquant exhibiting some areas of irrational resource 
combination of small farms 
In ranges la and bQ of the above isoquant, both capital and labor 
could be used in smaller quantities without a decrease in the aggregate 
output* Small farms usually apply either more labor or more capital, or 
more of both, than the upper limit of the rational use (OC or OL re­
spectively) in order to produce a given output* This point was very 
relevant in Hungary, where capital was the limiting factor of production, 
and at that time quite a few people believed that the land reform had 
created almost unlimited substitatibillty between labor and capital* 
Another fora of isoquant depicting small-scale production may provide 
a direct answer to the latter misbelief* 
Di Figure 2*2 and Q2Q2 are Isoquants indicating combinations 
of labor and capital (and all nonlabor) inputs which produce the spec­
ified levels of output (Qg ^  Qj)* 
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Fig* 2.2. Isoquant with limited substitutibillty between labor and 
capital 
If the amount of capital available is OC^, then at least amount 
of labor is necessary to produce Given the form of isoquant» neither 
the capital required will decrease nor the level of output will increase 
as labor input rises from OL^ to 01^ or even to Olg# Labor iiçut must be 
less than OL^ (111% OL*} and at the same time capital input shall be 
greater than (like OC*) ^ en substitutibillty between labor and 
capital exists along Isoquant Q^Q^, 
Labor input OLj is sufficient» on the other hand, for producing a 
larger output (Q2) If capital input is at least OC2* The marginal prod-
9 0 
uet of labor (MPP^) is zero in ranges aQj^ and bQ2» and it indicates the 
lack of substitutibillty, i.e. zero value for the rate of substitution 
(RTSj^ Q » rate of technical substitution of labor for capital =» 
= MPPx/MPPc » 0 ) . 
The intensity of production and average crop yields are of great 
importance in Hungary idiere population density is very high (10? persons 
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per square kilometer)o The density of the agrarian population is also 
high: 4«6 hectares of cultivated land per person engaged in agriculture* 
But average crop yields (per hectare) increased too slowly after the 
19^5 land reform. In 1948 the average crop yields were still lower than 
a decade before* 
Table 2,6* Average crop 3rields in Hungary before and after Vforld War II® 
(tons per hectare) 
Crop 1938 1948 
Wheat 1*62 1*12 
Com 2*21 2*09 
Sugar Beet 21*42 15.30 
Potatoes 7.19 7.48 
^Source: ( 2% p* 46). 
Coaçaring Tables 2*6 and 2*4 shows that the problematic gap did not 
cease; on the contrary, it widened concerning the most inçortant crops* 
The uneconomic small size of holdings did not permit inprovement in 
msthcds of cultivation* 
The final economic lesson of the 1945 Hungarian land reform was muda 
like the evaluation of the United Nations* publication (62, pp* 71-72) 
about the former land reforms in this geographical area: "The Eastern 
European experience in this period (after World War I) showed that a 
change in the scale of farm operation, if it is to be successful in 
raising the standard of living and promoting development, must be followed 
by a change in the type of production; and this change will not take 
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place simply as a result of peasant ownership ••• It showed also that 
land refona ... is not a sufficient remedy of rural overpopulation#" 
The lesson of the 19^5 remedial action is that land reform cannot be 
considered separately either from the whole fam organization or from 
the overall eonoaic development. Li the light of the Hungarian experi­
ence, Gittinger (35, p. 241) is inevitably right in sasring "To be most 
effective» agrarian reform must be continuous; one major reform .«• 
may only succeed in starting a cycle that leads to future need for 
another major reform." 
The Hungarian peasantry had not reached port and had not arrived 
at the Promised Land by the sailboat of the 19^5 land reform. 
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CHAPTER III. THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURE 
During the past twenty-five years two radical changes shaped the 
structure of Hungarian agricultures the land refera in 19^5 and the 
socialist transformation between 19^9 and 1961, largely conçleted in 
1960-1961. In 19^5, large estates were liquidated and the agricultural 
structure changed over to small-scale farming# As a result of the 
socialist transformation in 1961» about three thousand cooperative and 
state farms were in existence to carry on large-scale agricultural pro­
duction; in addition, almost a million of household plots remained or 
were brought into being. 
%e transformation^ of agriculture along large-scale collective 
lines took place about sixteen years after the land reform* Its politi­
cal and economic purpose was to raise the output and efficiency stand­
ards of Hungarian agriculture, sadly deficient in many respects, to 
a higher, more up-to-date level through the establishment of large-
scale sociauList farms. 
Periods of the Socialist Transformation 
Following the land reform, Hungarian agriculture went through a 
period of reconstruction before the large-scale socialist transformation 
definitely started* 
In the period of reconstruction (1945-1949) characterized in the 
^The terra "reorganization* was used to denote this transformation 
process in Hungary and in most other socialist countries. 
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last section of Chapter 11» the traditional small-scale individual farms 
made up the country's farm sector in »rtiich most work was manual and there 
were not even enough draught animals* Consumers* cooperatives* marketing 
cooperatives and cooperatives for savings and loans were active in the 
countryside but only a couple of fanners* cooperatives existed in the 
sphere of production prior to 1948. 
In 1948 by means of an association of individual tenants and 
peasant farming without draught animals, cooperative farms came into 
being in larger numbers# At the same time a network of state machine 
stations was created as a technical basis for large-scale farming* The 
number of cooperative farmers increased from 19^8 to 1953 when some of 
the cooperatives were dissolved; in. 1955 there was an increase again* 
3h 1956 many farmers withdrew from the cooperatives ; in 1957» however, 
the consolidation and expansion of farmers * cooperatives began again, 
although still at a moderate pace. In 1959 the organization of cooper­
ative farms made a new start and extended a great numbers of fanners 
who were still operating individually* This process continued in I960 
and also in I96I when socialist large-scale farms became predominant 
in Hungarian agriculture* 
The figures of Table 3*1 pinpoint the changes in the number of 
farmers* cooperatives and their members*^ 
^The significant temporary decrease in numbers of cooperative farms 
and cooperative members was due mainly to political reasons both in 
1953 and 1956. 
After 1961 some of the smaller cooperatives were united and the 
decrease in the number of cooperative members was mostly due to their 
retirement* 
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Table 3.1. Number of farmers* cooperatives and their members* 
Year Number of cooperative farms Number of cooperative members 
1950 2,185 119,527 
1952 5,110 369,203 
1953 4,536 250,009 
1954 4,381 229,952 
1955 4,816 305,501 
1956 2,089 119,315 
1957 3.394 155,794 
1959 4,489 564,568 
i960 4,576 960,311 
1961 4,523 1,182,894 
1962 4,019 1,164,340 
1965 3,524 1,098,301 
1969 2,840 1,023,937 
1970 2,676 1,035,019 
*Sourc68: (52, p* M5» 77, pp. 173,176). 
Daring the first part of the socialist transformation, from 19^ 
to 1956, an attenqpt vas made to apply a uniform cooperative model largely 
resembling the structure of the kolkhoz in the Soviet Union. An atteiqot 
was also made to increase production in the new cooperatives through prop­
aganda campaigns and the rigid enforcement of large-scale farming patterns. 
Such methods were unlikely to lead to success, since a number of methods 
unsuitable to agricultural technology were imposed by central government 
bodies, and because organisational patterns alone could not make up for 
the lack of capital and professional skill. 
Beginning with 1957, in the concluding period of the socialist trans­
formation, a substantial change occurred, not without producing its re­
sults. The increase of large-scale socialist enterprises was fortunately 
no longer coupled with the enforcement of rigid cooperative and farming 
patterns: the up-to-date methods and the experience of socialist and 
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capitalist countries were critically considered and adapted to Hungarian 
conditions» and the experience at home served as a basis for iiq>rovemant« 
There were, of course, unsuccessfol experiments in this period as well, 
but they were corrected through practice* And the useful small-farm tra­
ditions came into their own again, especially on the household plots of 
cooperative members, and — due to initial shortages in modem large-
scale capital equipment — in many fields even within the framework of 
large-scale farming.^ 
Changes in Social Stratification 
As a result of socialist transforsaation, there was a complete change 
in social stratification and in the whole production pattern of agricul­
ture, Li the years prior to the land reform, 6 per cent of the farm fam­
ilies belonged to the upper social group of the peasantry^, 25 per cent 
were middle peasants, and 69 per cent were poor peasants. After the land 
reform the number of landless fann laborers decreased by half a million, 
whereas the number of independent farmers considerably increased» 
Following the socialist transformation, the largest group of the 
farm population was made up of cooperative members (without assisting 
family members) approximately two-thirds of the whole; state-farm work­
ers formed the second largest group, with nearly one-fifth of the 1962 
agricultural employment# 
^The mechanics and procedures of developing from the small-scale 
privets famss to large-scale socialist farms as well as the major social 
and economic features of cooperative farming will be discussed in Chap­
ter VI. 
2 Mambers of this group are known as kulaks in Russian history. 
An occupational restratification of the whole population also took 
place after 1949» particularly at the beginning of the fifties. The most 
characteristic feature of this process was the considerable decrease in 
the size and proportion of the agricultural population. The number of 
the latter reached its maximum in 19^; since then it has decreased. Up 
to 1949 around 50 per cent of all those ençloyed worked in agriculture, 
today (1970) only about 28 per cent. Those who left agriculture at first 
found Jobs mainly in industry and later in the field of services. 
The socialist transformation has hastened the disappearance of the 
traditional way of peasant life, a process which is going on everywhere 
in the world. 
In Hungary the urban population went up by 17.8 per cent from 1949 
to 1960^, the village population rose by only 3 per cent, and the number 
of villages with decreasing populations was larger than that of villages 
•where there was a small increase (23). 
Another change in the Hungarian countiyside is that the population 
is no longer a homogeneous occupational group of peasants working on 
farms. Many of the villagers no longer work in agriculture, though a 
significant proportion of them continue to make their permanent homes in 
the villages. 
Technical Progress in the New Farm Organization 
The first stages of modem technical progress in Hungary coincided 
with the socialist transformation. The transformation of agriculture was 
initiated with a greater supply of tractors lAich quickly replaced 
census was taken in 1949, I960 and in 1970. 
draught animais» The tractors and other modem equipment were not divis­
ible according to the extremely small size of actual peasant holdings. 
Howevar» Hungarian experience has shown that pachine indivisiblities can 
be overcome through cooperative ownership and cooperative use of equip­
ment with large capacity and high fixed costs. This point is clearly made 
by Ready (42, p. 378) in the context of family farms. But in the first 
part of the socialist trans formation (1949-1956) neither sufficient ma­
chines nor modem means of production and materials were as numerous as 
required. In the second part (1957-1961) large quantities of new ma­
chines, equipment, and chemicals were made available, certain up-to-date 
technical elements were introducedp but really modem technological 
systems did not replace the old ones until the end of the socialist 
transformation (I96I). 
Technical development in Hungarian agriculture may be characterized 
by the following comprehensive indices (23); 
— the manpower per unit (100 hold) of agricultural land increased 
from 12.7 in 1930 to 13.9 by 1949, but dropped to 9.4 in 19635 
— the index of machines and materials of industrial origin increased 
from 100 in 1939 and 1949, to 293.4 by I963. 
Technical progress, in its widest form, the substitution of farm 
labor by capital equipment, was mainly dus to the following (23)» 
— tho tractor power used in agriculture greatly increased (the 
traction power ratio to one laborer was .54 in 1938; after its drop to 
.44 in 1950, it increased to «57 by 1963)1 the ratio of mechanical to 
animal traction dianged entii*ely in the same period (expressed by round 
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figuras this ratio was 10*90 in 1938, 20x80 in 1950; 78*22 in 1963)» 
— the use of fertilizers increased from a very low levf/1 per hold» 
from 79*5 kilograms in 1959 to 142.2 in 1963» 
— the area set for reclamation of soil in a year increased more 
than thirty times (from 5,000 hold in 19^7 to 155*600 hold in 1963)» 
— the use of chemical weed-killers more than doubled (thesa were 
used on 379,000 holds in I960, increasing to 814,000 in 1963)» 
Rapid technical progress started to develop a few years after 1961 
following the socialist transformation. But even this progress has not 
been spreading evenly. In some branches (broilers, wheat, com) it has 
achieved high speed. In others (hogs, vegetables, fruit, wine), it is 
developing, but some areas (dairy, pasture) it has made little advance. 
Looking at the present situation, one might say that the scientific-
technical revolution of our age has been conqueidng Hungarian agriculture 
largely since 1957* At first state farms took the lead in technical de­
velopment; recently, however, the cooperative farms have been closing 
the gap* 
Soma Organizational Aspects of the Socialist Transformation 
Cooperative groups and farmers' cooperative 
Ihe socialist transformation was finally carried out through the 
principle of voluntary enrollment in cooperatives. The peasantry of each 
village was free to organize more than one cooperative, and the small 
holdings could be united in agricultural or farmers* cooperatives of 
different types. Cooperatives of Types I and II, the agricultural coop­
erative groups, include only crop production carried out collectively. 
37 
Cooperatives of Type III, agricultural cooperative farms or agricultural 
producers* cooperatives» also produce livestock jointly and hold it in 
common (cooperative) property, except for that kept on the household 
plotso This third type of cooperative has come to predominate, but some 
cooperative groups of the other tvo types continue to exist* 
Cooperatives of Type III have also become the "^principal form" of 
farming in Hungary# As producers® cooperatives they are collectively 
owned by the members who are both the partners and workers in a large-
scale farm operation. The cooperative farm is managed on the basis of 
collective responsibility and for their own account» Each cooperative 
elects its own executive organs and management personnel# 
It was an essential characteristic of the socialist transformation 
that the peasants joining the cooperatives might keep as their household 
plot a maximum of 1 cad* hold (0#57 ha) of land, with one cow and its 
progeny^, and pigs and poultry without limit# Thus, side by side with 
the large-scale collective-cooperative farms, a part of agricultural 
production has remained in the sphere of household farming# The house­
hold farming of cooperative members, as later discussed in more detail 
from different aspects» is connected in various foms with the collective 
large-scale farming® 
^later this limit set by the centrally approved Cooperative Statute 
was abandoned and the right of limitation was placed under the authority 
of General Assembly in each cooperative# 
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State farms 
During the socialist transformation, state farms were also organised 
as publicly owned large-scale socialist firms for the provision of 
agricultural pi-oduots, Ihey resemble in organisational character the 
state-owned industrial and business firms# their direction, inner organ­
ization, and management being similar* At the end of the socialist trans­
formation, state farms occupied roughly one-tenth of the ploughland# 
Their actual role, however, has been substantially greater in technical 
progress and in modem capital foimation than would correspond to their 
territorial proportion* îhey are not simply farms conducting market 
production on a large-scale but were designated to provide the other 
farming sectors with improved seeds and breeding stock of outstanding 
quality, at the same time setting an example in the application of 
scientifically-founded, up-to-date methods of production and management# 
For many years state farms were given priorities in the distribution of 
the very limited capital supply and investment funds available for agri­
culture* (This is the reason why a substantial difference of fixed assets 
still exist between an average state farm and an average cooperative 
farm* Table 4.2 will show this difference*) 
If one adds to the state and cooperative sector the land allotted to 
workers on state farms as part of their pay in kind, and one also adds 
the group of so-called subsidiary farms consisting of plots less than 
0*57 ha which belong to those vho employed in socialist industry, mining, 
communication, etc., one can see the complex structure of the socialist 
sector in Hungarian agzdculture. As the data show, the share of the 
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individual peasant farms has generally become rather insignificant* 
The main characteristics of the extensive and ms^tllateral process 
of socialist transformation were, however, the emergence of cooperative 
farming and the development of the farmers* cooperative as a predominant 
cooperative form of agricultural organization* 
Socialist Transformation with Private Land Ownership 
When, on the one hand, land reform put an end to the feudal distri­
bution of land ownership In Hungary, on the other, it no doubt strength­
ened an attitude of private ownership* Just as it was socially necessary 
to carry out the "democratic'* transformation of 19^5 by passing the land 
into small-scale ownership9 it was socially necessary during the socialist 
transformation not to nationalize the land of the peasant farmers lAo 
joined the cooperative* As Fekete ( 26, Chapter VII ) analyzed it from 
the viewpoint of the theory of land rant, the collective form of land 
ownership was not considered an end in Itself but rather as a means of de­
veloping socialist agriculture* 
The government had to reckon with the strong — and between 19^5 
and 1948 even strengthening — attitude among the Hungarian peasantry 
in favor of private land ownership* It is relevant here that the law-
Decree No* 7 of 1959 ( the first comprehensive high-level statute con­
cerning the formation of producers* cooperatives and their operation) 
regulated the acquisition of land and the obligation to pay land rent 
in a very full and differentiated way* At that time there were voices iii 
favor of transferring the land ownership at once to the producers* 
cooperatives as organizational units* lAidoubtedly the forced Intro-
40 
duotion of cooperative land ownership when the cooperatives were first 
established would have delayed the lAole process of the socialist trans­
formation* 
A workable solution was found» whereby only the use of the land 
entered into the cooperative was socialized* But because the three parts 
of ownership concept (right of use, right of possession» right of dis­
position) are closely interconnected» the socialization of the right of 
use necessarily involved a redefinition of the right of ownership* The 
socialization of the right of use also practically meant the socialization 
of the right of possession* 
The right of disposition was treated differently* Part of this right 
ceased; lands in cooperative use could no longer be bought or sold or 
mortgaged* Another part of the right of disposition was transferred to 
the cooperative : for exanple, the voluntary exchange of land between the 
cooperative and its member in allocating household plots* At the same 
time the cooperative member can still exercise definite rights inç>ortant 
to the individual: e*g« he may dispose of his land by will* 
Law Decree No, 7 of 1959 also regulated in detail the inheritance 
of lands which were in the use of the large-scale enterprises of pro­
ducers* cooperatives* The essence of this regulation was that the gen­
eral rules govern such inheritance, but if the inheritor was not a 
member of the given producers* cooperatives — although he still in­
herited the title to the land — he had to lease the land to the cooper­
ative for an unlimited tera*^ 
^In 1968 this regulation changed, particularly in favor of the in­
heritors as discussed in Chapter VI* 
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Under these legal conditions the joining member was obliged to hand 
over to the producers* cooperative for common use all land owned, leased 
or otherwise used by him and by members of his households* Of course» 
this did not include the household plot since its land is in the personal 
ownership of the cooperative member. 
Leaving the land title in the register intact and the careful regu­
lation of inheritance, basically respect the attitude and attachment of 
the cooperative member to his private land ownership* At the same time, 
the cooperative fonn of the right of use and possession has removed a 
part of internal content of private land ownership and has brought it 
closer to social (cooperative) ownership. ïhe member can exercise only 
part of his ownership rights; this fom of private land ownership is 
called by jurisprudence "partial private ownership^•** 
New Developments in International Conçarison 
j^art from land ownership, the socialist transformation of Hungarian 
agriculture came to an end as a practical application of the Marxist 
theory. Hie major relevant theses of the classical Marxist theorists may 
be summed up as follows; 
—• the social ownership of land; 
— the development of large-scale collective firms with the form 
of farmers* cooperatives or state farms; 
— the system of farming in large-scale socialist enterprises to 
be carried out on a collective plan; 
^Ih my book (26, pp. 272-279) written before the law came out, 
I used the term "wstricted private land ownership." 
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— the progress of the sowoalled productive forces achieved by 
applying advanced technology and scientific farming methods in the large, 
collectively owned enterprises. 
At the beginning, the socialist countries established in Europe after 
the Second WG?ld War singly took over the Soviet model unchanged* With 
different conditions prevailing in these countries, this approach be­
came an obstacle to the socialist transformation of agriculture. In two 
countries ^  Jugoslavia and Poland — it led to an evident break in the 
progress of socialist transformation, with the result that although a 
certain cooperative framework has developed in both countries, this 
differs considerably from that followed in the rest of the socialist 
countries* Poland, as in the Soviet Union, state farms have signifi­
cantly grown In scopes; but small individual farms dominate in number* 
In the Soviet Ibiion the central decisions adopted in September 
1953 started to put an end to the fomerly rigid structure and uniform 
development of cooperatives* Major socio-economic changes followed (2?)* 
<— New methods of macroeconomic planning were introduced giving 
the collective fazms more scope for Independent decisions* 
— "Rie role of the agricultural machine stations (which formerly 
acted as servicing fiims as well es control of the government at the 
same time) changed, and large-scale agricultural machinery passed into 
the possession of the collective farms* 
— Conçsulsory deliveries of produce to government agencies were 
abolished and a new price system gradually appeared* 
Basically the same steps were undertaken in Hungary as well as in 
the other socialist countries, but not in a rigid pattern — rather 
in aooordance with the special conditions of the countries concerned* 
In Hungary the socialist transformation was completed by 1961; in 
Bulgaria earlier; in Czechoslovakia at the same time; in the German 
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Democratic Republic and in Rumania shortly afterwards* 
A number of further significant changes occurred in the organi­
zational structure of cooperative fanning. The most decisive of these are 
the following: 
— With the representative social organs of the cooperatives estab­
lished at both a nation-wide and regional level, the scope of authority 
of the central and local government administration has been restricted 
to the functions of legal state control. 
— Highly diversified fonus of management and work organization are 
emerging in the cooperatives, with the principles of cooperative democ­
racy and autonomy asserting themselves in an increasingly consistent 
pattern. 
"Die right to household plots of individual members has been 
fiimly recognized, including the right to make use of cooperative equip­
ment in the cultivation of individual plots, 
]h reviewing the socialist transformation the organic progress vrtiich 
modified the organizational relationships within the cooperatives deserves 
special attention. The transformation itself was mainly the result of 
political measures which could not fulfill the complex task of creating 
large-scale collective enterprises in fall operation. It, however, could 
create a new organizational framework, expressing the social values of 
the working people and the political priorities of the governing organs. 
In the period of consolidation (1962-196?), the organizational 
framework and the internal cooperative relations were stabilized, and 
well-proved forms of cooperative democracy and efficient management were 
widely consolidated. Ihis was the phase lAen various local solutions had 
to be found within the internal farm organization. 
The recent period started in 1968; its beginning is marked by the 
reform in the direction of the economy and by the codification of the 
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new cooperative law»^ 
State, Cooperative and Private Sectors in Hungary's Economy 
Ihe 1969 data of national income clearly show the organisational 
structure of Hungary's economy* The proportion of the three major sectors 
has been essentially the same since the organisation of large-scale cooper­
atives and state farms took place. 
Table 3.2. The sowces of Hungary's national income by economic sectors 
in 1969®^ 
Sector Per cent 
State sector 77 
Cooperative sector 20 
Private sector 3 
National Income, total 100.0 
fsourcei (77, p. 5). 
Table 3o3 Employment in the major sectors of Hungary's national economy 
(in percentages)^ 
Sector 1959 1968 
State sector 54.1 65oO 
Cooperative sector 8.8 30.9 
Private sector 37.1 4.1 
Active earners, total 100.0 100.0 
^Source: (77, pp. 8-9). 
^Both will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
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Distribution of employment in the national economy also demonstrates 
the changes in the proportions of the three sectors* "Die breakdown of 
those in engiloyment by social sectors at the beginning of 1959 and 1968 
is shown by Table 3«3« 
By the middle of I969 — lAen the total population amounted to 
10*25 million — the number of those employed was exactly 5 million (76)# 
The sectorial distribution of active earners of agriculture is 
shown in Table 3*4* 
Table 3*4. Sectorial distribution of active earners in agriculture, 1969* 
Sector Persons (1,000) Per cent 
State sector 176*8 12*8 
Cooperative sector 1,146*4 83*2 
Private sector 55*6 4.0 
Total in agriculture 1,378*8 100*0 
^Source: ( ^, p* 204)* 
A breakdown by numbers of those eaçloyed in vaidous economic branches 
also shows the process of industrialization* In 1950, the total number 
of those employed in agriculture amounted to 52 per cent, with only 19 
per cent employed in industry; by 1969, however, this proportion dianged 
to 35 per cent in industry and 30 per cent in agriculture. In 1969, 
active agricultural earners made up 27*6 per cent of the total number 
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of activa earners (76* 77). 
The sectorial division of cultivated land also developed in line with 
the socialist transformation# 
Table 3*5* The distribution of total arable land among state# cooperative 
and private fams in 1969® 
Sector Per cent 
State farms 14.1 
Cooperative farms of all types 80.3b 
Private farms 5.6® 
Total 100.0 
^Source: (77, p, 177)* 
^This figure includes the land area of household plots which made tq> 
9*8 per cent, "Riis figure also includes the land area of cooperatives 
other than producers' cooperatives whidi made up 3*7 per cent* 
^Including the auxiliary farming of people with non-agricultural 
occupations* 
From different aspects, the proportion of major agricultural sectors 
may be shown in details. 
Fazekas (25) calculated that in 1964 half of the people engaged in 
productive activities — roughly two million "breadwinners" — were 
eiqoloyed in the so-called agribusiness sector, in which he included the 
marketing and processing of agricultural products, and manufacturing 
of production means for agriculture. Fazekas also included forestry 
in this sector but excluded the agricultural sphere of banking and 
other financial services (e.g. local and r^glwial savings and loan 
associations). 
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Table 3,6, The share of state faros « cooperatives and homeplots in land 
use and in the output,1969 (in percentages)® 
State 
farms 
Cooperatives^ Household 
plots 
Others® 
Agricultural area total 15.5 77.8 9.5 6.7 
Arable land 14.1 80.3 9.8 5,6 
Gardens, orchards, vine­
yards 14,4 61.0 25.7 24.6 
Cattle stock 12.0 78.0 56.5 10.0 
Pigs 17.6 63.6 33.3 18.8 
Poultry stock 9.0 62.0 54*0 29.0 
Gross production of agri­
culture 16.0 70.0 24.0 14.0 
Procurement 21.5 71.4 15.0 7.1 
^Source? (77p pp. 177, 1%, I85), 
^Including household plots, 
^Including private farms* 
The dimensions of enterpzrisQs and the size of farms have also changed* 
A new, basically large-scale organization has emerged in the place of al­
most two million "minifundia.* Before the start of the socialist trans­
formation over one million of these small farms had fewer than three hec­
tares of land, and only & few ware of the maximum size of 14,5 hectares* 
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Growth and the Level of Eoonomic Development 
The damage of the Second World War to Hungary's national economy 
amounted to $ 4,000 - 5,000 million. Due to the losses in productive 
capacity, inventories and manpower, the national income in 1945 "" 1946 
consisted of only 45 per cent of that in 1938 - 1939o Ten per cent of 
the national income was spent on reparations and another 6 per cent on 
the most urgent reconstruction wo%4c« After the war the country went 
through a severe inflation# 
Economic reconstruction was successful so that the pre-war level 
of national income was reached in general by 1949» At that time, per 
capita national income was about $ 240# 
Since the end of the reconstmction period (1949) Hungary's national 
income has grown as shown in Fig# 3*1# 
loo 
ISO 
100 
Fig# 3*1* The growth of Hung&iy's national income (1949 = 100) 
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Pig. 3.1 depiots an annual Increase of 5*7 per cent. The graph 
clearly shows the trend; Hungary's national income grew from $ 2,100 
million in 19^9 to $ 7,400 million in 1969. The latter sum corresponds 
to a gross national product of $ 8,700 million# 
Per capita national income in Hungary was some $ 720 in 1969. Thus, 
as generally regarded by the level of economic development, Hungary's 
place is at the lower limit of that group of European countries to which 
Austria, Gtedioslovakia, and Italy belong at a somewhat higher level. At 
the same time, Hungary's place is above the higher limit of that group 
to which Spain, Portugal and Greece belong. Therefore, Hungary is 
considered as a member of the group of medium-developed European countries. 
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CHAPTER IV. SCALE RETURNS, FARM SIZE AND CHANGES IN FARM ORGANIZATION 
The transformation of Hungary's agriculture was definitely associ­
ated with radical changes in the number and size of farms# For this 
reason, it is worthwhile to deal with some aspects of scale and sise 
relationships in this chapter*^ After brief theoretical qualifications, 
the scale-size implications of both the land reform and the socialist 
transformation will be discussed* Finally the farm size and organisa­
tional units of the Hungarian agriculture will be described. 
Returns to Scale and Farm Size 
The conceptual problems of scale and size are thoroughly analyzed 
by authors of agricultural economics and mlcroeconomlc theory (^1» ^2, 
49, 50). 
Pure scale relationships are considered only -rfien all inputs are 
increased by the same proportion. This qualification inçilles that any 
pure scale relationship is conceived as a long-run concept. If output 
Increases by the same proportion as eadi input, then there are constant 
returns to scale. If output expands by a greater (smaller) proportion 
than inputs, then increasing (decreasing) returns to scale prevail in 
production. 
Scale relationships are based on long-fun production functions, 
no factor of which is fixed in quantity and all factors of lAiich rep­
resent one single aggregate resource in effect. Heady ( 42 ) conducted 
^Chapters IX and X will discuss certain implications of optimisa­
tion to farm size under alternative objective functions of the large 
cooperative enterprise and under those of the members' households. 
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research on scale relationships using the technique of elasticity of 
production, considering different factors separately, applying cost 
functions as well as anal3^ing external and internal economies* Holdren 
(50) eiqphasizes that the microeconomic theory of scale relationships 
has been worked out thoiroughly only for an individual activity or 
process of production» Farms and management units within large farms 
(the latter correspond to the plants of a business firm) are, of course, 
operating with multiprocess» A complex pi-oduction function for a prod­
uct and for a farm can be derived by applying intermediate processes 
and by the application of the theory of joint production» 
In order to give returns to scale a quantified meaning, the follow­
ing single-product, multi-input production function Is applied 
q — f (xi* «**, »•», 3^) (^«l) 
vhere q is output level, the x^ are resource inputs (l = 1, •»», m). 
After multiplying eadi Independent variable by some positive number» 
c. Equation 4.1 becomes 
bq » f (cxj, cXj^, . », cXj„) • (4.2) 
The new product output equals b times the previous one. If 
b  =  c  o r  c ~ ^ '  (4 . 3 )  
constant returns are the case. If: 
decreasing returns to scale are in existence. The returns to scala are 
given the same precise meaning by using the concept of elasticity of 
b > c  o r  ^ > 1 »  
increasing returns to scale prevail, and if 
(4.4) 
b < c or y < 1 , (4.5) 
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production which is the ratio of the marginal product (MPP) and the 
average product (AP)* In this case b stands for MPP and c represents 
AP in Expressions 4.3 - 4,5, 
The meaning of scale returns may be further clarified by the concept 
of homogeneity of production functions. In all regions of a homogeneous 
production function, the returns to scale are the same* either constantt 
Increasing at a particular rate, or decreasing at a particular rate. As 
a rule, nonhomogeneous production functions possess at least two of the 
possible three cases and may also have regions of constant, increasing, 
and decreasing returns to scale. 
The scale returns implications of a generalized-type nonhomogeneous 
production function are sho^n on the following diagram. 
0 
Scale 
Fig, 4,1, Nonhomogeneous production function maintaining increasing, 
constant, and decreasing returns to scale 
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Between points 0 and A the above nonhomogeneous production function 
has increasing returns at a decreasing rate to scale. In the region between 
points A and B, this function has constant returns to scale. In the sec­
tion following point B, the given function eriiibits decreasing returns 
at an increasing rate to scale. It may be noted that a non-homogeneous 
production will not give rise to a straight-line expansion path on the 
map of its isoquants. 
Distinction between scale relationships and proportionality is made 
by referring to the time dimension and its characteristic production 
function. In contrast with pure scale relationships and their production 
function — defined as having no fixed factor — proportionality relation­
ships involve the short-run production functions of >riiich one or more fac­
tors are fixed. In the long-run planning period» time is long enough to 
establish the minimum cost process such that the decision maker may 
consider all the relevant areas and forms of the production function. 
The above short-run implies that the decision maker cannot freely vary 
the rate at which he makes use of the services flowing from the fixed 
factor(s).^ 
Di the economic literature the concept of size is more frequently 
encountered, and this concept may be conceived of as a sort of extension 
of the concept of pure scale relationships. In Heady's definition 
(42, p. 361), the term of size refers to "different firm or plant 
capacities which are possible through expansion by either the scale or 
^Holdren (50) realizes also another kind of short-run in which 
time is not sufficiently long "to construct the relevant minimum coat 
process, but other process with higher unit costs may be constructed." 
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proportionality route or some combination of the two." The farm site is 
denoted by different levels of fixed factors in this vein. 
The concept of size expresses the fact that a farm is a firm having 
one or more geographically fixed plants, and In the long-run the relative 
quantities of production factors change since land available is limited. 
In connection with farm sizes Heady (44) argues that scale returns 
and efficient resource use are not tied directly to any form of land 
ownership. Under the conditions of private land ownership, major ineffi­
ciencies have arisen historically when privately-owned land is considered 
as the basis fori 
a« judging equity in case of borrowing capital; 
b. providing social security, especially concerning farmers lAo 
reach retirement age. 
It may be stated in general that returns and efficiency depend mostly 
on resources applied. 
The In^lications of Scale Returns to the Hungarian Land Reform 
Introducing the land reform of 1945, Hungarian policy makers might 
have possessed certain ideas about the prevailing scale returns and an 
liiq>lied objective concerning efficiency in order to relate returns to 
farm size.^ 
Representing the efficiency criterion by the output-input ratio (O/l) 
and considering the number of farms as the inverse of farm size, the 
Heady deals with the implications of scale returns to land reform 
programs in his courses at ISU. 
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three possible implications of scale returns to land (or, in general, 
to farm size) reform programs may be depicted by diagrams* 
The three curvatures of Fig» 4.2 represent alternative trade-offs 
between farm size and efficiency» Scale returns are the decisive factor 
that determines the nature of the three alternatives» In Fig. 4.2-A the 
slope of the curve expresses a trade-off which relies on decreasing 
returns to scale. As farm size becomes smaller and the number of farms 
increases (i.e. as one proceeds along the horizontal axis to the right), 
efficiency Inqoroves in terms of output per input* In Fig* 4*2-8 the trade­
off curve is horizontal and its zero slope (i*e* the lack of trade-off) 
is based on constant scale returns. In this case efficiency is not re­
lated to farm size and any number of farms results in the same output 
per input. Figure 4.2-C depicts the results of production possibilities 
which are characterized by Increasing scale returns. Here the curvature 
of the trade-off curve shows that efficiency improves (incidentally 
rather rapidly) when farm size increases* (i.e. as one moves along the 
size axis to the left). 
4.2-A 4.2-B 4.2-C 
Output 
per 
input 
Number of farms = (size)"^ 
Fig. 4.2. Efficiency under decreasing, constant, and increasing 
returns to scale 
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In the case depicted by Figure 4*2-C, there is clearly some sacrifice 
of efficiency if the number of farms is increased and average farm size 
is to be smaller* Exactly the opposite is the case if the actual produc­
tion possibilities are of such nature that they are reflected in the 
slope of the trade-off curve in Fig* 4.2-A. 
Which of the three relationships may have influenced the decision 
of policy makers when they voted for the land Reform Decree? The case of 
increasing returns to scale (depicted in Pig. 4.2-C) was clearly ruled 
out by action and by the reverse historical evidence of large feudal 
estates. Both the other two alternatives, however» might well have been 
in operation. Indifferences between various sizes and numbers of farms, 
i.e. the constant return case (shown in Fig. 4.2-B) may have been con­
sidered but were dominated by the political and social priorities at 
the same time. The version of decreasing returns to scale (characterized 
by Fig. 4.2mA) unequivocally may have sei'ved as an economic argument in 
favor of the land reform. In this respect» the inçlied objective function 
of the land reform was to Improve efficiency by increasing the number 
of owner-operated farms. This objective naturally Involved a decrease 
in the average size (scale) of farms. Smaller farms operating in the 
first phase of the classical production function were assumed to be more 
efficient. 
Scale and Size Aspects of the Socialist Transformation 
Decreasing returns to scale was evidently ruled out as the decisive 
relationship during the socialist transformation. From an economic point 
of view, the organization of large farms may explicitly have been sup­
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ported by the notion of increasing returns to scale (Fig. 4.2 C). 
In Hungary there has been no definite tendency of either increasing 
or decreasing the cooperative fam size (and of changing the number of 
cooperative farms respectively) for the last year or so. Prom a theo­
retical viewpoint, this fact may be considered as practical evidence that 
constant returns to scale is the relevant "size-determining" economic 
concept for policy makers and for cooperative decision-makers these 
days. 
Scale returns are directly related to farm size in a planned economy 
via a certain group of size-detemining socio-economic factors. As is 
thoroughly analyzed by Heady (41)^, farm size (Fg) is determined by 
three groups of relevant variables 
Fg = f (SAC, LAC; K,M,S; Pjj.Pq.i) . (4.6) 
The first group involves short-run (average) costs, SAC, and long-
run (average) costs, LAC, derived from the production function exhibi­
ting constant and/or increasing and/or decreasing returns to scale 
expressed by Equations 4.2 and 4.3, 4.4, 4,5» Ihe concept of scale re-
2 turns is closely connected with this group of size-determining factors. 
In the second group, K stands for capital supplied, M represents 
managerial abilities, and S syznbolizes socio-logical factors, such as 
family size, age of farm operators, properties of rural communities, etc* 
^In his recent lectures at ISU, too. 
^The classical t]ype of production function exhibits all the three 
variations of scale returns. 
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Capital availability is crucial in each form of farm organization» Socio­
logical factors are of special interest in cooperative farming# 
The components of the third size-determining group (input prices, 
product prices, and interest rates, i.e. the prices of borrowed capital) 
are becoming more and more important under the conditions of the new 
economic mechanism.^ 
Some aspects implicitly or explicitly considered by the policies of 
socialist transformation may be discussed from the viewpoint of external 
economies. 
The major types of external economies are mostly connected with 
pricing and economic policy* 
1# Farm output prices may be constructed as an increasing function 
of quantity sold. Such was the case during the early I960 *3 when cooper­
ative farms were paid a higher output price than small individual farms# 
This fact was explained by two basic reasons : 
a. newly formed cooperative enterprises required state price support 
in order to accumulate necessary funds for up-to-date large-scale oper­
ation within a relatively short time; 
b. trading companies could save expenses on transportation and 
handling if they brought large quantities from a farmers' cooperative 
instead of much smaller quantities from private farm units. 
^Most economists relate the inçjacts of technological variables and 
managerial factors to farm size. In addition to these. Heady (42) stresses 
the role of capital supply and uncertainty as the framework of farm 
decision-making. If uncertainty were not in existence, then the second 
group of size-determining variables would lose its great significance. 
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In this system a cooperative farm realized increasing prices if it 
sold a larger quantity. Categories were set for quantities marketed and 
each categoiy was given a separate price. 
The price break between cooperative and private farms as well as the 
existence of a certain stepped-price function for farmers' cooperatives 
may be expressed in terms of a pseudo-scale relationship of some sort 
Pq = f (q) , (4.7) 
and 
dP 
> 0 . (4.7a) 
dq 
This relationship supported the organisation and initial activities 
of large farms. 
2. Input prices may be set in such a way that these are a decreasing 
function of quantities purchased; in other words, input prices are a 
decreasing function of output produced 
Pjç = h (q) , (4.8) 
and 
dP_ 
— ( 0 . (4.8a) 
dq 
The economic reasoning for state support provided to cooperative 
farms was the same behind the lower input price and the higher output 
price mentioned before. Price policies and their pseudo-scale aspects 
reflected by Expi-essions 4.8 and 4.8a also contributed to the relatively 
fast development of Hungairlan cooperative farming in the decade of 
1957-1967. 
60 
3» Financial* mainly tax policy and credit supply policy, as wall as 
legislative actions, also promoted the operations of large state-owned 
and cooperative farms in certain periods of the socialist transformation» 
All three argnrnents raised before have shown aspects of the external 
economies operating in favor of larger farm size* In practice, however, 
internal (intrafarm) economies are likely to be more decisive in the 
advocacy of larger farm decision units. Internal economic forces are 
really responsible for why the long-run average cost curves decline in 
the range of relatively large outputs# Intrafarm (internal) economic 
forces promote the development of larger farms: 
a« output girows faster if more of some input is applied (in other 
words the index of production elasticity has a value which is larger 
than unity); 
b* the previous case is extended to the whole aggregate of resourced 
used in farming; 
c. divisibility of capital exists in the sense that larger fara 
equipment may be more efficient than smaller equipment; 
do discontinuity or "lunçlness" of capital (and investment) prevails 
— all the perceivable sizes of various farm equipment are generally un­
available; 
e. some other aspects of capital and technology are encountered, 
e,g. doubling the outside dimensions of a farm building may increase its 
inner (storage) capacity more than twice; 
f# divisibility and efficient distribution of labor (i.e, Adam 
Smith's famous argument in advocacy of larger scale operations) are in 
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existence. 
AU the factors listed are of a technological nature and have im­
portant implications on production costs in exactly the same manner as 
buying inputs in larger quantities may be associated with lower or dis­
count prices. Thus numerous internal economies may result in decreasing 
costs and in declining portions the long-run average cost curve over 
quite a wide range of larger farm size and greater farm output* 
Farm Size and Firm Decision Units 
During the years of socialist transformation (1949-1961) large-
scale cooperative farms and state farms^ were organized. Following this 
transformation period, a concentration process took place in both the 
state and the cooperative sectors of agriculture, as a result of which 
2 farm sizes were increased further. The number of decision units below 
Indicates both the result of the socialist transformation and the extent 
of the concentration process afterwards* 
There existed a few state farms before World War II, mainly to 
provide horses for the army. During the socialist transformation the 
major resource of expansion of state farms was the land of "rich peas­
ants* and others who left fanning mainly in the period of 1950-1952. 
^"Riis paper adopts Holdren*s (50) term of "decision unit* Instead 
of "unit of management" used in Hungarian statistics published in 
English. 
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Table 4.1, Decision units of the Hungarian agriculture in I960 and 1968* 
I960 1968 
State farms 333 208 
Agricultural producers* cooperatives^ 4,507 2,840 
Producers' cooperative groups 69 210 
PrWucers * cooperatives of fishers 21 22 
Cooperative associations® 127 215 
Private farms with land area bigger than 
0.57 hectare (number in thousands) 471 100 
®Souree: (77# p. 173), 
^For the details of this change see Table 2.1* 
^Specialized piroducers* groups and cooperatives producing grapes 
and fruit. 
In the state and cooperative sectors the average size of farms may­
be characterized by the fairly conplex set of data of Table 4.2, 4.3, 
and 4.4. 
An average state farm is generally much larger than an average 
cooperative farm and it is also reflected in the distribution of farms 
according to size. At the same time, the capital-labor ratio is con­
siderably different, mostly because of the capital supply system lAich 
was already referred to. 
Table 4.2 contains the most characteristic data with respect to 
the size of a typical state and cooperative farm* 
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Table 4.2. Average size of state and cooperative farms in 1968* 
State 
farms 
Agricultural 
producers' coop­
eratives 
Cultivated land, hectare 4,623 1,672 
Value of fixed assets, million forints 115.9 16.2 
Cumulated value of production, 
million forints 74.6 18.4 
Gross revenue, million forints 58.6 14.0 
Labor force (number of employees and 
members respectively) 756 379 
^Source* (77, pp. 175-176). 
A different grouping will be applied to tçive the characteristic 
distribution of state and cooperative fartas according to size. 
Table 4.3. The distribution of state farms according to size in 1966^ 
Ihe size of holding 
(in hectares) 
Share of farms in all state holdings 
number land area 
Below 1,150 7.9 1.3 
Between 1,151 - 2,300 18.6 6.9 
2,301 - 3,450 19.5 12.2 
3,451 - 4,600 15.8 13.3 
4,601 - 5,750 12,6 13.4 
5,751 - 6,900 7.0 9.2 
6,901 - 8,050 5.1 8.1 
Above 8,050 13.5 35.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
^Source t (52» p. 414). 
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Table 4.4 shows the distribution of cooperative farms according to 
size in a relevant grouping» 
Table 4.4. The distribution of cooperative farms according to size 
in 1966^ 
The size of landholdings Share of farms in all cooperative holdings 
(in hectares) number area 
Below 290 0.7 0.1 
Between 291 - 575 10.3 3.1 
576 - 1,150 32.3 18.4 
1,151 - 1,725 24.9 23.3 
1:726 - 2,300 14.6 19.0 
2,301 - 2,875 8.0 13.5 
2,876 - 3.450 4.6 9.4 
Above 3*450 4.6 13.0 
Land of intercooperative enterprises^ 
-
0.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
^Source» (52» p. 414). 
^Enterprises (e.g. broiler production, hog feeding) organized and 
managed by two or more cooperatives. 
The new framework of decision making and the recent form of farm 
organization in Hungary is perhaps best characterized by the data of 
Table 4.1. 
Output Performance and Commercialization 
About 60 per cent of the increase in agricultural output since 1945 
took place during the period following the end of the socialist trans­
formation in 1961* The increase in agricultural output taking place in 
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the socialist transformation period was due to deliberate efforts since 
this period did not enjoy above-average weather conditions and other 
benevolent natural factors (25), 
The gross cumulated output of Hungary's agriculture grew by 24 per 
cent between 1938 and 1966, •noncuimilated'* production by 33 per cent 
at constant prices of 1959*^ The 2*1 per cent increase per annum between 
1957 - 196? is the fastest growth rate of Hungarian agriculture output 
in our century» 
The yield of tAieat, the country's most important cereal, reached 
2.71 tons per hectares in 1969 and averaged 2.51 tons over the period 
1966 • 1969* This compares with 1.86 tons in the average years of I96I-
1965 and 1.34 tons in the period of 1931 - 1940. The average yield of 
com was 3*8 tons per ha in 1969» and 3*2 and 1.84 in the above peri­
ods (1, 76, 77). 
The speed-up growth is due, among others, to the fact that the 
capital supply, especially investments in mechanization and diemization, 
increased considerably since the beginning of the sixties. 
As a result of increasing output, Hungary has a good standing 
among the Eastern European countries concerning the magnitude of per-
capita agricultural products (exc milk). 
^In Hungarian statistics, cumulated output involves double (or even 
multiple) counting of materials (seeds, feeds) produced and used within 
the same farm (decision) unit. Noncumulated production excludes double 
counting of this sort. 
66 
Table 4,5, Farm products per capita in the Eastern European countries* 
Countries Cereals . 
kilogram 
Maat 
kilogram® 
Milk . 
liter® II
 
Bulgaria 643 59 190 16.25 
Czechoslovakia 712 70 331 21.0 
German Democratic Rep. 463 71.5 407 19.5 
Hungary 830 91.1 175 22.0 
Poland 575 66.6 456 16.5 
Rumania 654 40 200 13.0 
Soviet Union 521 49 345 12.0 
Jugoslavia 613 39.5 138® 9.0 
^Source; (36, p, 123I). 
^In 1968. 
«In 1967. 
^Ih 1970. 
®In 1966, 
Hungarian agriculture has become more commercialized as a result of 
increasing farm size. Market production (net commodity turnover) of agri­
culture increased by 55 per cent between 1938 and 1966 (calculated at 
constant prices of 1959)# The Increased level of commercialization is 
well reflected by the share of marketing in giHJss agricultural produc­
tion. 
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Table 4.6* Commodity turnover as percentage of gross agricultural 
production® 
Form of turnover I960 1968 
Purchase by state and cooperative trade 
companies 38.5 46.0 
Trade on free market 9.1 10.3 
Global turnover (sum) 47.6 56.3 
Repurchased by agriculture 8.3 7.5 
Net commodity turnover (as a part of 
agricultural output) 39.3 48.8 
^Source! (77, p, 17^) • 
^Generally based on contract and/or on forward pricing. 
Large farms are rapidly increasing their purchase of inputs of 
industrial origin# 
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CHAPTER V. CHANGES IN HUNGARY'S FARM ORGANIZATION: A MATHEMATICAL 
RESTATEMENT 
In this chapter simple models are presented in order to quantify 
the objectives and constraints which might implicitly have existed at 
the time of the land reform and during the socialist transfonnation» 
Ihe Land Reform Ihqpllcations 
It is assumed in this paper that the policy makers* economic ob­
jective was the maximization of the value of total agricultural output 
when they decided in favor of the land reform» This assun^tion has some 
logical basis in the great post-war food shortage and agriculture's role 
in export and employment» both shown in Chapter II* 
The implicit objective function of the land reform is written as 
Kmc r 7 » (5'1) 
iti A ^  
trtiere 
i = 1, •••» s the number of landowners, 
j = 1, n different agricultural products, 
Pj = the price of product j, 
= the quantity of product j produced on the land of person i. 
The upper limit placed by the Land Reform Decree on the size of 
landholding may be expressed as 
114 Lp + 57 Lfjp ^  H , (5.2) 
-.Aere 
Lp = number of landowners with agricultural occupations. 
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= number of landowners with nonagrloultiiral occupations, 
H = total agricultural land of Hungary, 
114 ha = maximum size of holding for Lp , 
57 ha = maximum size of holding for • 
The maximum limits were far from being typical in practice. Bie 
maximum size of granted land units was constrained as 
r^ <9*55 ha , (5*3) 
vhere 
r^ = the size of land granted to person i. 
The land area subject to expropriation restricted the number of persons 
actually benefited and mainly the size of their granted land# 
^ ^ i ^  3*2 million ha, (5*4) 
i=l 
where 
s° = the number of persons benefited by the reform. 
The inequality sign in Expression 5.4 states the fact that state-
owned forests and uncultivable land were also included in the expro­
priated area. 
The production matrix was thoroughly affected by the reform. The 
input mix changed. The small holdings used more labor relative to 
capital and land in comparison with the former large holdings. The crop 
mix also changed. Capital, both in its financial and physical form, 
became even more scarce. Labor still remained the only surplus factor. 
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A Note on the Feasibility of Alternative Objective Flinctions 
At the time of the land reform of 19^5 as well as somewhat later 
on, one often encountered opinions and hints that the direct objective 
of this reform was to maximize the output per land unit. This belief 
might well be supported by the fact that the only "success element* of 
the pre-reform agriculture was the relatively higher output performance 
per land unit on small-scale farms* Instead of Expression 5«1* the alter­
native objective function should have assumed the form: 
Max ^  , (5*ia) 
where 
Q = the value of agricultural output* 
The existence of Expression 5*la as an objective function» even in 
a slightly implicit form, may be rejected on the basis that the reform 
did not aim at any reallocation of resources after its conqjletion* The 
maximization of per-acre-output apparently should have required the 
reallocation of resources* not only between the latifundia and peasant 
holdings but also among the "minifundia*" 
In the view of Expression 5*la, the direction of resource allocation 
would be to channel all capital and labor away from enough hectares of 
â 
land so that H could be maximized on the remaining land area* 
Even a more relevant objective function could have been formulated 
during the land reform or shortly after: 
Max â- , (5.1b) 
where 
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CL = capital-labor input» 
Since labor was abundant and capital was scarce at that time, it would 
have required to satisfy the following conditions* 
= k , (5.5a) 
oCj^ 
and 
= k , (5«5b) 3«2. 
3C2 
and* 
= k , (5.5c) 
Equations 5.5a - 5.5c denote that the MPP per capital unit should have 
been equal on all farms. 
In short, both objectives expressed by Expressions 5.1a and 5.1b 
should have presumed the reallocation of resources among small-scale 
private farm decision units. This reallocation had become possible when 
the socialist transformation created large cooperative enterprises as 
resource pools by amalgamating the small peasant farms incapable of 
prosperous and efficient operation* 
Implicit Objective Rinctions in the Socialist Transformation 
The socialist transformation of Hungarian agriculture took place 
in favor of the working peasantry and reflected the vital interests 
of farm workers and small farmers. They were directly interested in 
finding a new organizational form of farming which would provide a higher 
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living standard and greater social security.^ The interests and objec­
tives of the newly established cooperative fanns as decision units are 
located at the medium level of an interest hierarchy discussed in the 
Introduction* Ihis section is concerned with the mathematical forms of 
social interests associated with the socialist transformation. Vftien the 
socialist transformation was initiated, the objective function of policy 
makers may have been the maximization of total agricultural value product» 
but this maximization was subject to the minimum^output-per-farm restraints 
expressing political priorities amd high social values attached to large-
scale farming at that time. Considering the new socialist organization, 
decision units took the place of landowners* 
The objectives function which may implicitly have existed durlJig 
the socialist transformation is written as* 
s n 
Mm 7 T (5.6) 
subject to 
"^ji^^ji • 
where 
1 = 1, s the number of decision units in socialist agriculture, 
j = 1, n different agricultural products, 
Pj = the price of product j. 
The old-age pension offered by the cooperative system proved to be 
a very strong stimulus for older farmers in joining the cooperatives. 
Chapter X will Investigate how other priorities and individual 
interests of farmers appear within cooperative farming. 
^Ihe relevant neso-zone of interests, i.e. the objectives and 
interests of cooperative finns as business enterprises are focused on 
in Chapter IX. 
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q,. = the quantity of product j produced on the farm of decision 
^ unit i, 
q . = minimum restraint on output of the j-th product for the i-th 
farm. 
This minimum constraint is also of implicit nature. (If possible, the 
constraint is even more implicit than the objective function here.) It 
reflects the consideration that policy makers and cooperative decision 
makers might have an idea of minimum fann size as a target variable 
of some sort. This minimally achievable farm size is denoted by a fixed 
level of output (lAiich is q^j^ for output j and farm i). 
During the socialist transformation, Hungarian agriculture made 
its contribution to the country's economic development in the following 
formst 
a* producing a larger amount of food for the increasing non-fam 
population; 
b# supplying raw materials for the corresponding industrial branches; 
c# providing export commodities in order to extend the Inçjort mate­
rial base of developing industries; 
d* producing "surplus" a part of which was taxed away in the forms 
of direct and indirect taxes; 
e. releasing labor force in large (in years 1951-1952 larger than 
optimal) quantities to support the economic development outside 
agriculture. 
In some periods of the socialist transformation, releasing labor 
force could be so important as to require a separate expression in the 
objective function. Labor transfer may assume the conqjletely separate 
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form of an objective function without simultaneous maximization of agri­
cultural output# Historical experience shows that appropriate constraints 
must take care of the target agricultural output (if such a target really 
exists in practice, as it should)* In this case Expression 5*^ has bo-
come 
Max A F (5*6a) 
subject to 
Pj ^ji - QP » 
where 
= the number of units of labor transferred from agriculture to 
other sectors, 
Qp = value of the target total farm output. 
Recalling some shorter periods of the socialist transformation in 
Hungary and in the Soviet Union, one may remember that Expression 5*6 
appeared in a much narrower form* The system of compulsory deliveries 
of farm products indicated that the "marketed" (released) part of out­
put gained first-rate importance in opposition to the total output, 
including farmers* self-supplying production and farm inputs. This 
narrower objective function is given by 
f y pT qKf . (5.6b) 
L L j jl 
ïrtiere 
= quantity of product j produced on the farm i and leaving 
^ agriculture through different channels, 
T Pj = purposefully depressed price of agricultural product j. 
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In Expression 5«6b the quantity superscript (NF) indicates that 
the first three forms stated previously were emphasized (probably over-
euq^hasized) among the five possible alternatives of agriculture's contri­
bution» The superscript (T) of prices resembles the fact that extremely 
low levels of producers* prices were also applied as a means of taxation 
in channeling agricultural "suiplus" (occasionally even more than that) 
to subsidize nonagrioultural sectors. (Ihis was listed in form d, be­
fore.) 
New Sets of Constraints 
Originating from the Socialist Transformation 
Hie socialist transformation created a completely new organization 
and resulted in a new set of restrictions* 
In contrast with the land reform of 19^5, the social transformation 
of the Hungarian agriculture did not impose a general maximum restriction 
on the size of landholding of farms; rather it implicitly contained 
minimum-output-per-farm restraints as stated in Expression 5*6# At the 
same time an upper limit was placed on the size of land belonging to the 
household plots of Individual cooperative members. Ihis maximum size of 
homeplot land was restricted* 
«m < 0.57 ha, (5.7) 
iriiero 
a^jj = the size of homeplot land of cooperative member m.^ 
^It was already mentioned that in most socialist countries as well 
as in the Soviet Union the cooperative farms allot a unit of homeplot 
land to every household and not to each cooperative member individually. 
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As a function of the actual number of cooperative members» the 
total land arsa used separately by cooperative households can be 
defined at any point of time as 
s* 
y a = H f (5*8) 
^ m h 
nF=i 
where 
m = 1, s*the number of cooperative members» 
H, = the country's land area used as homeplots by cooperative 
members* 
As a result of the socialist transformation» the pattern of land-
holding has resumed a mathematical form expressed by 
gi» s«i gi s* 
î ® v +  %  ^  * m  +  2  -  H  '  ( 5 . 9 )  
v=l u=l m=l z=l 
where 
V = 1, •••» s" the number of cooperative farms, 
a^ = the landholding of the v-th cooperative farm considering only 
the land area of the large-scale cooperative farm (i.e* 
excluding the land area of the homeplots of cooperative 
members)5 
u = 1, •••» s**' the number of state farms » 
a^ = the landholding of the u-th state farm, 
z = 1, ...» s* the number of agricultural decision units (land 
users) other than those mentioned above (this category is 
called "other farms*), 
a^ = the landholding of the z-th units in the group of other farms. 
The Expression 5*9 states the limited availability of farm land 
and it also allows the nonfarm uses of some arable land, whidi is in­
creasing in the process of urbanization» road construction, etc* 
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The labor constraints on production are given in decomposed form by 
s* s"' ^ s* 
2 by + ^ ^ bj. < F , (5.10) 
v=l u=l m=l 2=1 
where 
by = the number of units of labor used by the v-th cooperative 
enterprise, 
b^ = the number of units of labor used by u-th state farm, 
b^ = the number of units of labor used by the homeplot farm of the 
m-th cooperative member, 
b = the number of units of labor used by the z-th units of category 
of other farms, 
F = total labor amount available for agriculture. 
The functional form of the capital constraints reflects the fact 
that one part of agricultural capital is specifically adapted to the 
conditions of large-scale enterprises, and another part of the capital 
can satisfy only the needs of small-scale farming because of its physical 
form* 
The first part of capital constraint is given by 
gW gW 
2 *v ^v * ^ ®u ^  — ^ +u • (5*lla) 
v=l u=l 
vAiere 
®v» ®u ~ adaptation (a kind of production) coefficient, 
= capital used by the v-th cooperative enterprise, 
k^ = capital used by the u-th state farm, 
= total capital available on large-scale (state and cooperative) 
farms* 
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The capital constraint of the small-scale farm operations is 
expressed as 
®z ~ adaptation coefficients, 
kjjj = capital used by the m-th cooperative member's homeplot farm, 
kg = capital used by the z-th units belonging to the category of 
other farms, 
= total capital available for homeplot and other small-scale 
farm operations#^ 
A smaller than unity value of coefficient e^ expressed, for exartçlo, 
the fact that some production means (small plows, hoes, etc*) in the pos­
session of cooperative farms given by their joining members were not 
adaptable to large-scale operations. This was a characteristic during 
the first period of the socialist transformation. A value which is 
greater than unity for coefficient e^^ may reflect the situation dis­
cussed later vrtiere the homeplot faming of cooperative members is making 
tenç>orary use of large-scale equipment owned by the large cooperative 
enterprise. 
One may apply here also a constraint standing for non-agricultural 
inputs which support farm production from outside the agricultural 
sector. Such an input Is, for exançle, the capital embodied in the 
^Since epj and e^ as well as e^ and e^ may theoretically be defined 
as constant coefficients in any time period and k^, k^, k^, kg are given 
in money terms, the value of and can be conç>uted. 
(5.11b) 
where 
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country's education system which provides necessary conditions for agri­
cultural production. 
s" s"' s* s* . 
28v ^  ^  8u*^ 0» (5*12) 
where 
9v» ft *0 * fl ~ ® specified input (as education) other than 
^ " land, capital» and farm labor required by the 
previously described four sectors of Hungarian 
agriculture. 
The socialist transformation resulted in previously unknown values 
for coefficients a, b, e and k. Consequently» the production matrix of 
agriculture was changed almost completely. Ihe input mix of small-scale 
farm operations was also affected. As a result of extensive industrial 
development» labor ceased to be a surplus factor in the agriculture of 
most regions. In spite of its rapid growth, capital still remained a 
relatively scarce factor of fanning. The new social and political struc­
ture of the country, as well as the general economic and cultural develop­
ment» made a substantial change of positive character in 6. (For roads 
and communication facilities, etc. the same type of relationships are 
derivable as Expression 5»12 for education. Since each term is expressed 
in money form» an aggregate requirement of farming may also be confuted 
with respect to the whole "infrastructure" of the country in value 
terms.) 
Ety the time of the socialist transformation, national economic 
planning was introduced and the state sector became decisive or even 
exclusive in manufmcturing, in home trade as well as in foreign trade, 
and in the financial sector. Central planning created new opportunities. 
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especially for price policy and capital supply concerning large-scale 
fanning# 
Using Expression 5*1 as an implicit objective function, a relatively 
sinçle model of the land reform may be set up. A model of the socialist 
transformation may be constructed by using Expression 5#6 as an objective 
function and minimum constraints together with Expressions 5*9» 5*10* 
5*lla, 5.11b, and 5»12 as maximum constraints. It is obvious that the 
foregoing models present optimleation problems lAilch are naturally adapted 
to treatment by mathematical programming. There exists in each case an 
objective function whose variables are (implicit) functions of factors 
of production; i.e. the decision variables and the objective function 
variables can be connected by a production function. Finally, the problem 
is constrained by a set of inequalities involving the decision variables* 
The restatement in this chapter may also serve as a mathematical 
summary of the lAole Part I of this study. Hungjarlan cooperative farming, 
its major socio-economic characteristics and Its economic model will be 
presented in Part II. 
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PART 11$ 
COOPERATIVE MODELS 
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CHAPTER VI. THE MAJOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC FEATURES 
OF COOPERATIVE FARMING 
The location of cooperative fanns has been shown on the map of 
Hungary's farm organization. Now, a systematic procedure is presented 
for analyzing ideas and observations with respect to the cooperative 
form of farm organization. Chapters VI and VII provide a conçrehensive 
survey and mathematical models of the major social and economic charac­
teristics of Hungarian fanners' cooperatives. 
The Dual Character of Farmers* Cooperatives 
Socialist cooperative farming has thrown a new light on traditional 
farm organization. The United Nations* publication (62, p. 80) previously 
cited states* 
"The term *cooperative farm* covers several different kinds 
of fana organization, in which the principles of individual 
and joint ownership and operation are combined in differing 
degrees.* 
In practice there is much variety within the above general concept of 
the cooperative farm in lAich individual and collective objectives appear 
jointly and simultaneously.^ Within this unified general conception of 
the cooperative farm, farmers* cooperatives have developed as the chief 
form of decision units in socialist agriculture. 
the United States, different kinds of farmers* cooperatives are 
in operation, for example, the marketing cooperatives of the Associated 
Milk Producers, Inc. The cited definition is also applicable to farm 
organizations such as family corporations, partnerships, and trusts. 
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Today Hungarian farmers* cooperative has a clear-cut dual character. 
On one side it is a social organization, and on the other, an economic 
organization, primarily a business firm (enterprise). As a social organ­
ization it undoubtedly belongs to a wider category involving all cooper­
atives organized in the fields of marketing, retailing, services, housing, 
savings, and manufacturing. In this one-sided aspect there is no sub­
stantial difference between cooperatives and other social institutions 
(for example, trade unions) according to the Marxist theory of political 
organization* The real difference is the double character of the cooper­
ative as a social organisation and as an economic organization. 
Under the conditions of a socialist society, all types of cooper­
atives are of socialist character. Cooperative ownership as a form of 
socialist ownership, though different from state ownership which is the 
property of the nation, is by no means a lower-grade type. The cooperative 
organization is no less consistently socialist in its social character. 
It is, however, obviously a narrower form of ownership in conçarison with 
state ownership since the property of state-owned factories and farms are 
conceived of as the property of the whole nation. At the same time, co­
operative farms represent a much broader type of ownership in comparison 
with individually owned small farms*^ 
^It had been one of Stalin*s theoretical misconceptions that farmers* 
cooperatives (kolkhoz) represented a second-rate, non-consequent form of 
socialist ownership in contrast with a state-owned business firm or 
farm (sovkhoz). The linkage is not weak and not Imaginary between this 
concept and the actual policies symbolized by Expression 5*5b as an 
objective function. 
At the same time, Marxist theory validly emphasizes that cooperative 
ownership qualifies as socialist ownership only under the conditions of 
a socialist political system and worker-peasant state government. 
m 
Agricultural economists in the socialist countries had to recognize 
that it was not possible to understand the complex nature of cooperative 
farming» and even much less possible to solve its important problems if 
the farmers* cooperative is not conceived of as a defined economic organ­
ization. Sticking to such basically non-economic concepts as "farmers * 
association,* ••farmers* union,"social mass organization," or "cooper­
ative membership," neither the objectives not the material interests 
associated with cooperative farming, with its individual members and man­
agers can be clearly shown. Not even a comprehensive unified model of 
farmers* cooperative can be unambiguously formulated. The conclusion is 
drawn that the farmers* cooperative must be conceived of as an economic 
organization embodied in ths cooperative farm. 
The cooperative farm consists of two constitutent parts* the large-
scale cooperative firm and the small-scale homeplot farms of cooperative 
members. The large-scale cooperative farm is considered as a business 
organization and, because of collective-cooperative ownership, as a 
special type of business firm characterized by collective management and 
decision-making at the top level; and by its members as being both part­
ners (co-ownsrs) and laborers (enç)loyees)« The members * homeplot farms 
must also be conceived of as an economic, partially business-type organ­
ization. 
In the Soviet Union the first cooperatives of agricultural producers 
came into being 50 years ago and in the Eastern European countries some 
20 years ago. The established system of cooperative farming can look back 
on a past of four decades in the Soviet Union and only a decade in the 
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rest of the socialist countries» In the beginning, fanners* cooperatives 
appeared on the stage of history as socio-economic organizations of such 
a special character that even the first statutes did not define •what kind 
of organization they were in an adequate economic sense.^ Beyond the 
initial stage of their historical development» it has become evident that 
farmers* cooperatives are, on the one hand, social organizations operating 
in socialist cooperative form and, on the other, economic organizations 
vrtiich are centered on large-scale collectively-owned enterprises pursuing 
economic objectives. 
An important step in the strengthening of their socialist cooperative 
p 
character was made by the Land Act passed by Parliament in 1967* This 
Act has opened the road to the transfer of land into cooperative owner­
ship. In settling the question of ownership, a distinction was made be­
tween the members* land ownership and the ownership of outsiders living 
and/or working in cities.^ The Act decreed the compulsory purchase of 
The first so-called Standard Statute of Kolkhozes in the Soviet Union 
was adopted in 1933 and the first cooperative statutes of all other so­
cialist countries are the rules of socio-political association rather 
than directives on the economic organization of business enterprises. 
Surprisingly it is also true that at the 6th Congress of Soviets in 
1931 the kolkhoz was referred to as "an enterprise founded by peasants 
voluntarily collectivizing their own productive resources, and managed 
by themselves.• Yet later on, as Erdei (20, p, I6) notes, "its character 
as entezprise became blurred, and several decades had to pass before these 
aspects came again to the fore." 
^Act IV of 1967 on "Certain questions of land ownership and land use" 
is analyzed by Nagy (66)# 
^It has been estimated that in 1967 about 18-20 per cent of coopeir-
ative land was owned by such "third" persons and this percentage was 
estimated to increase by 1-2 per cent every year. 
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the lands of the latter, and their compulsory acquisition by the farmers* 
cooperatives to come into force by January 1» 1969# Thua landowners had 
to decide themselves whether to accept membership in the cooperative and 
to continue to be owners of their land and receive the land rent; or 
not to join the cooperative and to let the Act's provisions for conçulso-
ry purchase be applied.^ The Act also decreed that the cooperative was 
obliged to indemnify the owners for the land whose title it acquired. 
The Land Act of 196? set out to have the land freely offered for 
sale by the cooperative member in a mutually satisfactory free agreement 
between the cooperative and its member. In this category the indemnity 
is twice that which applied to outsiders. The new regulation enabled the 
cooperatives to buy land from private persons and from the state. 
As a first step of extending the sphere of cooperative ownership» 
farmers* cooperatives became eligible to buy large-scale machines in 
1957. As a second step, they bought, gradually, all the machinery from 
state-owned machine and tractor stations (MTS). As a third step, since 
1967* the cooperatives could become owners of the land they use. As a 
fourth step, farmers* cooperatives may now also run auxiliary enter­
prises (e.g. food processing plants, smaller-scale mines) *riiich were 
monopolized by state-owned firms prior to the reform of the economic 
mechanism# 
^The Act allowed the owner to request that his land be exençjt from 
compulsory purchase. There were two causes for exemption: (a) 0.57 
hactar land might be left to each owner; (b) all land of the owner 
might be exempted if the owner was an elderly person whose only liveli­
hood was the land rent that he received from the farmers* cooperative. 
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Large Cooperative Enterprise and Small Homeplot Fanns^ 
At present» cooperative fanning is a peculiar and conplex form of 
agricultural organization in which the new, large-scale cooperative 
pattern co-exists with the still remaining (and adjusting) elements of the 
earlier system of individual family farms. 
The development and expansion of large-scale cooperative farms took 
place in Hungary simultaneously with the economic progress of individual 
peasant farms rising to a higher technical and organizational level. The 
collective cooperative farms did not confront the small-scale individual 
farms as a hostile power» but they encouraged and organized their gradual 
union into large-scale farming. By this transformation the small peasant 
farms did not use up all their available material resources but trans­
ferred them into the framework of cooperative farming. 
When a cooperative farm was established» only a part of the produc­
tive resources (land, livestock, machinery and equipment) of the farmers 
joining the cooperative were taken into collective use; the rest remained 
under the individual management of the owner-farmer (now a cooperative 
member) within the frame of his small-scale homeplot farm. The united, 
collectively used means of production (which are also collectively to be 
replaced and increased in the future) constitute the technical base of a 
large-scale cooperative firm (enterprise). The means of production re-
this paper, the following terms are used as synonyms: large 
coogerat^m enterprise« large-scale collective enterprise, cooperative 
enterprise, cooperative firm. All these terms denote the large-scale por­
tion of the farmers* cooperative. The expressions farmers' cooperative, 
agricultural producers'cooperative « cooperative farm and collective farm 
are also used synonymously. The terms homeplot farm, household plot farm 
or household farm also have the same meaning. 
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maining in individual use serve as a foundation for the homeplot farms 
of the cooperative members* Thus, homeplot farms cmne Into existence 
simultaneously with a peculiar separation of ownership of productive 
resources, earlier owned private^* 
During the period when the early cooperatives were organized, one 
of the most critical problems was to decide which were the productive 
resources necessarily, feasibly, and justifiably to be taken into the 
large-scale collective farming* From a purely organizational point of 
view, scattered buildings suitable only for a few animals and their 
fodder, or certain simpler working tools useless for large-scale opera­
tion, could not be taken into the collective farming* At the same time, 
in the newly established collective enterprises there were no appro­
priate buildings even for the livestock at hand; therefore, a part of 
the cooperative-owned livestock was tenporarily left out of the large-
scale firms# Also when the land use was united, a number of technical 
problems arose — e.g., scattered vine]rards and orchards, gardens round 
the farmhouses, dispersed dwelling houses in "tanya"*^ areas hemmed In 
between ploughlands — all complicated the cooperative development and 
inhibited the rapid formation of the large-scale collective firm* 
However, economic and organizational factors constituted only a 
part of the difficulties; another part is of a subjective and political 
character* A complete elimination of private resource ownership and 
individual resource use would have meant a disregarding of all these 
relevant personal preferences, and it could have led to disastrous 
^The Hungarian name of Isolated farmsteads* 
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consequences. Thus, the establishment of household plots and hoiaeplot 
farming, as well as their maintenance at present and in the future is 
justified by various factors and multiple reasons (29» 30 )« 
The characteristic fonn of farmers* cooperatives so far developed 
is such that a proportion (although not a fundamental one) of productive 
resources is individual personal property in the household plots of the 
members* The existence of homeplot farming does not affect the social 
character of producers* cooperatives; moreover, at present it is a con­
spicuous feature — though not indispensable from an academic point of 
view — of the socialist cooperative character.^ 
As regards resource ownership relations, homeplot farms are built on 
a double fundamental! 1. on the extending collectively owned resources 
of increasing importance; i.e., on the partial use of modem large-scale 
forces of px*oduction in cooperative property; 2. on the individual private 
possession and use of means of production (of decreasing importance, 
except for some livestock) inherited from former family fanns. This 
double fundamental may be theoretically antagonistic in itself, still it 
does not necessarily cause unmanageable conflicts between the large-
scale cooperative enterprise and homeplot farms or between the interests 
of different groups of cooperative members. Contradictions and conflicting 
^The analyzed complexity scores to explain the fact that in offi­
cial statistics (as well as in Table 3.6 of this study) large-scale 
cooperative enterprises and small-scale homeplot farms are treated under 
the common heading of "farmers* cooperative sector,* but the data on 
homeplot farms are also given separately. Rightly so, since the cooper­
ative enterprise and homeplot farms form a closely coordinated decision 
unit and yet homeplot farms as disintegrated subunits have to be taken 
into account separately at the same time. 
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economic interests arise as differences and conflicts within the same 
comprehensive decision unit — the socialist cooperative farm. 
îhe homeplot fam is finally, a socialist economic formation but, 
at the same time, it is more detached and more disintegrated than other 
sectors of the socialist economy.^ Hwneplot farming is a small-scale 
operation based on a special kind of socialist ownership of productive 
resources* Close cooperation with the large-scale cooperative enterprise 
and the favorable conditions created by national economic planning may 
moderate but cannot entirely eliminate the various inner economic limi­
tations of the small size of homeplot farming. 
Ihe large-scale cooperative enterprise and its members* homeplot 
farms are thus not independent units but essential parts of one single 
economic entity: the cooperative farm. Members and managers of the 
large-scale enterprise are guided in their decisions at an increasing 
rate by the recognition of the complementary and competitive needs of 
both the large-scale farm and the small-scale homeplot operations. 
As a rule the large-scale collective firm contributes to the effi­
cient and profitable utilization of the productive capacity of home-
plots by mechanical soil cultivation, and transportation; by supplying 
fodder in the framework of contract and by different organizational 
^Ih socialist and in Vfestem countries one hears more than once 
the» opinion that homeplot farming represents a definite private 
sector and it is simply a manifestation of peasant individuality, a 
congjromise with the peasants* psychology. This idea is expressed in 
its crudest versions as "homeplot farming carries the germ of the 
revival of capitalism." As Fekete and Varga (29) argue, these opinions 
reflect a great misjudgment of the basic social and economic charac­
ter of the homeplot farms of cooperative members. 
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and advisory (extension services) activities in the field of plant 
protection, disease control, marketing» etc* The larger the scale of home-
plot fanning and the more diversified its production, usually the more 
it requires the various services of the large-scale cooperative enter­
prise. 
As at many places, homeplot lands are involved in the crop rotation 
of the large cooperative enterprise in the same way homeplot fanning is 
everywhere included in the "cooperative entity," i*e#, in the economic 
union of the large-scale collective firm and of small-scale homeplot 
operations. The food supply of the family household and many other 
commodities are produced by homeplot farming, but all these originate 
largely from the fodder supply and cornfield utilization furnished by 
the large collective enterprise#^ 
The market production of homeplot farms clearly bears the character 
of an income-earning enterprise. At the same time, the self-supplying 
(producing for subsistence) character of homeplot farming is also evi­
dent. Thus the functions of homeplot farming are determined simulta­
neously by the household, ïrfiich is the decision unit of consumption and 
of labor supply, and by the profit incentives of market production. In 
addition to supplementary income, the household plot also provides a 
place and opportunity for recreation and leisure activities, such as 
gardening, bee-keeping, and some livestock (and pigeon) raising. 
^Generally com is planted on 80 per cent of the homeplot land of 
cooperative members, and soil preparation, fertilization, planting, 
and transportation of crops aro conpleted with the equipment of the 
large-scale cooperative enterprise* 
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Usually the older farmers are willingly occupied with these activities 
because they are used to them and» furthermore, they like them. As a new 
generation substitutes the old, the recreation function of homeplot 
activities may take first place. 
As an interim summary» the dual character of the farmers' coopera­
tive as well as the bilateral relationships between the large-scale 
collective enterprise, the members * homeplot farm and the members* house­
hold is sketched in Figure 6.1. 
The cooperative farm» the large-scale collective enterprise, as well 
as the homeplot farm and the cooperative household are decision units in 
microeconomics. Their multilateral relationships and connections with 
the economic life outside the cooperative demonstrate that micro-units 
are "drops in the ocean" of the national economy.^ 
Before turning attention to the large-scale enterprise, a closing 
remark is due on the perspective of homeplot farming* 
In the coming years homeplot farming will play an iirportant role 
in the market production of agriculture as a whole, apart from the 
direct food supply to the owners' household. By the same token, one 
must take into consideration the facts that homeplot farming will some 
day become extinct. More specifically, the homeplot farms have to lose 
their economic importance both in food supply and as a source of per­
sonal income. The main preconditions are, on the one hand, a consid-
^As regards cooperative farming, Shubik's remark (74, p. 3^5) is 
evidently relevant: "The development of micro-economic theory has been 
entering a stage similar to that experienced by twentieth century 
physics in its break away from the simple comfortable closed system 
of its precursor," 
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érable increase in the technical level and the performance of large-
scale production; and, on the other hand, the substantial increase in 
the cooperative members* personal income derived from the large cooper­
ative enterprise — an increase to the general wage level of alternative 
(non-farm) employment# As these conditions are gradually met, the living 
conditions and the work-leisure preferences of members of faimers* co­
operatives will approach those of other persons who have non-farm occu­
pations and reside in the countryside. Oi homeplots, future activities 
will be in the categories of recreation and sport; production itself 
will always be of secondary importance and market production will be 
entirely lacking* 
Membership, Management and Decision-making 
Ihe socio-economic (cooperative) character of the cooperative 
farms gives the members the co-owners* standing of the large-scale 
enterprise with the right to decide collectively on all the principal 
questions of cooperative activities* At the same time, the large col­
lective enterprise is based on the work of the cooperative members who 
may be considered as an employee of their own collective enterprise in 
this respect* Tkis dual (co-owner and labor supplier) role of cooper­
ative members is "crucial when one views the human and social relations 
and decision-making processes in cooperative farms, especially within 
J 
"The owner as employee** case is discussed by Harl and Timmons 
(40, p* 59) concerning corporations lAere a partner in a partnership 
becomes an employee of the corporation upon incorporation of the business 
and when *a new relationship is created by law between the corporate enti­
ty and the people vhom the corporation enploys to conduct its business*** 
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large-scale collective enterprises# 
Erdei ( 24) puts a high enç}hasis on the fact that cooperative member­
ship itself is not sufficient for the optimal organization of a large-
scale collective cooperative enterprise» For this, the precise regulation 
of the members * employment relations is also required. Die theoretical 
problem involved in all this is I how the co-owner and employee charac­
ters of the cooperative members can be reconciled in such a way as to 
create consistency between the objectives of the large cooperative 
enterprise management and the objectives of the individual menber-ençloy-
ees* 
Economic and organizational relations within a cooperative are 
regulated by its statutes* These statutes lay down the rights and respon­
sibilities of members, the method of election to the leading organs of 
the cooperative, the principles of work organization and income distri­
bution. Certain binding regulations are, of course, laid down by law 
but within these rather broad limits each cooperative farm itself de­
termines its own detailed statutes. The statutes discussed and passed 
by the assembly of the cooperative's members must be approved by the 
appropriate , regional state authority in order to make sure conçliance 
with the legal rules and regulations has taken place. 
Once its statutes have been approved, every cooperative is entered 
on the official register of cooperative farms — somewhat similarly 
to the incorporation of a fiiro in the United States. 
The microeconomic and legal concept of the firm is so broad that 
it is applicable to the cooperative farm without any theoretical diffi-
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oulty,^ In spite of this fact, it vas widely debated for a long time 
whether an emphasis on the enterprise character of the large-scale co­
operative firm was justified and whether categories of wages, net reve­
nue, profits, capital consumption allowance (amortization), etc. custom­
ary in firms (enterprises) as such should be applied to farmers' cooper­
atives. The debate has already been decided since "civil rights* of 
these categories had been "declared" by the practices of cooperative 
farming itself, and the same stand was unequivocally taken by the reform 
of the economic mechanism and by legislation. 
The statutes provide the right of each cooperative member to par­
ticipate equally in making collective decisions on resource allocation 
and income distribution of the large-scale cooperative enterprise (firm). 
Di detail, the members* most inportant rights are the following: 
— right to take part in the General Assembly and equal right to 
vote; 
>— right to be elected to any office in the farmers' cooperative; 
— right to share in the cooperative income according to labor 
performance; 
— right to the rent for land owned transferred to the cooperative; 
— right to retain or claim the individually used (household) plot 
in the conditions specified by the law and the statutes; 
— right to old-age pension.2 
^In microeconomic theory, the firm is uniformly qualified as an 
autonomous decision (administrative) unit which transforms inputs into 
outputs in seeking some entrepreneurial objective function consistently 
with a technical production function (38,^9,50) • 
^The recent pension system for members of farmers* cooperatives, 
introduced in 1968, places the retired cooperative members in pension 
categories on the basis of their personal income earned in the large 
cooperative enterprise. There are, altogether, 21 pension-categories* 
Duration of cooperative membership is considerably emphasized in deter­
mining the sum of the pension. 
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The moat important duties of the cooperative members are* 
— the transfer of land and equipment (in excess of the approved 
needs of homeplot farming) to the large collective enterprise 
at the time of joining the cooperative; 
— participation in the activity of the collective enterprise by 
supplying labor. 
The inner organization of a large-scale cooperative enterprise is 
given in Figure 6,2. 
The highest authority in the farmers* cooperative is the General 
Assembly. (In cooperatives of a very large size it is replaced by the 
Assembly of Delegates.) The major responsibilities and functions of the 
General Assembly are: 
— election of the leading bodies; 
— approval of the long-run and annual farming plans determining 
lie allocation of collective resources; 
— approval of the yearly final accounts determining income distri­
bution; 
— contracting credits above specified limits; 
— admission and exclusion of members. 
The General Assembly elects the management responsible for the 
operative direction of the farmers* cooperative as an agricultural firm 
(enterprise). The number of administrative board members is generally 
between seven and seventeen. As a rule, the General Assembly also elects 
a control commission and a disciplinary commission, and various committees 
concerned with homeplot farming, cooperative welfare, social security, 
etc. 
The president is the responsible leader and legal representative of 
the cooperative, who directs the farming and administration in the name 
of, and relying upon, the management. The president is elected for a 
four-year period. A vice-president is also elected. Very often the chief 
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agronomist is elected to be vice-president if he is a member of the 
cooperative. (If it is necessary, managers may also be employed by the 
cooperative from outside the cooperative members.) The vice-president 
may be elected with a specified responsibility, e.g., the direction of 
all the subsidiary enterprises (machine repair shop, construction work, 
food processing, etc.) and/or marketing activities. The other leaders of 
the cooperative are the chief agronomist, the chief zootechnician, the 
chief accountant, the heads of subsidiary enterprises, etc., as is 
shown on Fig. 6.2. 
Pig. 6.2 also illustrates the structure of production and labor 
organization. The basic production units of the large cooperative firm 
are generally the brigades, which at the same time constitute units of 
labor organization; their responsible head is the brigade chief (foreman) 
who is entrusted by the management with this function. Within the bri­
gades and other productive units (such as dairy farm and pig-feeding 
operation) working groups, generally of 5-15 persons, are organized if 
a good deal of manual work is to be done because of the low level of 
mechanization. 
The machine tools are generally kept in a centralized organization 
on smaller collective farms but the crews working with tractor-drawn 
machines are assigned to the brigades. On larger collective farms the 
so-called complex production brigades (units) are equipped with the 
machines used throughout the year. 
In the case of row crops requiring much manual labor, most collec­
tive enterprises distribute among the members the planted areas, to be 
100 
individually cultivated. Hie essence of this family system of cultivation, 
regarded as a Hungarian "innovation,* is that side-by-side with the 
mechanized and team work carried out by large-scale operation, the typi­
cally manual work is undertaken by the individual members in order to 
cultivate a given land area by small-scale family operation* In the fu­
ture >Aen these processes will be mechanized in an efficient and profit­
able manner, no such organization of production will be necessary# 
In each cooperative the distribution of the income of the collective 
enterprise is planned ahead in the framework of the yearly working plan, 
and it is incorporated in the annual final accounts, both of which are 
prepared by the management and have to be discussed and adopted by the 
General Assembly* 
Income is distributed partly in accordance with the land transferred 
to the cooperative enterprise (land rent), and, for the most part, ac­
cording to the labor input performed; and it is paid partly in money and 
partly in kind* Share in the income was exclusively, and still is for a 
large but rapidly decreasing part, based on what are called "work units 
The work unit stands for the average work (concerning intensity, phys­
ical and skill requirement) performed during a typical working day, and 
the different labor operations performed are converted into this equiv­
alent. The work unit system determines only the relative labor incomes 
of members (both a daily and yearly sense) since the level of income 
^The work unit is an intra-cooperative category adapted from the 
practice of the Soviet kolkhoz system. Authors also use the term labor 
unit* 
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due to a work unit depends on the total income to be distributed» The 
money equivalent (••value*) of a work unit labor performance varies from 
year to year within the same cooperative and from cooperative to cooper­
ative in the same year (11)• 
Some cooperatives apply the system of remuneration or share in 
income, whichever it may be, reckoned in percentages of the output (mainly 
crop yield)# An ever-increasing number of farmers' cooperatives provide 
fixed labor allowances (wages) combined with profit sharing.^ 
As Erdei (23, p. jS) pointed out, in many Hungarian cooperatives 
"the leadership is called the management," and this is neither a problem 
of use of the language nor a matter of nomenclature. It rather expresses 
the general practice that the elected cooperative body is ^  facto manag­
ing the large-scale cooperative operations with full responsibility for 
the operative farming decisions. At the same time, the top-level deci­
sions, among these decisions on farm plans, resource allocation and 
income distribution, are still made by the Assembly. 
Within the frameworks of cooperative farming (depicted in Fig. 6.1) 
and of large-scale collective organizations, cooperative families make 
decisions as (a) consumers and (b) suppliers of production factors (most­
ly labor) in their households associated with their homeplot farming, at 
the same time the cooperative members of families make decisions as 
^As Fekete (28, Chapter IV) argued from the points of view of soci­
etal, economic and business organizations, wages fixed at the level of 
income from alternative (non-cooperative) enqployment and profit sharing 
are most consistent with the future model of cooperative farming. 
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(c) entrepreneurs and (d) co-owners by voting in the General Assembly of 
the cooperative. If cooperative family members are also considered as 
(e) voters in political decision making, the multiple role of cooper­
ative families appears in a conçrehensive pattern which is similar to the 
decision-making functions of private farm families analyzed by Heady 
(42, p. 496)/ 
In their economic decisions concerning homeplot farming, cooperative 
families are generally characterized by a limited planning horizon and 
by a sort of **family farm cycle" investigated in the research of Heady, 
2 
Black and Peterson (46). Ih their business decisions on the large co­
operative enterprises» members may be faced with an extended, almost un­
limited planning horizon which is known as a characteristic of incorpo­
rated firms (38). 
Cooperative Democracy and State Guidance 
The principle of cooperative democracy requires that farmers' co­
operatives are functioning as democratically led communities and the 
state exercises its role of national economic guidance toward them in 
a specific manner. 
^This study is concerned with the different types of decisions listed 
above in its corresponding sections; Chapter IX deals with decisions be­
longing to categories c and d. Chapter X with decisions in category b; 
Chapter XI focuses on decision categories a and e. 
Traditional family farming follows the pattern of a "family farm 
cycle" because the farm business parallels closely the personal life 
cycle of the sole proprietor who is the head of the family. Since family 
farm organization units are "bom" and also "die" within or with each gen­
eration, inefficiences due to shortages of management ability and capital 
occur in the early years as well as in the declining period of farming 
(38,46). 
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In the contemporary system of economic mechanism, the state guidance 
of the cooperative fams is, besides legal supervision, of entirely eco­
nomic-policy character. State guidance respects fully the principle that 
the cooperative farm is the collective, cooperative property of the mem­
bers, and thus the guidance of the state does not mean the ri%ht to Rive 
orders#^ It endeavours to achieve its economic targets by influencing the 
cooperative farms in the framework of the national economic planning, 
by economic incentives such as granting favorable-term credits, fixing 
and varying prices, production and marketing contracts, technical ad­
vice, information, recommendations, etc. 
The annual farming plan and the yearly final accounts are the two 
main links with which farmers' cooperatives are fitted into the social­
ist planned economy as a whole. 
As far as state firms are concerned the State is the owner and, 
moreover, the manager (director) appointed by a government body is the 
one-person representative of the State in the management of state firms. 
At the same time, the principle of self-management concerning coopera­
tives, is recognized and applied; in their operation the State does not 
*infer qua owner" (l8)« 
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CHA?Tt;R VII. MATHiCKATlCAL MODELS OF COOPERATIVE FART-aNG 
In order to construct mathematical models of farmers* cooperatives 
one finds algebraic expressions for relationships and interdependencies 
as analyzed in the last chapter and partially depicted by Figures 6,1 
and 6.2, At Tirst the model-builder may formulate a general behavioral 
model of cooperative farming. Then as the central construction, a linear 
programming model of farmers * cooperatives can be set up which is followed 
by a simple cooperative model placing emphasis on investment and tech­
nology. Finally, a separate section provides a relatively large set of 
equalities that specify the real content of economic categories prevail­
ing in socialist cooperative farming.^ 
In this chapter the constructed models are of a generalized type 
to serve as a basis for various optimization procedures and for further 
research orientation in this fairly unexplored but rapidly changing 
field. 
The Behavioral Model 
The first model presented may be called the '^behavioral model of 
cooperative farming," This model consists of functions and equations 
specifying the manner in which a variable behaves or responds to 
changes in other variables. Human behavior (such as cooperative members * 
labor supply pattern in relation to alternative wage rates) as well as 
^In this section an attempt has also been made to give mathematical 
forms corresponding to the two different economic terminologies commonly 
used in the United States and in Hungary, 
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nonhuman "behavior" (such as how the total revenue of a cooperative 
enterprise reacts to output chanpes) will be treated in this model. 
Behavioral relationships expressed in mathematical form will be used to 
describe the general organizational setting of a cooperative model, 
including the technological (for example, production function) and 
institutional (for example, homeplot farming structure) aspects. 
The model construction starts with the more complex yet smaller 
microeconomic unit of the cooperative farm organization, with a cooper­
ative household and with its homeplot farm. 
The production function for homeplot farming 
Each cooperative household is furnished with a homeplot. The pro­
duction function for the homeplot farm of a cooperative household is 
denoted by 
f^ (Lyj^, hj^, K^» **., qj^$ •••» q^^) — 0 . (7.1) 
In Expression 7.1 the letter i refers to the i-th cooperative house­
hold and i = 1, ..., M. Each homeplot is potentially a producer of any 
usual farm output; q^^ denotes the output of commodity j produced on 
the i-th homeplot and j = 1, ..., n. The quantity of the output is 
determined by the first four components of the production functionJ 
= the vector of the u-th type of labor inputs used on the i-th 
household plot from members of this household and in gen­
eral u = 1, U but u= 1, ..., s, if the cooperative 
household includes s persons and each person represents 
only one kind of labor; 
= the quantity of land available in the household plot; 
= the capital used on the i-th homeplot; 
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X = the vector of processing services supplied to the i-th 
household plot by the large cooperative firm. 
The production function has been expressed implicitly. The first 
four variables are inputs and the last n variables are outputs» It may 
arbitrarily be specified that the partial derivatives are positive with 
respect to the inputs and the derivatives are negative with respect to 
the outputs. If capacity output (relative to the inputs) is being 
produced, the function equals zero. The function is greater than zero, 
if excess capacity exists (that is, if the outputs are less than ob­
tainable from the ^iven inputs). The marginal products of the various 
kinds of labor are written as the matrix 
which is understood as the marginal product of the u-th type of labor 
in the production of commodity j« In the matrix denoted by Expression 
7,2 for each commodity there is a column containing the marginal prod­
ucts of various types of labor; for each type of labor there is a row 
of marginal products. 
The income function of cooperative household 
A cooperative household has one or more persons possessing member­
ship in a farmers' cooperative. It is not required by this term that 
the head of the household be a cooperative member. Pull cooperative 
membership and the rirht to a homeplot land area is an essential cri­
terion of such a household. According to recent practice, a cooperative 
(7.2) 
A single entry in Expression 7.2 serves as an example 
5 Lui 
(7.2a) 
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member has the ripiht to a homeplot individually; therefore, if the 
cooperative household includes two or three cooperative members, it 
may have twice or three times as large a homeplot land area as another 
cooperative household which only one cooperative member belongs to. 
The income function of a typical cooperative household is riven by 
= ^ 1 VJP, (7.3) 
"ei' TÎÎ' "*• T • ' 
where 
Y = the flow of spending power or its real pood equivalent to the 
i-th cooperative household and 1 = 1, ..., M as before; 
Vg^ = the wage rate paid by the large cooperative enterprise for 
the u-th type of labor to the person in this household who 
is a member of the cooperative in question; 
Ig^ = the labor supplied by the cooperative member of the i-th 
household to the large cooperative enterprise ( the quantity 
of labor is expressed in work hours); 
Vg = a vector of the wage rates paid by the large cooperative 
enterprise for various kinds of labor inputs of persons of 
the i-th cooperative household who are not members of the 
cooperative; 
Lgi = the vector of the hours of various kinds of labor supplied 
by the members of the i-th household who are not cooperative 
member^ but supply labor to the large cooperative enter­
prise; 
V* = the vector of wage rates obtainable in non-cooperative em­
ployment; 
It should be clear from the previous chapters up to the present 
that the larger part of Hungarian farmers* cooperatives has not adopted 
a direct wage system. However, a considerable (and rapidly increasijig 
group of cooperatives) applies this system in various forms» 
2 
These persons are called helping family members.* 
108 
Lf = the vector of hours worked by the members of household i in 
various non-cooperative employment; 
= the vector of hours of different kinds of labor supplied by 
the i-th household to its own homeplot farm; 
f^ = the matrix of marginal products of on the homeplot farm 
(see Expression 7*2); 
P = the vector of prices of the outputs produced on the homeplot 
farm; some of these may be the accounting prices of products 
for which there is no equivalent commodity on the market. 
In Equation 7«3» and everywhere later on, subscript e indicates the 
lar^e collective enterprise; its "ranpce" is e = 1 in this model which 
deals with one cooperative farm incorporating a large-scale portion 
and all its members' homeplot farms. Each of the first four terms of 
Equation ?.3 includes a labor supply variable. Thus, each of these terms 
contains a household decision variable, (If Expression 7.3 did not con­
tain decision variables, it would reflect an accounting relationship 
rather than a behavioral function.) Only one of these variables has a 
formal constraint. It is a minimum type constraint expressed by 
(7-4) 
where a^^^ is the number of hours of work in the large collective 
enterprise (as determined by the General Assembly) required from the 
k-th member of the i-th cooperative household in time period t. 
Expression 7*^ is a product of both institutional and technological 
considerations. I-lemhership in a farmers' cooperative is essentially 
based on a rej^ular contribution of labor to collective farming. The 
large cooperative firm is basically dependent upon the members * labor 
supplied in harmony with the seasonal nature of agricultural production, 
'.lihen the General Assembly of the cooperative enterprise decides upon a 
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minimum labor quantity (for example 1,200 work hours per calendar year) 
it also specifies that a part of the labor has to be supplied in certain 
peak labor periods. 
The remaining terms in Expression 7*3 are not decision variables 
for the cooperative household but they affect the total flow of spending 
power to this household: 
TTgi = the household's share of the cooperative's dividend (profit) 
including land rent; 
= payments from the cooperative welfare fund to the household; 
IT* = nonwapie income of the i-th household from non-cooperative firms; 
W* = payments to this household from the welfare fund of non-cooper-
^ ative employers ; 
W** = payments to the household from the centralized, national 
welfare fund administered by a state apency; 
= the household's implicit share in the net investment of the 
collective cooperative enterprise* 
Later, particularly in Chapters X and XI, different objective 
(welfare) functions will be set up which will contain also this latter 
3 group of variables. 
This model does not consider land rent as a separate item of 
members' income mostly because of the perspective of collective-cooper­
ative land ownership discussed in Chapter VI. 
^This share is implicit in the very sense of the word since the 
net investments make up the so-called "Indivisible Fund" of the large 
cooperative firm. As the name shows, this fund cannot be divided among 
the cooperative members in the event of cessation of membership. 
^See especially Equations 10.2 through 10.4, and Expressions 10.29 
ând 10«32« 
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The production function of the large cooperative enterprise 
Large-scale cooperative faming enterprises are raultiproduct and 
multiprocess in nature. iMany of the processes are such that a part or 
all of their output is an intermediate good applied either to other 
processes in the large-scale enterprise or to the homeplots» Some 
processes produce final outputs» intermediate products, and outputs 
that are inputs to homeplot farming#^ It is useful to write to produc­
tion function in such a fashion as to view the large cooperative enter­
prise as utilizing factors to create processes and using these proc­
esses to produce final outputs# In its simplified form this production 
function is riven by 
^e (yi* •••» Ypj » •••» # •••» ^0» (7«5) 
where to are final outputs, to y^ are factors of production 
(any of which may be fixed in quantity). The to x^ are processes or 
activities, the concept made familiar in linear programming. If relevant, 
different y*s can be considered as labor supplied in different seasons 
or labor classified by whether or not it is supplied by a member, by 
a member's household or by an employee not belonging to a cooperative 
household. The x's may be classified with respect to whether they provide 
final outputs or inputs to other processes or inputs to homeplots or 
some combination of the above. This approach yields operational flexi­
bility for the model. The production function of the collective firm, 
^In this respect, the feed and fodder supply to homeplot livestock 
is a well-definable task cf the large cooperative firm. The lack of an 
appropriate-size feed market explains why the extremely dense livestock 
population of homeplot farms (indicated by Table 3«6) depends heavily 
on the feed and fodder production of the large cooperative enterprise. 
Ill 
is an increasing function of yj^ to and a decreasing function of 
to x^. An increase in a supply of factors increases production possi­
bilities. An increase in the utilization of any of processes decreases 
residual capacity. Constraints can be applied as by their limitations 
on the y's or x*s. In fact, both cases will appear and provide great 
flexibility in treating various types of short-runs and institutional 
situations. Of course, this approach is only one of the possible alter­
natives* 
In every strictly short-run situation where all processes are fixed 
and can only be varied with respect to the intensity of application, 
one encounters a typical linear programming problem* The objective func­
tion is linear and separable within some domain of relevance* Without 
loss of realism one may also view the variable costs per unit of output 
to be constant* 
The Linear Programming Model 
The large-scale enterprise 
At the start, a "direct requirements matrix" for final outputs is 
set up in the construction of the linear programming model of a large 
cooperative enterprise* A final output may be sold on the market or 
may be "marketed" within the p-iven cooperative organization* The latter 
refers to the feed and fodder output of the large collective enterprise 
which is sold to its members as inputs to homeplot production* The 
system of production coefficients will be set up in a someWiat different 
manner as it is usually encountered in linear programming models* The 
first matrix of this model is analogous to the direct irequirement matrix 
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of a Leontieff-type input-output model and it is not the coefficients 
of the matrix of production processes. Ihe input-output or the direct 
requirement matrix is given by 
Il ' "lA * — (7-6) 
In " *"1*1 * — * 
Equation 7.6 contains all the final outputs (q's) that could be pro­
duced as well as all the conceivable processes or activities (x's) that 
could be utilized by the large collective enterprise. In other words, 
n is total number of final outputs, no matter whether they are sold 
on a usual market or on the "internal cooperative market." In similar 
manner, m is always the number of activities no matter where they are 
used. Thus, some of the Ot*s may be zero in Equation 7.6. 
The next group of equations is associated with activities which 
are not assignable directly to any final output. Applying the term used 
in bookkeeping and budgeting, this subset of activities results in out­
put of an over-head type. Top-level management always, road construction 
and other building processes as well as complex investments and repair 
shop works in many cases, make up the over-head services as outputs, 
the requirement matrix of which is given by 
''I 
\ • 
The outputs (z's) are essential, especially for large-scale farming 
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hut they are generally not final outputs on the part of an agricultural 
firm. The number of these outputs goes up to n', and the z's may use 
scarce inputs» scarce processes as expressed by Equation 7.? and thus 
can be competitive with final outputs*^ 
The third type of the large enterprise output is represented by 
community services which are not assignable as production costs. Coopera­
tively financed whole-year local cultural and cooperative welfare insti­
tutions together with seasonal lunch programs and daily care centers 
(the latter for members' children, the former for members and family 
helpers and/or for their children) may promote large-scale farming oper­
ations in several ways, but their cost cannot be added to the direct 
cost of a unit of labor input. Many items in this group may partake of 
some aspects of public goods. They may constitute fringe benefits to a 
single cooperative household. The outputs of cooperative public good 
character are expressed by 
®1 = ^11*1 + ••• + B^m^m (7'9) 
®n" = ' 
The number of cooperative public goods (6's) goes up to n" and they 
cover human needs which may be defined as having both non-production 
^In an alternative way, the z*s could be expressed as q's with 
zero prices but minimum constraints assigned to them. Any z could be 
treated as a specified supply from which the processes use and thus 
it serves in terms of a restraint 
^i ^  ^ (7.^) 
where qj is the amount of the j-th output and a. . is the amount of the 
i-th overhead services used by a unit of the output j. 
114 
(consumption» health, etc») aspects and a collectively (community-wise) 
satisfiable nature. 
The next set of expressions designates the requirement matrix of 
homeplot farms for all the processes produced by the large-scale enter­
prise 
Hj = hjjXj + ... + (7.10) 
• 
Any column on the right-hand side of Expression 7*10 is the vector for 
a riven process (for example, the first column is for activity 1) and 
contains the quantities of this process assigned to all the homeplot 
farms. (The total number of household farms is assumed to be M.) Any 
row denotes the assignment of all the processes to a particular home-
plot farm (for example, the last row stands for the M-th homeplot). 
Some processes may be inputs in parts to other processes, such as 
feed to cattle. Therefore, an intermediate product matrix is also 
required 
Xj = + ... + (7.11) 
V " Pml%l + m 
where = 0 for i = j . 
In Equation 7.11 each process is expressed as a linear combination 
of all processes or activities. The principal diagonal is zero since all 
activities are defined "net.* (in an alternative approach, total outputs 
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can be divided into final outputs, q^, q^; intermediate products, 
q^» •••» overhead productive services, q^, ..., q^; cooperative 
public foods, q^, •••, q^ ; and services to homeplot farms, q^, q^.) 
Now the usual programming constraint set will be broue;ht into the 
model of the large collective enterprise» It becomes clear why every 
process had to be included in each row of Expressions 7*6 and 7.7 and 
in Equations 7«9 through 7*11. As a result, one set of constraints will 
do the job. The constraining inequalities are 
^11*1 •*" ^lm*m -^1 (7.12) 
* 
^rl^l + """ + ~ • 
The model has r constraints. Each b may represent a determined quality 
of land, a form of capital, a certain kind of labor available at a 
particular time or some combination of labor and capital embodied in 
a piiven production process (for example, wheat harvesting by combine). 
They have the usual meaning one finds in programming models. 
The model building reaches the stage where it is required to have 
value wifhts for the objective function. At first a vector of variable 
costs of each process is needed to determine these value weights (net 
prices) in the model of the large cooperative enterprise. This vector 
is given by 
Tj ••• 7^ ••• • (7.13) 
However, the A matrix is derivable from Expression 7*12, the latter 
is not the one that F.oes into the simplex tableau of the cooperative 
model. Consequently, this vector is not directly applicable for evaluating 
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the final outputs. This model will obtain both the direct and indirect 
variable costs assignable to one unit of each final output (q) 
m m 
=''1/1 + — + "lA * "11 y "im I W'l 
i=l i=l 
(7.14) 
m m 
% ^'nl'^1 •*•••• "^^nn^ra ^nl Y '^^nin ^ ^ mi^ . 
1=1 i=l 
The variable costs of the production of one unit of is defined in the 
first row of Expression 7*14. The first term of this cost equation is 
derived by multiplying the requirement coefficient (the amount of 
process 1 which is required to produce one unit of q^) and the variable 
costs of one unit of the first activity (?^)« There are ra terms of this 
type in the uppermost row. 
Equation 7.14 is expressed in matrix notation 
= All 4. tfiiBjT 4. ... + aj^„T (7.Wa) 
= A,T + TEA, 
1  - ' 1  
VCq = A„T +cC^iBiT + ... 
n 
= A T + TB A^ 
n 'v n 
where B denotes a matrix and A, E, T indicates vectors. 
Expression 7.11 demonstrated that other processes also served as 
requirements of any single process. Now Equations 7*14 and 7*l4a also 
reflect the requirements for intermediate outputs serving as inputs; 
for example, the second term of Expression 7.14a gives the product of 
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and of a complex term tdiich was previously obtained from multiplying 
the intermediate output requirements of one unit of each process (B^) 
by its variable costs (T). Equation 7.14 has m terras of this type for 
each final product (qj). After global horizontal summation, every row 
of these equations will provide the total variable costs associated with 
the production of one unit of a particular final output* Here some entries 
may of course be zero» 
The same procedure gives rise to the total variable costs of other 
outputs treated by Expressions 7«7 and 7*9* The variable costs of out­
puts denoted by Equations 7«10 and 7*11 may also be attained by similar 
means* 
Keeping in mind that a price vector (P) is piven exogenously, the 
entries of the usual c (the net prices or profits associated with unit 
activity) vector can be calculated easily* If the sum of the right-hand-
side terms of Equation 7*14 is subtracted from the corresponding price, 
then the required c value will be provided for the simplex tableau* 
Market prices do not exist for outputs of z and Ô» type but they are 
provided with shadow prices by the linear programming dual* Therefore, 
implicit values will be placed on them* Ihe same is to be said about 
the services supplied by the large collective enterprise to homeplot 
farms* By this approach even the profitability of the outputs under 
discussion may be evaluated since their variable costs can be compared 
with their implicit values* 
In a standard linear programming model, some c values can of course 
be negative and hence behave also as a variable cost* 
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As an example, the evaluation of one unit of output 6^ is shown 
here. At the beginning, the vector of shadow prices is written, which 
is obtained for the scarce resources from the optimal solution, in the 
fOITO of 
u° ... u° . (7.15) 
In this expression the shadow prices of constraints (b's) are presented. 
To evaluate one unit of 6^, it is possible to proceed deriving terms 
such as 
^ll^lAU^ * ®llArlU° (7.16) 
whore A^^, and U° are vectors, and & is a matrix. 
In Expression 7»16 the unit usage of the scarce factors are calculated 
at their shadow price. It should be stressed that this expression f^ives 
only the first terms the evaluation. 
Outputs of z and & type do not appear in the objective function, 
rather they are used as constraints; in other words, the z*s and 9*s 
represent predetermined output-levels from the viewpoint of the present 
model. The H*s (Expression 7.10) will receive the same treatment. 
One must also calculate the variable costs of the activities 
utilized as well as their implicit costs from the shadow prices. Thus 
the implied value can be derived for a unit level of output 6^ and the 
implied value is its alternative cost. Finally, the valuation of q's 
is p;iven by 
Pq - VCq = (7.17) 
• ^ 
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These c values serve as weight and net profit associated with one unit 
of final outputs in the objective function»^ 
To construct a simplex tableau for this model of the large collec­
tive enterprise, all the z's, the @*s, and H*s should be considered as 
they represent predetermined demands on the processes or activities 
denoted by the x's* One may proceed by calculating the impingement of 
these required assignments of the x*s on the original constraints. This 
will result in calculating a new vector of constraints (bj, b*) 1 T 
which is the original constraint vector (B) with the impingement of z*s, 
&*s and H's subtracted. Thus from the ^  and B matrices it is possible 
to calculate a new A matrix denoted as A* which is the matrix of coef­
ficients applying to final outputs (q*s). Ihen the simplex procedure is 
applicable in the usual fashion. 
The homeplot farms 
For each homeplot farm, it is convenient to set up a simple linear 
programming matrix without any of the intervening matrices of the model 
of the large-scale enterprise as 
% ^ . (7.18) 
In Expression 7.18, is the vector of all final outputs produced by 
the i-th homeplot farm, ^  stands for the production coefficient matrix 
of this homeplot farm and B^ is the vector of scarce resources available 
for the given unit, 
^The arithmetic burden is much smaller in the standard linear 
programming model which applies positive cj values for all final outputs 
and negative Cj values for the intermediate products. 
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In some linear programming models which could be formulated, one 
may consider the labor input by the household in its own homeplot farm 
as a scarce (fixed) input in order to place a shadow price on this labor.^ 
At other times the family labor need not enter the vector of b*s and may 
be considered as a variable input priced at "opportunity wages'* attaina­
ble from alternative employment either in the large-scale enterprise or 
in non-cooperative firms* But in this latter case an equation is still 
needed for the different kinds of family labor, and these labor supplies 
are denoted as a variable. It should also be noted that any alternative 
wage of labor would contain all fringe benefits. 
Similarly, may express the vector of variable costs associated 
with the final outputs of the i-th homeplot farm. In the same vein, 
denotes the vector of prices for outputs sold on the market by the i-th 
household from its own homeplot; and may stand for the vector of 
implicit prices for the homeplot products which are consumed by the 
owner's household. In the second case the retail price that the house­
hold would otherwise pay for the product seems to be the relevant one. 
In various income accounting procedures, one may decide to utilize the 
equivalent wholesale prices rather than the retail prices depending 
upon the purpose of the analysis in hand. Ihe work-leisure choice of 
the cooperative household will be dealt with in Chapter X. 
Actually lAen one lets the model "decide* where the cooperative 
household should use a unit of labor, the household objective function 
is in operation and the opportunity cost is the shadow price, but 
optimization also provides shadow prices for the household as a "final 
value." 
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The unified cooperative model 
Py now there are at hand all the relevant ingredients for a unified 
linear programming model of the whole cooperative farm organization 
where certain collective decisions concerning member's rights and duties, 
and members' individual decision concerning the division of their labor 
supply among various pursuits, have already been determined# With these 
elements predetermined, it is possible to perform sub-optimization, i.e. 
maximizing the objective function for the large-scale enterprise sepa­
rately and maximizing the objective function for each of the homeplot 
fanns. The total output and total profits of a farmers* cooperative 
organization then would simply be a sum of those of the large collective 
enterprise and of those of each of the homeplot farms. 
•nie whole problem of integration could have been approached in a 
rather different way but it would have come to the same answer. One can 
think of each of the previous matrices, ^  and g, as being a partition 
of a prior-existing matrix which would include the production matrices 
of all the individual homeplot farms. Intrinsically, the constraints for 
the individual homeplots could then have included in an overall constraint 
vector. The production of any commodity on the i-th homeplot would then 
have been considered as a final output activity which is different from 
the production of the same commodity on another homeplot. The production 
of the same commodity by the large collective enterprise would have been 
yet another activity. The essential point is that so long as one is talk­
ing about a single period, short-run situation this is a simple parti­
tioning problem for the matrices. Since developing the A and B matrices 
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for the homeplot farms would not have cast light on any new theoretical 
problem, this model has chosen to utilize the ••pre-partitioned matrices,* 
so to speak. It would not be a too complicated matter to expand the model 
as noted above, but it is far from being essential* Inplicitly, when more 
general, nonlinear optimizing models are considered, the previously men­
tioned decisions will not have already been undertaken and one will be 
faced with the allocation problems between homeplots and the large-scale 
enterprise and also among the homeplots themselves in order to derive 
equilibrium positions or to analyze the consequences of alternative 
cooperative organizations, including doing away with the homeplot farms 
entirely* 
Underlying assumptions and further considerations 
To establish the linear programming model the following underlying 
assumptions have been used* 
First assumption is the basic short-run assumption. The model deals 
with a short-run situation in which each production process (activity) 
is determined or fixed both with respect to the technological form and 
the total available quantity or intensity per annum at which the process 
can operate. 
Second is the standard linear programming assumption that all vari­
able inputs or all variable processes are linearly related to the process 
intensity. 
ïhe third assumption is that all processes that are limited with 
respect to the intensity or quantity available per unit of time are 
linearly related to some constraining element. This p-ives a usual A 
matrix of linear programming. There are only constant scale returns both 
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to the fixed factors and to the variable factors in the definition of 
process# 
The fourth assumption states that all processes are independent 
or separable, thus the level of utilization of any one process does 
not affect the variable inputs or fixed inputs to another process and 
neither does it change the transformation coefficients (the values). 
Since optimization has not been carried out with this model so far, 
no additional assumptions are needed explicitly; otherwise an assunq)-
tion would be that the objective function is both linear and separable 
in all its variables» 
It has been noted above that certain decisions must be predeter­
mined in order to give useful application to a model of linear pro­
gramming. In the following chapters optimization will be apnlied with 
respect to the linear programming model and then various relevant ob­
jective functions will be explored in the context of the general 
behavioral model, with nonlinear relationships within the production 
sector of the model. This will demonstrate the relevance of various 
linear programming models which may be more useful in operational 
application than the expanded nonlinear model. Thus, the non-behavioral 
linear model will serve as a basis for analyzing the consequences of 
various objective functions and for building various relevant linear 
programming optimization models. 
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A Simple Model with Emphasis on Investment and Technology 
The cooperative model presented so far is of short-run nature; 
in other words, this model refers to a single production period in which 
technology is considered only implicitly and unchanged. In this one-
period model a part of the proceeds is separated as investment funds but 
none of the effects of this investment is accounted for. The following 
model will contain investment and technology. As a rule, technical prog­
ress has an influence on technology through the application of improved 
means of production and through the development of more advanced manage­
ment, enterprise organization and information. The latter is the case 
of disembodied technical progress, and the former refers to embodied 
changes. 
Ihe model treats the cooperative farm and its two portions in a 
parallel fashion. The model defines outputs as 
Qe = F (Ke. Dg, Tg, ; (?.19a) 
— f I t (7.19b) 
M 
Q_ = Q* + 5 Q, . (7.19c) 
i=l 
Equation 7.19a fcives the output of the large cooperative enter­
prise as a function of capital (Kg), land (D^), technology (T^) and 
labor (Lq) available for this enterprise while the previously defined 
requirements of all members' homeplot farms (Xjj) appear in terms of a 
fixed factor (a given magnitude). In the production function of a 
member's homeplot farm denoted by Equation 7.19b, there are two fixed 
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factors: the size of the horaeplot land area and the productive services 
available to this household from the large cooperative firm (see Equation 
7.1). Equation 7«19c sums up the outputs of the two portions of a farmers* 
cooperative. 
The following expressions state that technology is a function of 
investment. 
T* = T (Ig); (7.20a) 
= t (I^); (7.20b) 
Tg = TQU T^U - TgO Ti - TgA . (7.20c) 
Technologies available for the large cooperative enterprise and for 
the homeplot farms may, of course, not be added or multiplied but they 
may be treated by set operations. The cooperative technology set (T^) 
is Fiven by Expressions 7.20c in a simplified form, selecting only the 
i-th and the M-th homeplots. The collective technology set (T^) and 
the homeplot technology sets usually have intersections because produc­
tive services are provided by the large collective enterprise for the 
homeplot farms. These processes are denoted in algebraic form as 
M 
Xh = ^ Xj, , (7.21) 
i=l 
where 
Xy = the vector of the productive processes that the large 
cooperative firm supplies to the homeplot farms of all its 
members in a given production period. 
Some elements of are typical productive processes and the provision 
126 
of any homeplot excludes the other homeplots from simultaneous utili­
zation. Other forms of may result in a sort of public good provided 
by the large enterprise; for example, flood and disease control, market 
information or managerial services can be given free of charge to any 
individual cooperative member*^ The intersection of the technology 
sets will be different in these two cases# Both cases are shown in 
Fig. 7.1 depicting only two of the homeplot farms. (The relative magni­
tude of homeplot sets is nonproportionally increased for illustrative 
purposes.) 
iJach of the next three equations gives a definition for investment 
and considers investment as a function of enterprise profit and total 
surplus value respectively. 
Ig = dKg = I (%); (7.22a) 
\ = dK. = g (m^); (7.22b) 
M 
Ic = le + 7 • (7.22c) 
i=l 
Expression 7»22c aggregates the investments of the large-scale col­
lective enterprise and the investments of all the homeplots which 
belong to the c-th cooperative farms. 
The properties and significance of the so-called cooperative 
public goods are discussed extensively in Chapter X. 
The prospects of homeplot farming and its alternative technologies 
will be examined largely iji Chapter XI. 
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= The technology set of the large cooperative enter­
prise. 
= Die technology set of the i-th hooeplot farm. 
= The technology set of the M-th homeplot farm. 
If 
= The intersection of and (T^/lT^)* 
The intersection of and (T^nT^)» 
= The intersection of T^,Tg and (Tj^HT^riT^), 
Fig* 7*1. Intersecting technology sets of cooperative farming 
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Profits and total suiplus value are considered as a function of 
technology and labor input. 
Te =1 (Te. Le) 5 (7.23») 
- jLt (T^» Dj^» Xji^) ; (7•23b) 
^ M 
m = Il ^ ^ * (7 *230) 
c "e • / "Ï 
i=l 
where is the total surplus value produced by the c-th farmers* cooper­
ative. 
Labor supply functions are given by a similar set of equations as 
= L (Vg, N) ; (7.24a) 
li = 1 V.) ; (7.24b) 
M 
1% = Le + 2 ^i • (7»24c) 
i=l 
In Expression 7.24a denotes the total wage bill of the large collec­
tive enterprise, the symbol N stands for the institutional requirement 
decided by the General Assembly. Expression 7.24b includes the marginal 
product of labor and here is the calculated (normative) wage bill 
of the i-th homeolot farm. 
Both the total wage bill of the large cooperative enterprise and 
the computed wage bill of homeplot farming are assumed to be a function 
of investment in order to determine their values within the given system. 
Vg = V (Ig) ; (7.25a) 
= v (I^) ; (7.25b) 
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M 
= V- + 5 V. , (7.25c) 
•= ® 1=1 ^ 
Finally, the model is closed by three definitional equations of 
net output» 
Qe =Tfe + Ve : (7.26a) 
Qi = ; (7.26b) 
M M 
:;c 
= TT +  Tm. + V + y V « (7.26c) 
e d. 1 e t. i 
i=l i=l 
The net outputs defined by Equations 7.26a through 7.26c are 
identical with the concept of gross income quantified by Equations 7.28a 
through 7.28c in the next section* 
Revenue, Income and Profit Qualifications 
This section provides a complete set of equations and identities 
in order to Rive the socialist cooperative categories precise, quan­
tifiable meaning both in the Marxian terminology used in Hungary and 
in economic terras applied in the United States»^ 
At first, attention will be focused on the large-scale cooperative 
enterprise. 
The total gross revenue of the large collective enterprise may be 
denoted by 
R = PQg . (7.27A) 
e ^ 
In this section, capital letter A attached to the identifying 
number of an equation denotes the American concepts and capital letter 
B denotes the Hungarian versions. The lower-case letters are included 
in the alternative formulae of a given category. 
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In Equation 7•27k is the total press revenue, P is a vector of 
commodity prices and is a vector of final outputs of the large 
cooperative enterprise* 
Viewing the total eross revenue from the Marxian standpoint it 
becomes 
GUg = CjjL + Vg + m* , (7.27B) 
where 
GUg = pross value product of a large cooperative enterprise, 
^NL ~ the vector of nonlabor costs, the latter includes capital 
consumption allowance (amortization costs) and the costs of 
all material inputs, 
V = the vector of wages or labor costs (remuneration paid to 
® members and nonmembers for their labor input), 
m = total surplus value embodied in the products of the large 
cooperative enterprise. 
In the practice of socialist planning and statistics, the concept 
of national (or pross) income is of central interest. It corresponds 
to the Western concept of net national product. Hie subtraction of 
nonlabor costs from Equation 7,27P will çive the p;ross income of a 
microeconomic producing unit which makes up the national income in final 
agfreration; in symbols 
GYe = GUg - CjjL , (7.28a) 
or 
GYg = Vg + Mg , (7.28b) 
or 
GYg = NUg , (7.28c) 
where 
GY - the eross income of a large cooperative firm. 
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NUQ = the net value product of a larpe cooperative enterprise. 
It is customary, although it may be rather vaRue, to speak of the 
net income of a socialist firm as a remainder of its gross income 
after having wapie costs subtracted from it. According to this practice, 
net enterprise income would be equal to total surplus value in the liarxian 
sensem With respect to a large cooperative enterprise, net firm income 
or total surplus is defined in this vein as 
NY = GU - V - Cm t  , (7.29a) 
e e e Ni. 
or 
NYg = NUg - Vg , (7.29b) 
or 
NY. = m , (7.29c) 
e 6 
where 
NYg = the "net income" of large cooperative ''irm. 
To introduce the concept of cooperative enterprise profits, total 
surplus as well as the above net income may be equated with this profit 
TTe - rag = NYg , (7.30) 
where 
TTq  = the profits of the large cooperative enterprise. 
In Expression 7.30 the profit includes taxes. Taxes can be con­
ceived of as social surplus 
"e. = . (7.31) 
where 
m •= social surplus (a part of total value of the large collec­
tive enterprise which is devoted to cover the needs of 
society as a whole). 
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Xg = taxes paid by the large cooperative firm. 
A third kind of surplus can be distinguished as the term of the 
cooperative surplus with respect to the large cooperative enterprise* 
This surplus equals the enterprise gross income and, curiously enough» 
it is larper than the total surplus defined by the classical Marxian 
economics. Cooperative surplus (Sg) is piven in this sense by 
Sq  = Ve + me , (7.32a) 
or 
Sg = GYg . (7.32b) 
The composition of the profits of a large cooperative enterprise 
is characterized by 
M 
= Xa + le + "e + 2 
i=l 
Profits are divided into taxes (X^), expenditures on investments (1^), 
contributions to the cooperative welfare funds (W^) and payments (of 
dividends) to members of the cooperative (last term in Equation 7*33)* 
At this stage 7.27B will be redefined and decomposed as 
M M 
GUe = + Va + ^ » (7.3^B) 
i=l 
where 
= profits (surplus) retained by the large cooperative firm, 
iTjg^ = dividend of the i-th cooperative member (household), 
= benefits of the i-th member (household) from the cooperative 
welfare fund. 
An attempt may also be made to redefine and decompose Equation 
7.27A in an equivalent form of Equation 7.3^B 
133 
L "ei 
1=1 
(7.34A) 
where 
FC = fixed costs. 
VC = variable costs. 
Fgg = profits retained by the incorporated enterprise. 
If , = dividend of the i-th stockholder. 
ei 
With respect to Equation 7»3^A it should be noted that workers' 
frinpe benefits and employers' contributions to the social welfare funds 
(social security payments, pay-roll taxes, unemployment insurance premium) 
are involved in the wage fund and in the variable costs according to the 
calculation practice of business firms in the United States. 
Using normative magnitudes as wage costs and accounting prices 
where these are necessary, equations may be set up to characterize the 
relevant categories of the homeplot farm portion of a farmers* cooper­
ative. Ihe homeplot versions of Equations 7.27A and 7.27B are espe­
cially important. This American version is given by 
where 
= the gross revenue of the i-th cooperative household's home-
plot farm, 
= the total output of the homeplot farm of the i-th cooperative 
household (including self-supplying production). 
An Hungarian version can be formulated as 
Ri = PQi , (7.35A) 
(7.35B) 
where 
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GU^ = the p:ross value product of the 1-th horaeplot farm, 
= the calculated wape costs of the i-th homeplot farm as labor 
input» 
= the total surplus value as a part of • 
The homeplot versions of Equations 7*28 and 7.29 are derived in a 
similar manner. 
The entirety of a farmers' cooperative may be shown by equations 
integrating the large collective enterprise and all its members* 
individually operated homeplot farms 
R = R ) R, , (7.36A) 
c e ^ ^ i=l 
where 
Rg = the gross irevenue of the c-th cooperative farm. 
The extension of Equation 7*27B is given by the same route 
M 
GUg = GUg + ^ GU^ , (7.36B) 
i=l 
where 
GU^ = the gross value product of farmers* cooperative c. 
There is involved no novelty in developing a unified expression 
for gross income or net value product which may well be a good measure 
of the economic performance of the complex cooperative farm organization. 
In a new set of equations, the personal income of a cooperative 
household may be derived from Expression 7.3 by the mears of the follow­
ing procedures! 
— exclusion of 1^; 
— replacement of I^f^P by R^; 
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— summation of all the variables on the rirrht-hand side, 
Ihus the personal income of the i-th cooperative household (T^) 
is Riven by 
\ = Wei * \h± * + "ei + + "I + "" • 
(7.37) 
where the symbols (except R^) are defined in connection with Equation 
7,3, Some terms may be missing (have zero value) while some terms may 
appear more than once (for example, more than one cooperative member or 
non-cooperative employee or welfare-benefited person may belong to a 
%iven cooperative household). 
Completing the set of equations, one may formulate the property 
of equilibrium prices on a perfectly competitive market as 
Pq = MCq , (7.38A) 
where 
Pq = the market equilibrium price of product q, 
MCq = the marginal cost of producing the q-th output. 
The i'^arxian non-marginal concept of the "value-price" which is 
a sort of ideal, and the equilibrium quantity can be expressed by the 
help of alteration of Equation 7.27B 
P° = + JÇ + -EL , (7.388) 
q qo Q° 
where 
P° = the "value price" of a unit of product q, 
Q° = the socially desirable ("market-clearing") quantity of 
product q. 
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C^L» = the socially necessary (accepted) level of nonwage 
^ costs, wages and surplus value (generated in the 
production of output q) respectively. 
At first glance it is evident that Equation 7«383 reflects unit 
(average) cost pricing in contrast to the marginal cost pricing prin­
ciple expressed in its twin equation. 
* 
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PART III. 
COOPERATIVE OPTIMIZATION 
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CHAPTER VIII. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
COOPERATIVE OPTIMIZATION 
Short Review of Literature 
It would take a separate study to show the similarities and dis­
similarities among cooperative theories developed so far and the co­
operative models presented in this paper* In Hungaiy» Erdei (22) wrote 
a comprehensive survey of the history of cooperative concepts* This 
book, published more than a decade ago, analyzed the role and capac­
ities of cooperative organizations in social progress and in economic 
development* In Erdei's study there may be revealed both the cognizance 
of the dual character of cooperative organizations and the conception 
of cooperatives as business enterprises. These concepts were canonized 
by the new Hungarian Cooperative Law in 196?• 
For a long time cooperative theories did not view the cooperative 
association as a firm. The generally accepted theories were restricted 
to marketing cooperatives and these cooperatives were considered merely 
as an extension of their patrons' economic activity* In total accordance 
with the concept of Emelianoff (19)» Robotka (69, p* 113) formulated: 
"The cooperative association, as such **• is a sovereign unit 
only with respect to its extemal relationships* Internally, 
the participants act in their individual capacities in a 
mutually agreed upon manner, hence the acts of the cooperative 
represent the sum of the act of the participants. Functioning 
cooperatively thus represent **. an extension of their entre­
preneurial functioning*'* 
In this theoretical framework the cooperative, as such, does not have 
its own entrepreneurial organs and the cooperative association is shown 
as an aggregate of economic units, each fully retaining its independ­
ence in seeking profits. 
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Following the track of Enelianoff (19) and Robotka (69), Phillips 
(68, p. 75) states: 
"As an economic institution, the cooperative association ... 
is an organization ... of sovereign economic units — firms 
or households.* 
Phillips argues that a member firm should be treated as a multi-plant, 
vertically integrated firm and the entrepreneurs of each associated 
firm must allocate resources to the common plant in the same manner as 
a multi-plant firm allocates productive resources to each of its plants. 
In the light of organization theory, Helmberger and Hoos (48) con­
ceive the cooperative as a firm defined in a more complex (organiza­
tional) sense. From the authors* viewpoint, organization theory pro­
vides a broader interpretation of the firm that is useful for empirical 
research on cooperative decision making. The study of Helmberger and 
Hoos (48, p. 275) suggests: 
"... by making certain assumptions within an organizational 
framework, the marginal analysis can be used in deriving hy­
potheses about cooperative performance in much the same way 
as it has been used in traditional (microeconomic) theory." 
In the vein of the conceptual approach of Helmberger and Hoos, one 
may view Domar's (16) purely methodological article on the Soviet col­
lective farms from wider, more operational angles. 
A most recent publication of Heady (44) has shown that behavioral 
relations and equilibrium positions can be derived through traditional 
marginal analysis after assuming optimizing behavior on the part of 
the cooperative enterprise. 
The models introduced previously and optimizing procedures shortly 
to be discussed are based on the firm notion that a cooperative farm. 
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its objectivest and its environment are all multivariate systems»^ 
General Theoretical Considerations 
To develop a theory of cooperative farms, the forepoing part of 
this study involved the construction of several models, each of which 
purports to be a compact description of some relevant aspects of the 
real cooperative farm organization. Even the most casual observations 
on socialist cooperative farming indicate that its froals, structure 
and behavior may be sufficiently different from those of other types 
of farm organization. This part of the study will predict rational 
behavior which aims at optimization, i.e. at maximizing goal achieve­
ment on the part of the decision makers in the given, somewhat differ­
entiating organizational, institutional framework. 
For prediction purposes, an adequate model of the behavior of the 
cooperative farm must at least implicitly reflect considerations asso­
ciated with; 
a* the objectives of individual cooperative members as decision 
makers ; 
b. the large-scale cooperative enterprise as the basic economic 
and organization unit; 
c. the special features of small-scale homeplot farming as a 
complementary and subsidiary activity; 
d. the interactions within the cooperative entirety as well as 
between the cooperative community and its socio-politico-
economic environment. 
The cooperative farms are essential components of the agricultural 
^Shubik (74, p. 365) made a similar statement concerning corporate 
organizations. 
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sector in a socialist economy; at the same tine the cooperative organi­
zation consists of many people embedded in local communities and finally 
in the whole society. 
Peing interested in predicting the behavior of the large coopera­
tive enterprise owned by the members' collective or having interest in 
predicting the behavior of individual cooperative member, the economist 
must thoroughly analyze the requirements for optimizing behavior and 
develop models which foresee behavior as well as makes distinction 
between optimal behavior and actual behavior. An essential part of the 
theory of cooperative farms should be concerned vrith characterizing 
the optimal or equilibrium situation for decision units involved* By 
assuming that these units behave optimally, the relevant models of co­
operatives predict with appropriate accuracy in a wide range of circum­
stances. Thus great operational value is attached to working out op­
timal decision rules for individuals as cooperative members and for 
cooperative collectives as groups of individuals. 
Throughout Part Three the separate chapters will be dealing with 
predictions derivable from optimizing behavior of cooperative decision 
units. As Koldren (50) stresses, optimal behavior always depends upon 
the restraints on the decision maker, the choice variables available 
to him and his knowledge of them. The models of optimizing cooperative 
behavior themselves incorporate the chosen set of variables which are 
relevant to economic decisions and embody the construct in such a 
manner that predictions of considerable welfare significance are made 
workable. Thus cooperative economics concentrates on variables, models. 
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predictions, and outcomes that bear direct relationships to the "eco­
nomic welfare* of individual members and to that of collective (cooper­
ative) groups. Thus, eriven the value system of any particular society, 
cooperative economic theory attempts to define states which, relative 
to those values, make cooperative members best off as a societal stra-
1 
turn in some economic sense. 
As has been shown, in a cooperative farm organization, the business 
firm is not distinct from the members' governing collective represented 
by the General Assembly, and the large-scale collective enterprise is 
not separated entirely from its members' individual homeplot farms, Ihe 
economic spheres of consultation, market production and labor supply — 
all are interrelated by the decisions of a typical cooperative house­
hold, Both theoretical considerations and practical evidence indicate 
that the economic structure and behavior of the small-scale individually 
managed homeplot farms are rather dissimilar from those of the large 
collective firm. Within the large-scale collective enterprise, the dis­
tinctions among manager, administrator, entrepreneur and leader are not 
always clear. This fact and the multi-person nature of the large cooper­
ative decision unit may give rise to behavior which would be contra­
dictory or even irrational for an individual but which is not neces­
sarily so for a multi-personality group such as the General Assembly 
^The reasoning of this paragraph, and some others later on, is 
parallel to the general approach of Holdren (50) connecting economic 
models and the welfare concept, Holdren also draws attention to the 
fact that economics can be thought of as a parent discipline for oper­
ation research since the latter utilizes very much the same types of 
models as economics but it is primarily concerned with what one might 
call "private optimization," 
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of a fanners' cooperative» Even if this decision unit behaves as a 
single-headed organism, it is impossible to predict its behavior without 
a rood understanding of the social environment. Cooperative theories 
and models confined to microeconomics and "simple" constructs could be 
severely limited in the comprehensive description of a complex, change­
able environment* 
The Set of Alternative Objective Functions 
After all the foregoing, it may not seem unrealistic to hypothesize 
that the relevant set of objectives of a large collective-cooperative 
enterprise might includeî 
(1) maximization of firm net profits, 
(2) maximization of members* benefits in terms of a residual income 
on their labor input, 
(3) maximization of output per land unit, 
(4) maximization of total output of the enterprise, 
(5) minimization of the production costs of a riven level of output, 
(6) maximization of the firm's net worth (capital value) over time. 
According to these separable objectives, the optimizing behavior may be 
expressed by six consecutive models of the large cooperative firm such 
as* 
(1) the pure enterprise model 
(2) the cooperative model of the family-farm type, 
(3) the intensity model, 
(4) the output-maximizing model, 
(5) the efficiency models, 
(6) the growth models. 
m 
All the six basic versions of optimization of the large-scale 
collective firm will be elaborated in Chapter IX. The maximization of 
the individual "economic welfare* (objective) function of cooperative 
households (members) will be dealt with in Chapter X« Following these 
two suboptimization procedures, a unified, long-run cooperative opti­
mization model is presented in Chapter XI» These chapters may also be 
a contribution to the debate in Hungary and in other socialist countries 
on the economic objectives and material incentives of the farmers' co­
operative* For a long time it has been debated whether the system of 
cooperative incentives should be connected with the gross income of the 
cooperative or with the net income of the cooperative enterprise. Both 
approaches arrive at their conclusions by largely logical arguments 
concerning optimal output levels, optimum production patterns and effi­
cient resource utilization. The quantitative analysis, especially mathe­
matical programming can provide optimal solutions and optimality cri­
teria relative to an objective function and by means of a specified 
production function. 
The Concept of a Cooperative Entrepreneur 
In most of the following models, each cooperative member will be 
considered as an entrepreneur. But how should one define a cooperative 
entrepreneur? This very proper question in a general (non-cooperative) 
sense was raised by Haavelmo ( 37, pp. 209-210) and his unusual way of 
answering is challenging to follow. It may be argued that a cooperative 
member as an entrepreneur is not just a capital (and land)-owner, or 
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one who has the collectively-exercised rirht of disposal over capital. 
Even in a managerial position, the cooperative member is not simply a 
manager because cooperative managers could be hired as employees. The 
best way out offered is to define the entrepreneur as the "owner of a 
production function." In this vein each cooperative member possesses 
some sort of exclusive right which is exercised by determining produc­
tion plans in the General Assembly. Still remaining on Haavelmo's track, 
there may exist other production functions that will influence very 
strongly %vhat this exclusive right belonging to a cooperative member 
as "owner" of a particular production function is worth.^ 
The type of production function really lies at the heart of optimi­
zation. It is crucial to select a functional form which characterizes 
the farm organization under scrutiny, and also fits in the optimization 
technique applied. If a linear programming model is in application, then 
production processes (activities) exhibiting constant returns to scale 
are exclusively workable. If constant returns to scale are the case, 
then optimal farm size cannot be determined by marginal analysis. Ap­
plying Heady's ( 44) approach, a simplified example will clarify this 
point by entering the field of optimization in the large-scale collec­
tive cooperative enterprise. 
Haavelmo (37» p. 210) also notes that the deeper understanding 
of why and how a new enterprise is established is probably the task 
of social science in a much wider sense than of economics. 
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The Implications of Constant Returns to Scale 
A production function exhibiting constant returns to scale is 
riven by 
q = a + bM^ , (8*1) 
where q stands for output, Mq represents one resource category in terms 
of a certain mix or some unified package of different inputs including 
labor; b expresses the constant marginal (and average) productivity of 
and a is a particular portion of q conceivable as "gift from nature" 
or output without scarce inputs. Equation 8.1 is a long-run production 
function in which all inputs are variable and changed in the same pro­
portion (as was discussed in Chapter IV). 
Given Equation 8.1, the profit function for the cooperative deci­
sion unit assumes the form 
Tr= Pq (a + bK) - (Vjj + rV^) M » (8.2) 
where; 
T= enterprise profit, 
Pq = price of output, 
Vm = price of labor input, 
= average price of aggregate nonlabor input, 
M = labor (cooperative members') input, 
r = the ratio in which the aggregate resource is applied together 
with M. 
The objective function of a cooperative decision unit is given by the 
maximizing Equation 8.2, i.e. 
Max Tr= p (a + bM) - (Vw + rV„) M. (8.3) 
M ^ " 
147 
Ihe letter M placed under the profit symbol draws the attention to the 
fact that labor input or the number of cooperative members is the de­
cision variable in the objective function. 
To optimize farm size expressed by the value of M (i.e. by the 
number of cooperative members), the derivative of Equation 8,3 is to be 
calculated with respect to the decision variable 
lt=bPq-V„-rV^. (8.4) 
Since every term, thus the derivative itself, is a constant which indi­
cates that if profit is positive in Equation 8,2, there is no limit to 
the optimal size of the enterprise. 
Constant returns to scale would suggest that cooperative decision 
units could be as large as possible and any farm size might be consist­
ent since production functions with first degree homogeneity leave no 
room for enterprise size optimization. The production function of this 
nature excludes profit-maximizing behavior based on marginal analysis. 
Neither technology nor input prices influence perceivably farm size 
when constant returns to scale dominate. 
It is instructive to turn to the cooperative version of Haavelmo's 
entrepreneur. If an entrepreneur's production function were homogeneous 
of first degree, he would never integrate his smaller-scale individual 
farm into the larger-scale cooperative unit* If it has already been done, 
our homo oeconomicus (the cooperative member possessing this particular 
production function) would show complete indifference in respect to the 
division of his labor and other resources between the collective enter­
prise and ^is homeplot farm. 
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Selecting nn Appropriate Production Function 
Leaving out the constant terra a. Equation 8,1 becomes a special 
case of the power or Cobb-Douglas production with exponent (production 
elasticity) unity. A C-D function, even in its generalized form which 
does not have first degree of homogeneity» cannot be characteristic for 
agricultural production in the long-run as has been verified by Heady 
and Dillon (47)» 
The C-D function exhibits too many constancies, e.g. constant 
marginal and average productivity, constant elasticity of production, 
and constant resource mix (when input price ratio is unchanged). This 
function does not fit when both increasing and decreasing MPP prevails; 
the function does not ''acceptboth negative MPP and positive MPP for 
the whole production process, therefore, does not "allow** increasing 
total product in some region and diminishing total product in other. 
The C-D unction also does not define maximum output. 
To overcome most of the previous unrealities, a cooperative opti­
mizer may select from the set of other production functions such as 
quadratic, functions named after Spillman or Heady and Pesek, square 
root, etc (47). The last one has been chosen in the following chapter 
to characterize larp,e-scale cooperative operations. 
A production function of the square root type is given in its 
one-input and long-run form by 
q = a - bM + cM'S . (8.5) 
The major characteristics of the square root function may be 
summed up as ( 4?) : 
The production function of the square root type allows decreasing 
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and negative marginal productivity while its marginal products decline 
at a diminishing rate. Hie square root equation also accepts a diminish­
ing total product and defines a maximum output level; its elasticity of 
production decreases when input and output magnitudes lessen. 
When two resources are applied and their positive interaction 
(substitutibility) is assumed» the square root function gives rise to 
curved isoclines passing through the origin of the input space. These 
isoclines converge at a particular input combination which corresponds 
to the maximum output denoted by the peak of the production surface. The 
curved isoclines and expansion path indicate that the least cost path 
to larger outputs marks an altering input mix. 
Programming Approach to Cooperative Optimization 
A non-linear programming model 
The production function as constraint To set up a programming 
model for cooperative optimization, first the production function will 
be given for the large-scale cooperative enterprise in terms of a con­
straint as 
•••» •••* "jr) — 0* 
Expression P.6 denotes the production as the m'-th constraint. To make 
it stand separately from the other constraints, the production function 
is designated as the f^ function of six groups of variables. The first 
rroup involves all the factors of production which are variable inputs 
in the situation nnder consideration; they are numbered 1 to r and des-
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lim/it.od by y's. If the situation is any kind of short-run, there will 
be some processes or activities which are fixed in form. The second 
Rroup of terms designates these by Xj to x Final outputs are desig-
2 
nated by to q^. 
As discussed in Chapter VII, the large cooperative enterprise, 
like any business firm has some over-head activities which it feels 
essential but which are not directly assignable to any given output as 
a cost. These are designated by z*s.^ Activities of an over-head type 
may well use variable inputs and indeed may compete for the use of 
fixed factors in the short-run. The large cooperative enterprise cus­
tomarily provides some services for its members and (not always inten­
tionally) for all the people of a rural community. These partake of the 
nature of a public %ood. The services in question are designated by 
4 5*s. Finally, the cooperative large enterprise provides inputs of 
services to the homeplots of its members. These services are denoted 
by H's.5 
The other constraints Individually or collectively, each of the 
foregoing variables may be subjected to constraints either directly or 
indirectly. Thus, the remaining m'-l constraining inequalities may be 
^For more detailed information about the y's and x*s see Expression 
7.5. 
See Equation 7.6, 
*5 
See Equation 7.7. 
4 
See Expression 7,9* 
^See Expression 7,10. 
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written in vector notation as 
Kj (Y, X, Q, Z, 0, H) ^ 0 (8.7) 
gm'_l (Y, X, Q, Z, S, H) > 0 . 
Prices and the initial objective function It is enough to note 
at this point that the P and V vectors used as prices of outputs and 
prices of inputs are Riven constants for the decision unit. These condi­
tions can also be handled in the form of demand and supply functions. 
It would not make the problem theoretically more complicated but com­
putationally and expression-wise it would. 
The objective function, at least in short-run applications, is 
assumed to be that of profits 
Expression 8.8 denotes that profits will be maximized. 
The maximum conditions Expressions 8.6 and 8.7 constitute a general 
non-linear programming problem. If one assumes the set of feasible 
points defined by the constraint set is convex and the objective func­
tion is at least concave, then the maximum exists if conditions denoted 
by Expressions 6.9 through 8,11 hold 
Max = PQ - VY . (8.8) 
(8.9) 
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If < holds in Expression 8,9 for the j-th commodity. 
then q (8.10) 
If (Y, X, Q, 2,6, H)>0, 
then ^  = 0. 
(8.11) 
The conditions stated in Expressions 8.9 through 8.11 are more 
restrictive than necessary to obtain a maximum point in non-linear 
programming. There are a number of less restrictive concavity conditions 
and correspondingly less restrictive convexity conditions '^or the con­
straint set which establishes the existence of, at least, a local maxi­
mum. If the conditions expressed al^ ove are met and the convexity and 
concavity conditions are also met, then the maximum is a unique or glob­
al maximum. The latter is not essential for the purpose at hand and, thus, 
the restrictive assumptions of convexity and concavity may be relaxed 
somewhat (50)» 
Expression 8.9 says essentially that the slope of the profits func­
tion plus the summation of the slopes of the constraints with respect to 
the independent variable times the Lagrange multiplier associated with 
each constraint must be less than or equal to zero. Maximum condition 
denoted by Expression 8.10 shows that if the inequality holds in Ex­
pression 8.9, then the output of the associated commodity must be zero 
in the profit-maximizing optimum solution. Expression 8.11 shows that 
^This topic has been well explored by a paper of Arrow and Enthoven 
( 2 ) and by a paper of Arrow, Hurvicz and Uzawa ( 3 )• 
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if the available quantity of a constraining factor is not exhausted 
then its associated shadow price (A^) must be zero. 
One of the derivatives from the profit function can be written as 
Equation 8,6 can be decomposed into many separate and possible 
related production functions. It was admissible in a compact model to 
write it as one equation at this point. Whenever it is helpful, and in 
some cases when it is logically necessary, one can easily decompose that 
function and make several functions out of it. Another essential point 
is here that it is most convenient to express the constraints as im­
plicit functions. 
In order to illustrate the pujrpose and applicability of this model, 
a set of simplifying assumptions is required to turn it into a linear 
model which can be treated with the techniques of linear programming. 
The linear programming problem 
It is instructive to go through the linear programming application 
in many respects. Of the many reasons why it is instructive, one is 
that at any optimal point all the relationships necessary for the linear 
model to be optimal would also hold for the non-linear model. 
Requirements First, the total requirement vector for processes 
or activities must be obtained. Throughout Chapter VII, X was defined 
as a vector of direct requirements in terms of processes. Since the 
vector X denotes requirements of processes and since intermediate 
^See Expression 7.5* 
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processes are also used, a transformation is necessary to include both 
direct and indirect processes 
X = Xg , (8.13) 
where X denotes the vector of total requirements of the m processes. 
The matrix D is associated with intermediate processes and is m by m 
in dimension. In Expression 8.13, xD. . denotes the inputs of x., x i J 1 m 
used to produce a unit of x. In the g matrix d_j = 1 when i = j. This 
matrix containing I's on the diagonal is the sum of the square matrix 
of the intermediate product, g, and the identity matrix 
D + I = D . (8.14) 
^ fsj 
Constraints The familiar set of constraints of a linear pro­
gramming problem is denoted by 
B - X D A* ^  0 , (8.15) 
where B is the ordinary constraint vector of a linear programming 
model. It is 1 by r in dimensions. The A matrix is the usual production 
(transformation or input-output) coefficient matrix of linear programming 
technique and this matrix is r by m in dimension. A single constraint 
is designated by 
b i - X ^  
and there are r constraints of this kind. Intrinsically, Expression 
8.16 denotes a part of the decomposition of the production function 
(Equation 8.6), 
3^ - A A^j — 0 (8.16) 
^Intermediate processes are defined here as processes used in 
producing other processes. 
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The decomposition of the production function From this point one 
could proceed in several ways» The shortest seems to be to state the 
following side relation 
X = QV , (8.17) 
where the final output vector, Q, is 1 by n in dimension. The matrix 
denoted by V is n by m in dimension and it establishes the relation 
between final outputs (q) and corresponding processes (Xq). The latter 
matrix is also associated with the «^'s of Equation 7.6, A typical ele­
ment of Equation 8.17 is written as 
• (8,18) 
Equations 8,17 and 8,18 express a linear production relationship 
between the x's and q's. One could state it as an inequality and treats 
it as a constraint. The X*s thus obtained would have no particular 
use; therefore this road is not chosen here. The approach followed is, 
in reality, a decomposition of the production function which was given 
in the non-linear model as Equation 8.6. A part of this decomposition 
is contained in Equation 8.17 with respect to the final output. Similar 
equations exist for over-head type activities (z's), for cooperative 
public goods ( B's), and for processes of the large-scale collective 
enterprise which are required by members' horaeplot farming (the large 
enterprise processes in the latter category will be denoted by symbol 
HP in this section),^ 
The decomposition of the production function according to these 
^For further information about these three types of processes, 
see Expressions 7.7» 7.9 and 7*10. 
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three sets of processes is expressed as 
X = ZA, (8.19) 
z r\i 
where Z is a vector with dimension 1 by n*« The matrix ^ is n' by m 
in dimension and its elements correspond to the 6*s of Equation 7*7# 
An elements of Equation 8,19 is piven by 
x^ = Z• (8.20) 
A similar equation holds for the 0's 
X^=&E, (8,21) 
^ Aw 
where the 0- vector is 1 by n** in dimension, thus matrix E is n** by m; 
and an element is piven by x = S-E •^, This matrix connects the cooper-i J ^  
ative public goods (©•) with the corresponding processes (X^). 
The decomposed portion of the production matrix is expressed for 
large-scale activities devoted to all members' homeplot farms (as an 
aggregate the latter is denoted by H) 
Xjj = KPH, (8.22) 
where the vector HP is 1 by M, the matrix H is H by m in dimension (M 
denotes the number of cooperative households as before), A typical ele­
ments of Equation 8,22 reads* x^ = HPH^j, 
The relationships in Equations 8,19 through 8,22 could be stated 
independently as constraints but this alternative was not chosen here. 
Implicit values may be placed on the Z, 6» HP vectors without directly 
utilizing Equations 8,19 through 8,22 in terms of constraints. The 
alternative selected is, in essence, the subtraction of the output 
levels (defined in the above equations) from Expression 8,15 (constraint 
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set) and the computation of implicit 2, 6^ and HP values from the re­
sulting solution. 
Variable costs To define total variable cost, a linear relation­
ship is assumed between the utilization of processes (x*s) and the 
utilization of variable factors (y's) 
Y = XDT, (8.23) 
where the matrix T is ra by r in dimension and its elements correspond 
to theT's in Expression 7.13 and in Equation 7.14. 
Now total variable costs may be written as 
total variable costs = V QVDT, (8.24) 
m fv mV 
where V is the input price vector, Q is the final output vector, and the 
three matrices (V, ^  ^) are defined by Expressions 8.17, 8,13 and 8.23 
respectively. In Expression 8.23, X has been replaced by the relation 
denoted by Equation 8.17 in order to derive total variable costs. 
The objective function The objective is to maximize profits as 
piven by 
Max ¥= PQ- V Y* , (8.25) 
where profit is expressed as the difference between the product of the 
final outputs and their prices, on one hand, and the product of variable 
factor inputs and their prices, on the other. 
The new constraints A new set of constraints is derivable by sub­
tracting the requirements of Z, 6*, and HP from the original set of 
constraints (B) 
B = B - [ZA+ &E+ HPj^ DA» , (8.26) 
where B is the difference between the original constraints and the new 
ones. 
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This model pives the optimum values of the q's (final outputs) but 
the constraints are piven in terms of X (processes defined before). Now 
it is convenient to define 
Â» = A* D« V» . (8.27) 
Utilizing Equations 8.27 and 8.17» it is possible to replace 
Expression 8,15 by 
B - q I ' > 0 .  (8.15a) 
Now the new constraints are stated directly in tenns of the variables 
of the objective function. 
The **fi3ced costs" of final outputs A method is necessary in order 
to calculate the variable costs encountered in the production of the 
predetermined levels of Z, ©•» and HP. These costs represent fixed costs 
with respect to the determination of the final output vector, Q. This is 
a situtation well known in business firms. Holdren ( 51» Chapter III) has 
used the term "discretionary fixed costs" to denote costs that are 
functionally variable in the usual short-run consideration but are not 
variable with respect to the decision at hand. In the recent context, 
discretionary fixed costs are expressed as 
V ^  A + @"5 + DT = discretionary fixed costs. (8.28) 
This suggests that the implicit value that the cooperative fii-m is 
placing on activities Z, Q-, and HP will be a function of the shadow 
price of the fixed constrained inputs plus the variable costs assigna­
ble. The marginal cost of Z, or HP is simply the derivative of 
Expression 8.28 with respect to each variable. 
Expression 8.15a establishes r constraints and their derivatives 
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with respect to the decision variable are 
^ = -^DX' . (8.29) 
3 Q ^ ^ fV 
The evaluation of 2, ^  and HP To evaluate the Z» the S-, and the 
HP terms is a relatively simple procedure now. Each of these makes use 
of scarce fixed factors (b's) which have given a shadow price. Each of 
the Z, ©v HP also utilizes variables inputs (y's) for which prices have 
already been calculated. Equations 8.19* 8,21, and 8,22 give the linear 
production function for Z, ©i and HP in terms of the x*s and in the b's. 
Equation 8,23 for T Rives the use of y*s with respect to the x*s. 
Now it is possible to compute the use of the fixed factors by Z, 
S, and HP as 
ZADA'= Bg . (8.30) 
SEDA> = . (8.31) 
(8.32) 
The cost equations can also be set up for each of 2, and HP as 
+ TCg . (8.33) 
VegDT TOg. (8.34) 
V HPHgJt Bjjj. X'= TOgp . (8.35) 
These equations show the total costs of variable and fixed factors 
utilized by Z, &•, and HP respectively. 
The maximum conditions The conditions for the maximum are given 
by the four relations 
Pj - V DT-AA'^ ^0. (8.36a) 
Qj (Pj - V ^  ) = 0 ' (8.36b) 
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(b^ — Q j) = 0 » (8.36c) 
> 0 . (8.36d) 
Relations denoted by Expression 8,36a essentially determine the 
value of the K*s for the non-zero q's. These A*s form a vector which 
is 1 by r in dimension. Expression 8.36b states that for any output that 
is positive in the optimum solution, this relation must have a zero 
value. Expression 8,36c establishes the relation that the Lagrange mul­
tiplier, corresponding to any constraint which is not used up completely, 
will Riven zero value. Expression 8,36d requires that the \'s be non-
negative. 
The optimum solution Once it is known which A's are non-zero and 
Expression 8,17 is incorporated in Expression 8,15a, the solution can 
be obtained for the decision variables, q*s. 
The presentation of this model aims at two objectives. First, it 
may provide some initial steps in developing a systematic programming 
model adapted to the rather complex problems of cooperative optimization. 
Second, this optimization model of large cooperative enterprise will 
connect programming procedure with alternative objective functions in 
Chapter IX, Thus the next chapter gives double treatment to cooperative 
optimization tasks — concerning the large collective enterprise — by 
applying both the marginal and programming approaches. 
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CHAPTER IX. OPTIMIZATION IN THE LARGE COUECTIVE ENTERPRISE 
Several models with alternative objective functions may serve the 
optimization purposes of the large-scale collective poi-tion of a farmers* 
cooperative# 
Optimization in the Pure Enterprise Model 
Ihe pure enterprise version of the large-scale portion of a farm­
ers* cooperative is conceived of as the usual commercial farm in the 
United States or as a typical state-owned farm (firm) in Hungary» This 
model of large-scale collective farming has the objective function of 
maximizing net profits whidi is the difference between gross revenue 
and production costs. Given prices, resource availabilities and techno­
logical possibilities, the profit-maximizing conditions will determine 
the optimal levels of outputs and inputs as well as the optimal size 
of fann operation in this model.^ 
An application of marginal analysis 
The objective function of a profit-maximizing cooperative enter­
prise by means of the square root production function expressed by 
Equation 8*5 is formulated as 
where stands for the average price of a unit of M defined as in 
To optimize under the conditions of different farm structures. 
Heady (^) applies a production function exhibiting the ranges of 
both increasing and decreasing returns to scale in mathematical form 
Y = aR + bR2 - cR3 , (9.1) 
idiere R is the ancestor of M which this paper operates with. 
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Expression 8.1. 
Maximum profit and optimal magnitude of M (as a farm size indi­
cator) can be determined from the derivative of Equation 9*2 taken 
with respect to the independent variable 
-|I = . bP, + .5cPqM-*5 . ÏJ, . (9.3) 
To calculate the pi-ofit maximizing level of input. Equation 9»3 is equal 
to zero and the new expression is solved for M 
-bP„ + ,5cPjr'^ - = 0 (9.4a) q q M 
.5cPqir*5 = bPq + Vjj (9.4b) 
(9.4c) 
.5cPq 7^ 
= 2bc"^ + 2c'^ V„ p"^ (9.4d) 
n q 
M = (2bc'^)*'^ 4. (2c'^ (9.4e) 
M = •25b'^c^ + .25c^v;:V . (9.5) 
n q 
Equation 9.5 gives the optimal farm size in terms of the profit-maxl-
mizing input magnitude for a large cooperative enterprise having a 
square root production function under the specified conditions. 
With the help of Equation 9.5 it is possible to determine sepa­
rately the nature of the relationships between M, on the one hand, and 
b, c, V^, Pq, on the other hand. These relationships are characterized by 
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(9.6) 
(9.7) 
#(0. 
3VM 
(9.8) 
(9.9) 
Expressions 9.8 and 9.9 reflect the logic of economics according to 
>diich firm size increases (decreases) idien output price increases (de­
creases) and firms become smaller (larger) if their inputs are more 
expensive (cheaper), assuming unchanged conditions otherwise. Li the 
optimal farm size, 
extending the mathematical formulation. Equation 8«5 may develop 
into a square root function incorporating two inputs (X and Z) and their 
positive interaction 
After partially differentiating the new profit function, one can derive 
for maximum profit and optimal farm size the conventional first-order 
conditions (marginal profit is zero; the marginal value product of eadi 
resource is equal to its price; the marginal rate of technical substi­
tution between two inputs equals the inverse ratio of their prices). 
The optimal state of this sort may oocist when prices are constant 
parameters for the farm decision unit and no input is of limited availa-
given context, b behaves like and o acts like P with respect to 
q = a + eXZ + cX"^ + dZ'^ . (9.10) 
164 
blllty* In addition to these» decreasing returns to scale (diminishing 
marginal products of each input) must be in existence which have been 
ensured by the chosen (square root) type of the production function* 
If capital availability is limited» then marginal conditions will 
still prevail; however» farm size has become smaller because m lesser 
quantity of each input is used. 
A numerical example of linear programming 
Ibis section contains a short numerical exargile which shows the 
application of the programming technique and also demonstrates the 
efficacy of the linear programming model developed in Chapter VIII, 
The initial set of data According to Equations 8*13 and 8*14 
the D, matrix and the D matrix assume general forms 
4l ^12 D = 
nJ 
^21 **22 
(9.11) 
and 
D = 
'V 
*12 
d2i 1 
(9.12) 
Di order to have a brief exarqple it is assumed that d^g = d^j^ = 0. 
By this a6sunq)tion matrix D has become the identity matrix and the 
intermediate processes have been eliminated from the exan^le* 
The diosen form of the usual A* matrix indicates that there are two 
constraining factors (b*s) and two processes (x*s) in this sin^lifled 
exaiq>le 
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A* = 
.1 .2 
.3 .4 
The tvo constraining factors are given numerical values as 
bj = 100 
b, « 250 . 
(9.13) 
(9.14) 
According to the data in Equation 9.14, an upper limit was placed on 
each of the two processes utilized 
xj = 500 (9.15) 
*2 = 250 . 
The form of matrix V defined by Equations 8*1? and 8.18 indicates 
that both processes are utilized in producing both products (q*s) 
3 1 17= 
2 . 4  
(9.16) 
A* 
INf 
(9.17) 
Matrix defined by Equation 8*2? relates the b's and the q*s 
and takes the fora 
.5 1 
1.3 2.2 
The T matrix defined in connection with Expressions 7.13 and 8,23 
relates the x*8 and the y's (the variable factors) in form 
1 3 
20 4 
(9.18) 
Uie dimensions of this matrix show that there are two y*s (y^^ = non-
labor» y2 = labor) in this exanple and both processes utilize both 
variable factors. 
The price vector of the variable factors is assumed to be 
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V = B 
Thtt price of the two final outputs are 
Pi » 56 
Po = 138 • 
(9.19) 
(9.20) 
Ihe value weight of a unit of outputs On the basis of the above 
information. Expression 8.36 oan be given numerical values for the first 
output (q^) as 
56- [1 2] [3 1] 
1 
1 3 .5 
20 4 
" 
Ai hz 1.3 
— m 
6 0 . (9.21) 
The calculation gives 49 as variable costs; therefore, the familiar c 
value is 56 • 49 = 7 for This is the net price or the value weight 
or profits associated with one unit of output. The o^ value must be 
equal to the product of the last two matrices of Esq^ression 9#21, i.e* 
.5 + 1.3 A2 = 7 . (9.22) 
For the second output (q^,) E^qiression 8.36 takes the numerical 
form 
^ If j I -[^ ^ 1 2.2 (9.23) 
These data give 126 as variable costs and Cg = 12. The twin esqpression 
of Equation 9.22 for qg is written 
\ + 2.2 ^ 2 = 12 . (9.24) 
The shadow prices The simultaneous solution of Equations 9.22 
and 9.24 gives the numerical values 
\ = 1 (9.25) 
Ao = 5 . 
167 
Ihese two numerical values are the so-called shadow prices for the two 
constraining resources; the total value is = 100 for the first 
resource and ^ 2^2 = 1,250 for the second (considering the endowment 
expressed by Equation 9«14), The positive values of and indicate 
that both the constraining resources are used up con^letely by the final 
(optimal) plan. 
Optimum output levels ag^ maximum profita Given all the informa­
tion obtained, the optimum level of outputs can be conqjuted by utilising 
Expressions 8,17 and 8,15a 
q^ « 150 (9.26) 
qg = 25 . 
Together with the o^ and Cg values. Equation 9*26 gives the sum of the 
maximum net profits ( TT^) 
IT® = 7 (150) + 12 (25) = 1,350. (9.27) 
The numerical value of the optimum solution can be checked by 
A^bj + Agbg « 100 + 1,250 = 1,350 . (9.28) 
quantity and cost of variable factors used Knowing the optimum 
q^ and qg values and utilizing Equations 9.16 and 9.18, the optimal 
level of the variable factors can be calculated from Expression 9,26 
[150 25] 
This expression results In numerical values 
yj ' 5,500 (9.30) 
y° = 2,500 . 
The total value of the utilized labor input (yg) is computed from 
3 1 
2 4 
1 3 
20 4 
(9.29) 
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Equations 9*19 and 9*30 in terms of the total wage bill 
VgYg = 2 (2,500) = 5.000 . (9.31) 
The amount of the cooperative surplus Utilizing the solution 
values in Equations 9*27 and 9*31* the maximum amount of cooperative sur­
plus (gx>oss income) obtained by this pure enterprise model is given by 
Cooperative surplus per unit of labor input is confuted from 
Equations 9*32 and 9*30 as 
This data will later serve the purpose of a very instructive comparison* 
Optimization and the Cooperative Model of the Family-Farm 
It is assumed by a large groiq) of Marxian and non-Mandan economists 
that the large cooperative enterprise has been organized to give maximum 
benefits to the cooperative members who seek maximum returns on their 
labor input* The model expressing this idea be termed as the family-farm 
type model for a large cooperative enterprise. The objective function 
of this model is associated with the synonymous concepts of gross income, 
net value product, and cooperative surplus defined in Chapter VII, Ex­
clusively the first term Is used in the socialist countries; the last 
one will be applied in this section* 
Results from marginal analysis 
The amount of cooperative surplus per cooperative member is given 
S® =ir° + VgYg = 1,350 + 5,000 = 6,350 * (9*32) 
(9*33) 
by 
S « (P q - rV M) IT^ , q X (9*3^) 
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where S denotes the total amount of the cooperative surplus (defined by 
-1 
Equation 7.32) divided by the number of cooperative members; M indi­
cates that the terms in parenthesis are divided by the number of cooper­
ative members (the other symbols are esqslalned In connecti<m with Ex­
pression 8.2). Ihe mathematical fora of Equation 9*3^ hints that this 
model does not consider direct wages for the cooperative members* It 
also shows, explicitlyf that cooperative surplus has clearly a residual 
nature which is characteristic for the income of family farms* 
Ch the basis of a square root production relationship» the objective 
function of this model is set as 
Max S = jpq (a - bM + cM*^) - rV^l^ * (9*35) 
Expanding the terms and dividing by M in Equation 9«35 and taking 
derivative will give the results 
MaxS = aPM"^-bP + oP - rV, (9*36) q q q * 
%§ = - .5cPqM'^*^ . (9*37) 
Setting Equation 9.37 equal to zero, the optimal value of M may be 
calculated 
- aPqM'^ - .ScP^lT^*^ = 0 (9.38) 
aPqlT^ = *5cPqM'^*^ (9.38a) 
M = .5a"^c 
M = (.5a"^c)"^ (9.38b) 
M = 4a^c"^. (9.39) 
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Equation 9*39 shows that the optlimim size is insensitive to prices 
of output and nonlabor inputs in the pure family-farm model of the cooper­
ative enterprise* (The terms of P and V have not shown up in Equation q X 
9*39*) This finding is due to the nature of this cooperative model and 
it may not be attributed to the type of the production function applied* 
The optimal solution has exactly the same nature as Heady* s (¥^) solu­
tion based on a different production function (Equation 9*1) in the 
framework of the given cooperative model* 
In his own practical experience covering more than two decades of 
cooperating farming» the author has never met a single cooperative 
member or cooperative manager whose ideas about production scale and 
farm size are in harmony with the notion formulated by Equation 9#39* 
However» he admits that some public administrators and policy makers 
have shown attitudes and behavior which are fairly consistent with the 
essence of this equation* At the same time» the economic literature is 
quite "rich* in authors jàïo are in favor of a cooperative model of the 
family-farm type and who consider the maximization of the per capita 
cooperative surplus as the only perceivable objective function in a 
cooperative model* First in the technical literature. Heady has shown 
the link between the nature of the cooperative model, the type of the 
cooperative objective function expressed in Equation 9*3^* on one the 
hand, and the size-insensitivity to prices formulated by Equation 
9*39# on the other hand* Ehnpirical studies may demonstrate the corre­
spondence between cooperative theories associated with Equation 9*3^ 
and practical policies inplicitly based on Equation 9*39* 
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A new interesting feature of the given model is explored by means 
of other production functions* Using the homogeneous version of the 
square root Equation 8«5t the objective function beooAes (instead of 
Equation 9.35) 
Max S = ^ Pq (- bM + cM*^) - rV^ . (9.40) 
Following the steps expressed by Equations 9*36 through 9.39 will give 
the results 
Max S = - bP» + - rV^ (9.41) 
M q q * 
-|| = -.jcPqWrl'S = 0 ^9.42) 
M = 0 . (9.43) 
Expression 9.43 suggests that per capita cooperative surplus is 
"theoretically* maximum at M * 0; it means that for the objective func­
tion of the family-farm-type cooperative model, the value of S declines 
definitely for all positive values of M, In this model the cooperative 
enterprise should be as small as possible and if M denotes labor-sup­
plying members, the "collective-cooperative" enterprise would be a 
"one-person* operation. If the cooperative model of the family-farm 
type is the case, a production function of constant scale returns (as 
Equation 8,1) will also give a solution expressed in Equation 9.43 
(44, p. 24), In contrast, it may be recalled that the pure enterprise 
model has no limit to the optimal cooperative size, 
J&pplying the above homogeneous square root equation again, an 
optimal farm size is cclculated for the pure enterprise model 
172 
Max "îr= P (- bM + cM'^) -
M q 
(9.W) 
Mbx TTa _ bP M + cP M'5 - VuM 
w q q M
(9.44&) 
H = . bP, • .5cP,K-5 . V„ - 0 (9.45) 
M = .25b"2c^ • .25c^q Vjj^ . (9.46) 
Conçarlson of the two solutions (Equations 9*43 and 9*46) detects 
that the pure enterprise model has an optimal farm size larger than the 
family-type model of the large cooperative enterprise unit* The inoom-
parability of Equations 9*5 and 9*39 (originating from the selected 
particular functional form) necessitated a sinqilified comparison in 
vhic^ one of the compared "optimal cooperative" sizes was zero* Heady 
(43, 44) avoided trivial procedure of this sort and derived congparable 
nonzero values for M in his models by applying a quadratic production 
function (q = - k + aM - bM^ in ny notation). 
To summarize; the optimal size for the family-farm-type cooperative 
model is not influenced by prices of output and nonlabor inputs* It is 
only a function of the parameters of the production function* (The 
value of Pq and does not enter in Equation 9*39*) As the objective 
function of this model designates in Equation 9*35» the magnitude of 
Pq and does influence the sum of returns (cooperative surplus) per 
cooperative member but either of these prices does not influence the 
optimal size or the optimum number of cooperative members (in Equation 
9*39)* If P_ is lowered and/or V is raised, cooperative members will q X 
of course be given a lower income but the optimal size of their cooper-
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atlve operation is unaffected by any price change* 
The optimal size or dimension for the pure enterprise model is a 
function of output and input prices. (The value of both Pq and or 
is Involved in Equations 9»5 and 9*46,) In this model the optimal 
volume of production will decrease as P^ decreases or Increases, 
and farm size will increase as a result of higher P^ and lower 
(V^ stands for the prices of all the aggregate inputs here.) 
In a given period, the optimum-seals cooperative of the pure enter­
prise model would be larger (its M will have a larger value) than the 
corresponding cooperative of the family-type model; the actual differ­
ence in size is influenced by the price of output and nonlabor inputs 
as well as by wages (P^, V^, and Vj^). 
Conceiving these two cooperative models as twins, "the enteiprise 
twin* in this paper corresponds to Domar's (16) "capitalist twin" and 
to Heady*8 (43,44) commercial or state farm model. Hie "family-farm 
resembling* twin is bom in the same family as Domar's producer cooper­
ative and Heady's pure cooperative.^ 
solution values of linear proeramming 
For the cooperative model of the family-farm type, linear pro­
gramming procedure will be applied on the basis of the simple, con­
trived, initial data which exemplified the pure enterprise model of 
It is also very important to distinguish between the cooperative 
model of family-farm type and the original family farm model since the 
family farm almost always operates as an enterprise unit. 
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cooperative farming» Eatprossing the essence of the family-farm-type 
model, this example will not put a price on the labor factor. It will 
change vector V in Equation 9*19 into a scalar* This alteration will 
not influence Expressions 9*13# 9*18, and 9*20 but it will result in 
conqpletely different solution values* 
The value weights In the recent programming model. Expression 
9*47 will take the place of the first part of E:q)re8sion 9*21 of the 
pure enterprise model (the second part is unchanged and will not be 
repeated) 
1 
56-1 [' •] 
20 
(9*47) 
This will give 23 as variable costs for and Cj^ = 33* Ihus Equation 
9*22 is (dianged to 
*5Ai + 1*3^2 = 33 * (9.48) 
Expression 9*23 will be altered partially as 
1 
138 - 1 [= •] 
20 
(9*49) 
which provides a variable cost of 84 for q^ and C2 = 54* Thus Equation 
9*40 is replaced by 
+ 2.2a2 = 54 * (9*50) 
The shadow prices The simultaneous solution of Equations 9*48 
and 9*50 shows that the first constraialag fixed factor (b^) has not 
been ea&austed by the optimal program, therefore, = 0# %e actual 
value of ^ 2 will be computed later after the optimal q's and the 
maximum surplus value are calculated* Now just the data is given (Wiidi 
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will be calculated by Equation 9«57) 
Xj « 0 (9.51) 
A2 = 25.38. 
Optimum output levols In this numerical example the second output 
will not be brought into the optimum solution by the programming proce­
dure. The profit (surplus) maximizing output levels are 
q^ = 192 (9.52) 
qg = 0. 
Quantity and costs of variable factors Instead of Equation 9*15» 
this model will operate with x values obtainable from Equations 9*16 
and 9*52 
=4=3 (192 ) = 576 12 (9,53) 
^ 13 13 
*2 ' ^92 ^  . 
The optimal levels of variable factors used are oomputed as 
y? - 576 ^ + 20 (192 Jt ) = 4,423 ^ (9.5**) 
^ 13 13 
y| = 3 (576 ^ ) 4. 4 (192 1. ) = 2,900. 
^ 13 13 
The total wago bill which is an iopliolt normative category in 
this model can also be calculated 
« 2 (2,900) = 5,800 . (9.55) 
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MajdLgua surplus Equations 9«53 and the c^, Cg values give maxi­
mum gross income (cooperative surplus) attainable in this model 
S® « 33 (192 JL ) = 6,346.66 (9.56) 
13 
Now — referring to Equation 9*14 — the calculation of the shadow 
price of the exhausted resources (bg) can be illustrated 
Ag = 6i?46,66 ^  25.38 , (9.57) 
250 
Cooperative surplus per unit of labor input is given by 
â- = 6,^46^66 = 2.18 . (9.58) 
^ 2,900 
Maximum profits Equations 9«55 and 9«$6 give the maximum profit 
(IT®) attainable in this cooperative model 
11° = S° - Vgy® = 6,436.66 - 5,800 = 548.66 . (9«59) 
A Comparison of Two Cooperative Models 
Values in the optimum plan 
The results achieved for the two cooperative models by the linear 
programming technique may be coiaparad in several aspects although a 
simplified example may not serve as a final argument in any discussion. 
Without far-reaching direct conclusions, the major dissimilarities are 
listed and commented on below. Par the sake of brevity, the pure enter­
prise model of the cooperative fana is called Model I, and the cooper­
ative model of the family-farm type is named Model IIo 
The major characteristics and differences in the optimum plan of 
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the two cooperative models are the followingt 
1, The o values are, of course, larger in Model II since its vari­
able costs do not include wages* 
2# Both the limited fixed factors are esdiausted by the optimal plan 
in Model I; only one of the two gets this solution in Model IIo 
3» Both outputs are produced in the optimum product mix of Model I; 
only one final output is included in the optimal plan of Model II* (Here 
a warning is especially due against any generalization of this exarqale#) 
4# Each model utilizes one of the variable factors in a larger 
quantity and uses the other variable factor in a smaller quantity» 
5* dhe total amount of profits obtainable is much higher (more than 
twice) in Model I* 
6# The total amount of cooperative surplus (gross income) is almost 
the same In both models; it is 6,350 In Model I and 6,346*66 in Model II* 
7* Finally# the cooperative surplus (gross income) per unit labor 
input (member) is lower in îfodel II tdilch claims the declared objective 
of maximizing this value* 
The numerical exasples offer understandable explanations for the 
last major (and perhaps unexpected) difference by indicating that re­
sources may remain unutilized and the output mix may be suboptimal; 
therefore, much lower profits can be achieved and only a smaller per-
capita gross income can be "earned" in Modal 11* In other words. Model II 
does not seem to be organized for the maximum benefit of its members* 
In addition, this model may not provide maximum profits for developing 
the large collective enterprise and may not produce an optimum output 
with efficiently utilizing the limited resources* 
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Son» considerations based on programming approach (Model I) 
It has not been customary to utilise the profit-maximizing pure 
enterprise model in cooperative optimization. spite of this faot, 
economists should recognize the evident advantages of this model, 
especially if it is formulated in the framaworic of a linear programming 
model* In this case the linear programming procedure discussed in Chapter 
VIII is completely applicable and the objective function is exactly the 
sane as defined in Equation 8,25* namelyi 
Max « PQ - VY* • 
Linear programming seems to be the most powerful technique for a 
large-scale multiproduct cooperative enterprise for calculating the 
profit-maximizing quantities and mix of outputs to produce, and for 
computing the optimizing quantities and mix of inputs to apply and pur­
chase. 
The optimal solution obtained by linear programming provides the 
shadow prices of the scarce resources. These prices are of great inpor-
tancQ in the efficient allocation of inputs among different branches of 
the largo collective enterprise. 
To achieve efficient intrafarm allocation of resources, a large 
cooperative enterprise should consider as cost each scarce input used. 
no means can labor bo an exception, although direct wage systems 
are not applied in many cooperatives and the "civil rights" of formal 
Wages paid to cooperative members are vehemently refuted by quite a few 
economists. This point will be taken up and discussed further in o<m-
nection with Model II and other cooperative models. 
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Programming approach and ita lessons (Model II) 
îhe cooperative model of the family-fam type suggests that the 
value of output minus nonlabor costs divided by the number of cooper­
ative nembezv should be maximized on the part of the large collective 
enterprise. In a linear programming framework, this objective would 
have the same functional form as Equation 8.25» but the content of the 
cost-term (VY*) would be different. Ihe input price vector, V, and the 
variable input vector, Y, are slnçly interpreted as nonwage and nonlabor 
items. 
In the standard linear programming model, the maximization of the 
total cooperative suzplus is equivalent to the maximization of this 
surplus per cooperative member since her© the labor supplied is a lim­
ited resource rather than a decision variable. Heady and Agrawal (^5) 
have developed the technique of linear fractional functional programming 
in order to optimize an objective function which is a ratio of two 
linear functions of decision variables, subject to linear constraints. 
"Die cooperative model of the family-fam type presumes that large 
collective enterprises do not considsr their members' labor input as 
production cost. The category of cooperative surplus (or gross income) 
lumps basically different income shares into the sszss inseparable basket. 
It does not distinguish betwsen profit returns and inqplicit wage re­
turns lAidi are of rather different nature from a functional point of 
view. Profit is, in reality, a return to the collective of the cooperative 
members as an economic organization embodied in their large common enter­
prise. The wage return is logically return on their labor inputs to the 
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individual members-laborers as such* 
A cooperative member may allocate his labor among différent em­
ployment opportunities, including his work In the large collective 
enterprise* But the large cooperative enterprise has no other economic 
alternatives than to utilize its members* labor, its capital, land, 
managerial resources and to pursue profits for the benefit of its 
members in accordance with social goals and priorities» 
Maximum cooperative surplus as an economic objective seems to be 
the consequence of a functional falsification without any Ideological 
connotation* If profits ard wages are placed into the same boat, with 
no distinction between them, the economic reasons for cooperation may 
think into the •dim ocean* of cooperative surplus. 
Agricultural economists in my country, Hungary, should follow the 
practical path of cooperative managers in recognizing that the proper 
"cooperative* wage rate for calculations is well known alternative 
(or opportunity) cost in most cases* It is ^ at the cooperative member 
and ençloyee could earn in cocç>arablo esçloyment outside the large col­
lective enterprise* 
Optimum Intensity in Fanning 
Increasing yield from a given (or even diminishing) area of arable 
land may be the necessazy aspect of farming as is the unquestionable 
case in Hungazy* Under these circumstances the optimum utilization of 
available land plays an important role* 
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The applicability of marginal analvsia 
Ihe amount of any single input or that of an aggregate input 
category (defined as in Expression 8.1) which mazimizes per hectare 
output can be determined by the standard optimization tedinique after 
an appropriate production function has been selected* Now one may 
assume that Equation 8*5 is characteristic for the input-output rela­
tionship of a tedinlcal unit (1 hectar land) of agricultural produc­
tion and may also assume in the place of M« 
The derivation of the output-maximising condition (MPP =0) will 
give the optimum amount of input per unit of land area 
q = a - bMg + (9.60) 
0^ = - b 4" •Scfl ^ - 0 (9*61) 
o 
o 
Mq = o25b'^/ . (9.62) 
Equation 9,62 shows the level of aggregate input (or a single input 
as fertilizer) whidi gives rise to maximum output per hectare if 
Equation 9*60 is the relevant production function for this technical 
unit. 
The optimum level of intensity can be confuted by the usual opti­
mization technique. This optimal intensity may be conceived of as the 
amount of an input (for exaaple, fertilizer denoted by Z) per hectare 
lAlch maximises return from expenditures spent on this input. The farm 
unit is assumed to have limited capital in this case* 
Applying Heady*8 (4)) recent example in a generalized form, first 
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"gross returns from fertilisation** are calculated by the help of a 
quadratic response function in order to find the optimal intensity of 
fertilizer use* Then this return from fertilization is divided by the 
total cost of fertilizer use. Thus the resulting rate of gross return 
function, GR*, for fertilizer expenditure is derived as 
P (aZ - bZ^) 
gr» = » (9.63) 
P +V 
where Z stands for fertilizer used on one hectare of land, V denotes S 
the price of fertilizer and F is the fixed cost of fertilization per 
land unit* 
Taking the dérivate of GR* vith respect to 2, equating it with 
zero and solving for the value of Z will give the optimal intensity 
expressed by the per-hectare amount of fertilizer t^ioh maximizes 
gross return from expenditures spent on buying and applying fertilizer* 
An important physical aspects of optimal intensity may be shown 
by co:g)uting the substitution rate between fertilizer and land* In this 
two-resource case, the production function is assumed to be given by 
where D denotes the units of land, q, Z, and a, b are output, fertilizer, 
and constants respectively (as before)* Multiplying and dividing by D 
will result in 
q = aZ . bZ^D'^ . (9.6i^a) 
Both Equations 9*6^ and 9»64a express output as a function of fertilizer 
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and land. From Equation 9«26a one can easily calculate the marginal 
physical products of the two inputs and their ratio will represent the 
marginal rate of technical substitution between fertilizer and land 
Equation 9.65 shows that fertilizer substitutes for land at a diminishing 
rate* 
To bring economic indicators into the picture, one should set RTS 
equal to the corresponding price ratio. Since the market price for farm 
land is not given in the Eastern European countries, it must be adopted 
either from the dual solution of a linear prograianing model or from the 
statistics of land prices paid for alternative uses (for exaiqple, home 
and factory sites)# 
Another variant of optimal intensity can be computed from the regu­
lar profit maximizing condition (applied on per hectare basis) «hidi 
equates the marginal value product of an input with its price* "Diis 
principle is applicable to each kind of input* In the cooperative model 
of the family-farm type, however» the optimal intensity of labor input 
may be derived either with the help of a normative wage or by finding 
the state vhere the marginal product of labor is zero (if available 
labor were unlimited and conqpletely "free" as well as if "ceteris paribus" 
conditions prevailed)* 
MPPg a ZbZD"^ aD^ 2D 
MPPj) bZ^D-Z bz2 Z 
(9.65) 
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Programming aspects 
In a programming framework, the optimum Intensity model depicts a 
situation where only land is considered as a scarce factor and the 
objective function of the large cooperative enterprise is to maximise 
the output per land unit. This amounts to the sans programming problem 
as maximizing total output, with the only special feature being that 
labor is considered in unlimited supply* 
In today's Hungary it is hard if not impossible to conceive of a 
cooperative situation in whldi optimum intensity would be a rational 
decision rule* A cooperative of this type would have to be an almost 
Robins on-Crusoe-type economy with a labor supply unlimitedly abundant 
relative to land# This cooperative would have a surplus of labor idiose 
societal marginal product approaches zero, and it would purchase no 
external Inputs for fanning# %der these rather unrealistic conditions, 
the profit function would assume the fom of maximizing the rent on 
the scarce land* 
A variant of this intensity model is the case where there are no 
inputs from nonfarra sectors to agriculture and land is not scarce but 
labor is scarce. Once again one maximizes rent on land associated with 
labor vnp to the point where the marginal product of land approaches gero# 
If the objective function of the intensity model is a ratio of two 
linear functions of decision variables (in a form resembling Equation 
9.63), then linear fractional functional programming (45) may come into 
the picture again. 
Aspects of the intensity model oast light on the relative rarity 
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of modem cases vhere output maxlmigatlon Is a relevant rule* This rule 
be analyzed under cooperative conditions in the next section* 
Results from marginal analysis 
If a cooperative enterpi<ise wishes to maximize production subject 
to cost constraints» it may treat this optimization problem with the 
usual technique of marginal analysis. Assuming linear relationships, 
one output and two inputs, the relevant functions are given by 
where M and K are labor and capital inputs with unit price and 
respectively, and F represents fixed costs* The objective fonction (<&) 
will maximize output subject to limited capital (C) which is entirely 
used according to Equation 9*6? 
Maximum Output Model 
q = f (M,K) 
C = VjM + + F 9 
(9.66) 
(9.6?) 
Max 96= f(M,K) + (C - - F) . (9.68) 
Partial differentiation results in 
(9.69) 
H - H - (9.70) 
= (F - PjjV -PgV - F . (9.71) 
o A 
Dividing Equation 9.70 by Equation 9.69 will give the first-order 
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conditions for maximum output whidi may be written in two alternative 
forms 
— =™^f.rX = -. (9-72» ) 
MPP„ MPPy . 
— 2  =  — A  .  ( 9 . 7 2 b )  
% 
In Equation 9«72b the Lagrangean multiplier» A* is interpreted as the 
total derivative of output with respect to costs (the reciprocal of the 
marginal costs). 
Output maximization procedure is altered in the cooperative model 
of the family-farm-type to such extent that labor costs are not con­
sidered# Since a relevant production function is inconceivable without 
labor inputf some calculativa price (alternative wage) should be used 
for labor; otherwise no solution oould be derived in this cooperative 
model containing two inputs. If mora than two input categories are in­
volved but labor is given no price, then the conclusion still remains 
the same* The next model to be developed will determine a maximum 
(potential) return on the unit labor input of the coc^rative members 
as some kind of cooperative *wage* in terms of solution values* 
Cons iderations from a programming viewpoint 
]h a programming approach, the output-maximizing model is con­
sidered a variant of the intensity model in the sense that both labor 
and land have a fixed quantity and for some reason or other the deci­
sion-maker does not want to put prices on these inputs. In general it 
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would of course lead to mlsallocation of scarce resources and to inef­
ficient resource use if some inputs were priced and others were not. This 
point has been discussed in connection with the cooperative model of the 
faaily-fana type* 
If there existed a "free* and practically unlimited capital siqtply 
from outside to the farm decision units but labor and land were fixed 
in quantity, it would seem obvious that one should simply maximise out­
put relative to the fixed factors* This would probably not result in 
resource misallocation in the event of a single output* However, even 
in the unrealistic case of a super-specialized farm, if the only product 
is produced by several processes (or technologies) resources could 
easily be misallocated by not considering land or labor costs* 
When labor and land are both scarce and more than one output is 
produced, then a manager (even that of a freely and abundantly equipped 
state farm) must charge both labor and land — at least implicitly for 
intrafarm use — in order to choose the correct product mix which maxi­
mizes the value of output and in order to select the mix of the most 
efficient production processes (technologies) for minimizing the cost 
of -sriiatevar output mix that is optimal* 
In general, when there are at least two factors that can be substi­
tuted for each other in many different uses, and there are various ways 
of producing the same product, or there exists the possibility of pro­
ducing different products with different processes (technologies), then 
an allocation problem is always in existence* If an allocation problem 
arises, then optimal allocation can be adiieved only by utilization of 
188 
prices of some sort; thus at least shadow — or intrafam — prices are 
required. Regardless of how many factors are involved# for example if 
the government is willing to grant all the necessary capital goods to a 
state farm with no charge (as was the case for quite a long time in 
Hungary)» this farm could not optimise in any meaningful economic sense 
without considering these capital factors as costs* 
The farm situation depicted before is optimally adaptable to treat­
ment by mathematical programming# Ihe more inputs and the more outputs 
involved» the more essential and the more powerful the programming 
technique is in every respects* 
"Efficiency" Ifodels of a Cooperative Finn 
In the socialist countries cooperative farms are very often given 
the politico-economic slogan of efficiency in a specific form: "to obtain 
the greatest possible output at la^t cost," According to the author's 
judgement, this tautology may essentially express the minimum cost 
principle termed as "lex minimi" in economies* At the same time Shubik 
(7^) and others should be praised for saying that the cited goal or 
inspiration is nonsense as no ^eratlve meanings can be attributed to 
it* While "the maximum output at minimum cost" is operationally undefined, 
it is completely meaningful to ask for the greatest output for a fixed 
(given) cost, and it Is similarly reasonable to seek for the least cost 
of a fixed output* 
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Cost minimization and maximum imlt price for coopérative labor 
lAider general clrcuastances» the mlnimom cost of a given output is 
determined as subject to the production function* Operating with Equa­
tions 9,66 and 9*67, the cost minimizing objective function is e^qpressed 
by 
Min ^  = Vj^  + Vj^  + F +A [q - r(M,K)J , (9.73) 
lAere q denotes that the quantity of output is predetermined* Successive 
partial differentiation and division vill result in the same first-order 
conditions for minimum cost as have been previously confuted for maximum 
output (Equations 9.72a and 9»72b). The same problems have also arisen 
with respect to the price of labor input in the cooperative model of the 
family-farm type as discussed before* In the one output, two input oase 
some sort of labor price is also required in order to achieve the standard 
geometrical (tangency) solution because the price line cannot be graj^Aed 
without it* 
addition to the alternative cost and the programming-provided 
shadow price, a third kind of labor price (wage) may also be derived 
in the cooperative model of the family-farm fype. îhe latter is based 
on the concept of cooperative surplus and is analogous to a certain prod­
uct price elaborated by Helmberger and Hoos (48) for members of mar­
keting cooperatives* 
In a large-scale cooperative enterprise (assumed for the time 
being as a family-farm type version of the cooperative models) various 
other inputs are associated with M (me#)ers ' total labor ii^ut), to 
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produce a final good» q. The production function is given by» 
(9.74) 
where the X*s represent nonlabor inputs and H stands for all the home-
plot faras belonging to the given large cooperative enterprise* 
The following assunptions will serve in the model to be developed* 
1. the production function is a regular single-valued function whidï 
specifies all the technologically efficient methods of produc­
tion; 
2* the marginal physical products are nonnegative in the relevant 
range; 
3o the isoquants are smoo^i and convex to the origin; 
4* All X*8 are bought and q is sold in a perfectly conç)etitive 
market and/or their prices are constant parameters for the 
cooperative; 
5* the number of cooperative members is fixed and the large col­
lective enterprise is able to utilize all the labor that its 
members supply; 
6« all cooperative members receive the same return per unit of M 
(and this return is denoted by V^), 
In addition to the above assumptions, it is also assumed that the 
objective of the cooperative organization is to maximize the return 
(unit price) of M, for any amount of M which the individual members 
wish to supply, but subject to the restraint that all nonlabor costs, 
including fixed costs, F, are met. 
If the large cooperative firm acts according to the pure enterprise 
model, its profit equation would be shown in the given context by 
N 
i r =  Pqq - 2  %  -  V  - f. (9.75) 
1=1 
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Recalling that the large cooperative firm views M as a parameter beyond 
its control. Equation 9»75 may be rewritten in the form resembling the 
concept of the cooperative surplus (S*) 
N 
S* » - J - P • (9.76) 
i=l 
An alternative form of this cooperative surplus is given by 
S* , (9.77) 
where M is a parameter for the large cooperative as and but 
is not 80. Clearly, a maximum 8* will determine a maximim V^« The 
maximization of S* implies the fulfillment of a cost minimisation 
condition and an optimum output requirement» On the track of Helmberger 
and Hoos (48) it ia possible to show that these conditions are exactly 
analogous to those whidi must be satisfied by a profit maxlmiming 
cosqpetitive firm* 
Although the amount of members' labor input is fixed, various 
alternative levels of q may be feasible considering different tech­
nologies, timing, etc» To achieve a maximum S*, any level of q pro­
duced must be produced at a minimum variable cost (excluding labor cost) 
>^en the sihb of all nonlabor variable costs, C*, is defined by 
C« = ^  . (9.78) 
i«l 
With Equation 9.78, the cost minimizing Lagrangean term is written as 
N I Jl 
Min C* = ^  ^i^i " •••» •••» Xjj I M, H) — cy * (9.79) 
i=l 
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Ih order to have C* as a minimum, two conditions must be satisfied 
^ . 0 (9.80a) 
and 
*1 
. (9.80b) 
where 1 « 1, N. Costs minimisation for any given amount of q 
inqplies that the cost-productivity ratio (the ratio of input price to 
the marginal physical product) must be equal for all nonlabor productive 
services# 
In the recent "efficiency" model eadx q will be associated with 
a corresponding minimum variable nonlabor cost of production according 
to a specific cost function 
C* = C*(q) , (9.81) 
lAere C* denotes the variables costs of nonlabor nature again* Equation 
9,76 may be rewritten by substituting Equation 9.81 
S* = P^q - C*(q) - P . (9.82) 
If 8* Is to be a maximum, the analogous conditions to Equations 9.80a 
and 9.80b must hold in form 
dS* iq (9.83) 
and 
P, - . (9.W 
Thus a maximum S* iiqplies that output price equals marginal cost# (The 
marginal cost curve is assumed to have a positive slope at its inter­
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section with the horizontal price line,) 
Still remaining on the track of Helaberger and Hoos (48) let q® be 
o 
the output connected with the maximum 8*, and let AC denote the corre­
sponding average total nonlabor cost of production. At the maximum» 
therefore» S* = (P^ - AC°) q° and since S* = (defined in Equation 
9,77) thus 
(P - AC°)q° 
yo = (9.85) 
M M 
For any given level of M» the large cooperative firm will select the 
level of q which maximizes In this vein» Equation 9*^7 expresses a 
unique functional relationship between the maximum return (unit price) 
of M (denoted by V®) and the level of M.^ 2h another form it may be 
written as 
= g(M) • (9.86) 
Under the specified conditions of this •^efficiency" model of the 
cooperative» shows the maximum remuneration (termed as gross income 
or dividend by most Marxian authors) the cooperative firm can return 
for its members* unit labor input after covering fixed and nonlabor 
variable costs in the ease of various quantities of total labor which 
the cooperative members might be willing to supply. Solution values for 
nay be called maximum (potential) cooperative "wage* or gross-unit» 
income payable to members at various levels of their labor supply. 
^Helmberger and Hoos (48) call this relationship the short-run 
net returns function. 
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Prograwmlnig and cost minlmlgatlon 
Cost minimisation included in the "efficiency* model seems to be 
a frequently encountered decision rule* A careful examination of eoonomlc 
programming models shows that the cost-minimizing objective function as 
such is simply IncooqDlete* It leaves unanswered the question of the 
optimal output level and that of the optimum output mix of the enter­
prise* If the target mix and levels of outputs are previously specified, 
then the cost-minimizing model Is automatically reduced to a special case 
of the profit maximizing model* 
Costs are minimized for every output mix that is produced in the 
frameworic of a programming model of profit maximization* However, it 
should be emphasized that an arbitrary pre-fixing of the enterprise 
production target will generally lead to inefficiencies fraa a macro-
economic viewpoint.^ In other words, a given farm might produce what 
it produces at the least cost but this would not be the least-cost 
output for the farm industry as a whole nor would It be a social-
welfare-maximizing output by any other means than by chance* 
The programming language expresses that in Equation 8*25, VT* Is 
minimized with a given PQ by a cost-minimizing model* Since the vector 
P and the vector Q are both given (the latter as a target), then the 
problem under consideration is reduced to the case of maximizing -VY*« 
The first term (PQ) would slnqjly drop out of Equation 8*25* 
^Kaldor and Saupe (56) conducted a deep analysis of the efficiency 
of the farm industry In the North Central Region of the United States* 
The authors paid special attention to the lack of fulfillment of the 
minimum cost requirement* 
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Whatever output a farm might obtain to naxioise its profits, it 
nust also minimize its production costs* Di the "efficiency" model, the 
cost term is minimized regardless the value of the output, and if an 
arbitrary PQ is determined, then the profit maximization problem is 
solved by cost minimization# 
The "efficiency" models evidently depicted short-run, one-period 
situations in vhidh accumulation (investments to increase productive 
capacity) are not considered directly. The next section will turn 
attention to the long-run nultlperlod oases* 
Problem of Cooperative Growth Models 
^ concept of cooperative growth 
Large-scale cooperative enterprises reflect the heavily-weighted 
objective of steady economic and financial growth lAich is an Integral 
part of the agricultural development in socialist countries* For a 
large cooperative firm, economic growth may be defined very broadly 
as the changes in its financial position that permit an increase in its 
productive capacity to satisfy the needs and desire of its members* As 
a rule, aggregate output may be used to denote and quantify economic 
growth both in general and in a cooperative sense* With respect to the 
cooperative conditions, three further qualifications might be helpfulI 
1* The rate of growth of aggregate output should not be lower than 
the rate of increase in cooperative membership (if the latter prevails), 
thus a higher per capita output must be ensured as an index of economic 
growth. 
2. Ihe increase in aggregate ou^ut should not be associated with 
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a substantial worsening of the financial posititon (Indebtedness)« 
3* The growth of aggregate output should not be linked to a signif­
icantly increasing inequality of the cooperative income distribution. 
As expressed in the basic definition and emphasised In the second 
qualification» the economic concept of cooperative growth involves an 
improving (or at least non-worsening) financial position* Thus finding 
the present value of future income streams is crucial from the viewpoint 
of economic growth, This way one arrives at the problem of discounting 
whi<* lies in finding the present (capital) value of given sums (reve­
nue magnitudes) that are available in successive years of a chosen 
period* 
The maximisation of capital value as an objective 
Id the economic literature (4), $4, 81») it has been suggested that 
the proper objective function for a firm is that of maximizing the firm's 
net worth (capital value) over time* 
Objective functions discussed up to this point are relevant for 
short-run decisions and they do not consider capital investment* Di the 
cooperative case, the acquisition of new members is an investment in 
human capital and this is similar to an increase in the technical skills 
of members*^ Both would have direct pay-offs to the cooperatives* 
The maximization of capital value would be a perfectly sufficient 
guide to investment decisions if the only objective of the cooperative 
were that of making profits in the long-run. However, in the cooperative 
^In his lectures at ISD, Kaldor discusses various social aspects 
of investment in human capital, including the costs and benefits of 
human capital formation* 
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case particularly there are many other objectives to be considered* 
Members* aspirations and life styles as well as their social security 
and opportunity for their dilldren are all relevant factors* The like­
lihood that the cooperative farm will remain a viable organisation 
implies that its major objective may at times not coincide with long-
run profit maximisation* The latter is just another term for maximizing 
present capital value* 
In some aspectst a large cooperative firm Is certainly more than 
a typical business enterprise because it furnishes personal income and 
services to its members and it considers members* personal goals and 
aspirations in a more direct and more encompassing fashion than a 
private capitalistic firm mostly does concerning woricers and engiloyees* 
Since growth of the large cooperative firm or investment in this 
enterprise directly competes with members* personal income and conse­
quently with their individual personal savings, there is introduced 
another problem in any long-run consideration* The business firm por­
tion of the cooperative farm can only grow from withheld profits not 
paid out to the cooperative members; therefore, it must clearly offer 
an expected return not only in profits but also in amenities* These 
expected returns should be at least equal to the expected money returns 
on members* individual private savings* 
A growth model constructed to reflect all the relevant foregoing 
considerations would have the sane mathematical form as that of the 
ordinary profit-maximizing enterprise model but the discount factor 
would possess crucial li^ortance and sight well be different from its 
196 
usual value connected closely with the market rate of interest. 
"Present value* in cooperative optimization 
Assuming T periods of tine (t = 1, T) and as prospective 
revenue at the end of the t-th year* the total present (capital) value 
of is the sua 
T 
PV = ^  R^(l + r)"^ > ( 9.8?) 
t»l 
iriiere PV denotes present value and r is the rate of interest per annum. 
If three years are only considered (in a sizqple example), then the 
present capital value of a recent farm investment is given by 
PV = Rj(l + r)"l + Rg (1 + r)"2 + (1 + r)"^ + K» # (9.88) 
vfaere K* denotes the capital value of the given investment (for exav^le* 
a purchased farm machine) at the end of the time period considered. If 
the Investment is not utilised according to its original designation, 
then K* will stand for the familiar "scrap value** of the capital good 
in question. 
To consider multiperiod cases and growth aspects, a large cooper­
ative farm can formulate a maximizing objective function from Equation 
9.49, and after specifying the relevant restraints, it may call for 
optimization techniques. 
Similarly to Siubik's (7^) management-run coz^oration, a large 
cooperative firm may pursue its objective by attempting to maximize 
the value of the discounted income stream paid to its members over 
some time period subject to the constraint that the risk of indebtness 
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(Insolvency* bankruptcy) 1» kept below a specified level# Now the opti* 
nitatlon is set up as 
T  ^  
Mudnise ^ (9*89) 
t=o 
subject to 
i; t - • 
Wiere 
/>» discount factor, 
= members * Income in period t* 
Ihe restraint in Expression 9*89 indicates that the probability of sur­
vival (avoiding insolvency) for T periods will be at least k*^ 
Insolvency condition is specified as 
< 0 , (9.90) 
lâiere denotes the value of the collective funds (called Indivisible 
Rmds of the large cooperative enterprise in the Eastern European coun* 
tires) and U stands for the stun of current debt and liabilities of the 
cooperative fim* Expression P^(E^ ^  U) is, of course, the probability 
that the cooperative firm will be bankrupted in the t-th period* 
To evaluate the yearly inccma stream of cooperative members a 
discount factor, j>, is applied in Expression 9*89; this factor has the 
usual forapB (1 + r)*^ idiero r is the rate of interest# 
^The upper-case Greek pi denotes that eatA periods (t = 1, •••, T) 
is considered separately# 
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While its relevant magnitude is far from being determined or agreed 
upon, some eeonoaio aspects of p may definitely be recognised under so­
cialist conditions* Everywhere the discount rate takes into account time 
dimensions and alternative use of investment funds* Both are especially 
in^ortant la Hungary where capital is extremely scarce for most cooper­
ative farms* Vhen a cooperative firm ties \xp capital in any given invest­
ment, it is prevented from using this money for alternative purposes* 
In particular» it could put this money in a bank savings account and could 
have a return on this investment, a year hence, of 3*5 per cent or 5 
per cent* %us a forint invested this way today would be worth 1*035 
or 1*05 forints a year hence, or alternatively, a forint return a year 
hence may be equated to (1*035) ^  or p® (1*05) ^ forints today* Bxe 
concept of p known as the discount factor has nothing iAiich is method­
ically special under socialist conditions* In a large-scale enterprise 
it is also clear that p should not be neglected for long time horizons 
idiich are an especially characteristic feature of cooperative farm 
organization* 
All types of cooperative models presented in this chapter may 
prevail side by side at a given time when large cooperative finas aim 
at different objectives and have various sets of restraining factors 
since their political, social make-tq>, and economic aspirations are far 
from being unified* It is also highly perceivable that a given cooper­
ative may change objective functions when its inner organisational 
structure and its economic power is strengthening in harmony with general 
agricultural development and national economic growth* Cwisiderlng the 
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large-seale portion of farmers* cooperatives only# an observer can 
recognize that elements of the pure enterprise model are gaining place 
and those of the family-farm-type model ar# losing weight Wiile those 
of other models are present mostly as constraints in Hungaxy*s co<^r-
atlves today* 
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CHAPTER X. ECONOMIC WELFARE AND OBJECTIVES 
OF COOPERATIVE HOUSEHOLDS 
This chapter Is addressed to the economic welfare of the cooper­
ative household (family) considered as a certain type of tightly-knit 
interacting organization* The first step in the analysis will be to 
set up an objective function containing the decision variables open to 
the cooperative household* Second, the pay-offs to the household for 
its various employment choices will be defined* Third» the constraints 
Impinging on the labor supply alternatives of the household are devel­
oped* Finally, the economic welfare (objective) function of the cooper­
ative household will be maximized subject to the relevant constraints* 
It is to be en^asized that an economic welfare function is going 
to be developed and not the much wider, so-called social welfare func­
tion of the cooperative households* 
Decision Variables in the Objective Function 
The level of the economic welfare of a cooperative household is 
determined by two groups of variables* The first group, which this 
chapter focuses on, consists of decision variables associated with 
employment alternatives* The second group discussed in much shorter 
form is made up of variables determined by the cooperative or by the 
state* This latter group contains variables which are not decision var­
iables from the viewpoint of a cooperative household unit; but these 
variables determine the alternatives open to the household, and are 
decision variables for the cooperative decision unit and/or the state* 
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Ihe variables that are functionally related to the welfare ob­
jectives are grouped as 
Ml « "i (liji. Ml. . (lO'i) 
lAere 
3 the economic welfare of the i»th cooperative household* 
In Equation 10,1 the first decision variable, l^j^, denotes the 
hours of labor of particular (the j-th) kind which is supplied to the 
large cooperative enterprise by person 1 in the i-th household who is 
a member of the cooperative, 
denotes the matrix of all kinds of labor supplied to the large 
cooperative firm by all members of the i-th household, ïhe dimensions 
of this matrix are s by r# if s family members provide r kinds of labor 
input. In Equation 10,1 the second term, has the same meaning as 
the matrix with the cooperative member excluded, D* other words, 
the first row of the latter matrix is deleted, therefore, has dimen­
sions of (s-1) by r. If in a household there is more than one cooper­
ative member, then will change its dimensions accordingly. 
The third term of Equation 10,1, stands for the matrix of non-
cooperative eaploynent of all household (family) members; its dimensions 
are s by r* where r* kind of labor are supplied to non-cooperative 
eiz^loyers. Finally, denotes the labor performed by the household 
members on their own homeplot farm; this matrix is of s by r* In its 
dimensions. 
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Evaluation of Alternative Enq>loynent Opportunities 
Die four decision variables involved in Equation 10*1 aymbollze 
four categories of labor supply* Each of these labor (employment) cate­
gories provides the household a specific return. Diese returns are 
evaluated by Equations 10*2 through 10*5* The first equation gives the 
evaluatim of the cooperative employment 
= (v^ij • Fg) , (10.2) 
where 
the value to the household of a cooperative member's em­
ployment in the collective enterprise* 
In Equation 10*2 v^^^j exprssses the wage return to the cooperative 
member for a unit of work In the large cooperative enterprise. The next 
term, stands for the profit-share going to the cooperative house­
hold from the large enterprise* This share is proportional to the number 
of hours worked by a cooperative meznber* The last term, (its first 
letter may be thought of as referring to fringe benefits), denotes non-
wage benefits accruing to the laborer which vary with the hours worked 
in the large enterprise*^ 
It should be noted that the relationship is simplified between 
the Fg» (and if » F*), on the one hand, and the Z*s, on the other* 
It is assumed here that the relationship is linear* In many cases, 
however, this relationship is far from linear; in particular the if*s 
may have threshold values and the F's may fozm a stepped-functlon with 
respect to the number of hours worked* In other words, profit-share 
and some fringe benefits are usually available only to a person whom 
one might call a regular ftill-tine ea^loyee* This has the prime ob­
jectives of attaching laborers more securely to a particular em­
ployment* 
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A t3rploal cooperatlY* household Involves persons who are not 
cooperative members but supply labor to the large cooperative enterprise* 
Equation 10*3 evaluates the return on the labor of these family members 
+ Fg) , (10.3) 
where 
(2) 
2 - the value to the household of a unit of employment of other 
family members in the large cooperative enterprise. 
In Equation 10#3» denotes the vector of net wages paid to the 1-th 
household for ençloyment of its member by the large collective enter­
prise; this vector has r elements if the household members perform r 
kinds of job (j = 1, ..., r in the case of this household which has a 
cooperative member employed in the j-th job of the large collective 
enterprise). has already been defined. 
Some members of a cooperative household are generally working as 
non-cooperative enq>loyees. The return on their labor services is 
evaluated 
(?) 
Z * (V* + IT + ?*), (10.4) 
where 
(3) 
Z =» the value to the household of a unit of emplc^ent of all 
family members working in non-cooperative organisations. 
In Equation 10.4 V*» if**» and P* are of the same basic economic content 
as defined by these symbols before, and they are related to non-ooeper-
atlve employment again. The vector, V* has r* elements since this Is 
the corresponding number of kinds of labor assumed* 
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The work performed on its own homeplot farm of the 1-th cooperative 
household oan be evaluated by 
2^^^ = (Pf^ + g), (10.5) 
«here 
= the value to the household of a unit of labor on its own 
homeplot farm. 
In Equation 10.5» P is an n-dimensional vector of prices of outputs 
lAlch are produced on the homeplot farm. Symbol f^ stands for the matrix 
of marginal physical products of various labor inputs that are supplied 
by the household to its own homeplot farm. This matrix is r" by n in 
dimensions since there are assumed to be r" kinds of works and n vari­
eties of outputs on the homeplot farm. Matrix O denotes the marginal 
recreational value associatsd with csch family mamber's ttork performed 
on the household farm. The ^  matrix is s by r** in its dimensions. 
The Set of Relevant Constraints 
As discussed before, each cooperative member is constrained to 
supply a certain minimum amount of labor hours to the large collective 
enterprise. This constraint is expressed by 
l^j^ — — 0 » (10.6) 
where 
Xj = the minimum labor quantity to be supplied per annua by a 
cooperative member to the. large collective enterprise. 
The first term in Equation 10.6 spells out that person 1 belonging 
to the 1-th household, the cooperative member, is assigned to job j 
in the large collective firm. 
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Leiaurs or recreation time will not enter the objective fonction 
directly* However, it is worthwhile to consider the fact that if r^ 
is the number of recreation hours for the k-th members of the i«th 
household and <r^ is the vector of hours available for this family 
member to be devided between work and leisure, then the equation for 
leisure (recreation) of the k*th member of the i-th household reads as 
4 =• «Ik - 1 • 'Lc 1 • Kk 1 • Sik î] • d"'?) 
The first three terms in brackets are defined in connection with 
Equation 10*1* The fourth tem, denotes the obligatory household 
duties for the k-th manner of this household* (These duties are espe­
cially worth considering in the ease of the housewives of cooperative 
peasant families*) In each bracketed term, the l*s denote that only one 
family member is taken care of by Equation 10*7* 
Leisure (recreation) must, of course, be a nonnegatlve quantity 
and, therefore, the leisure constraint for the k-th family member takes 
the foBtt 
There are s expressions of this type -»» one for each member of the 
cooperative household. 
Maximum Conditions and Relevancy 
On the basis of evaluations (Z*s) and constraints discussed, one 
can derlv« the maximum conditions for the objective function expressed 
by Efjoation 10«1* A typical member of this maximum condition set is 
given by 
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The flTSt term of Equation 10*9 is the evaluation of a cooperative 
member's ençloynent in the ooUeotive enterprise times the derivative 
of the objective (welfare) function with respect to the work performed 
in this employment* The second tern» Is equal to zero if the given 
cooperative member works more than the minimum requirement (i#e* if the 
inequality holds in Egression 10,6). In this case Expression 10*9 
becomes exactly like the maximum conditions for other family members 
voricing in the large collective enterprise* This condition for the s-th 
family member (helper) is expressed as^ 
'u (lo'w) 
If the equality holds in Expression 10*6 and is positive in 
Expression 10*9» then the following relation appears 
IMder the conditions of this model the cooperative member would sugpply 
only the required minimum of labor to the large collective entexprise 
if his cooperative io^licit wage plus his "profit-share" (dividend) 
were lower than the implicit wages of other employment* 
1h@ case where - 1^ >0 and, therefore ® 0 can occur if 
and only if the implicit wage rates are equal in the different oocu* 
1 (3) (4) 
Similar conditions are derivable by using 2 and Z * 
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patlons 
dearly something must be wrong with this model developed so far# E-
quation 10.11a suggests that a cooperative member of "homo oeeonomicus** 
type may take all possible combinations of occupations or may work just 
in his cooperative eii^lo3raent« Equation 10*11 states that the coUeotive 
enterprise provides an inferior form of employment* UndoubtfuUy neither 
is the case in the real world and this suggests courses of action make 
the model more realistic* 
The model elaborated so far assumed a linear monetary equivalent 
for the F and £ variables* In this model, pleasure or pain of woricing 
in various employments could be given a monetary evaluation and the 
individual's "utility* for varying wox* conditions of different em­
ployments would not change with the time length (nuinber of hours) of 
work* Ihis feature of the model suggests that the individual's evalu­
ation of the different employment opportunities (eadi Z above) is a 
vector rather than a single dimensional scalar* 
It should also be recognised that an individual is not free to 
work as many hours as he would like in most forms of conventional 
employment* Whenever one has an hourly-wage-type of eiq)loyment there 
is usually both a minimum and a maximum number of woz4c hours specified* 
The fonser is evident in cooperative employment as stated in Eaqpression 
10*6* In most other employments, however, the upper limit is more 
frequently encountered* Ihus including a maximum constraint on wox4c 
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hours will also make the model relevant to a large set of situations* 
Another short owning of the above model is the fact that the amount 
of leisure (defined as r° is Equation 10.7) would intrinsically have 
zero value# On the road to a more realistic model* in order to incor­
porate the work-leisure choice it is also necessary to alter the objec­
tive function.^ 
The More Realistic Model 
Ob jective fYinction 
On the basis of previous reasoning Equation 10.1 is to be replaced 
as the objective function in a more realistic model by 
where 
R » the vector of leisure time for all the s Individuals belonging 
to the i-th cooperative household. 
Evaluation 
The evaluation of a labor hour for the household becomes a vector 
for eadi kind of ei^loyment and is denoted by Equations 10.2a through 
10.5a. 
In this model there is no necessity to assume that only leisure 
is associated with pleasure (utility) and work is always linked to 
pain (disutility). All it is necessary to specify is that leisure has 
some positive value and any pleasure associated with it diminishes 
after some number of hours spent on leisure (recreation) and likewise 
for work. 
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2^" " [('.ij \ 'a]* 4i^ * 
z'3' =^(V« +T*), E*^'^ = . 
z'''^ BA*"^ . 
(10.2a) 
(10.3a) 
(10.4a) 
(10.5a) 
The evaluation of the F and 0 type variables on the part of the 
household Is a Amotion of the pleasure (utility) of these things to 
the individual family members being exposed to theme This approach does 
not rely upon any particular cmacept of household organisation and thus 
laqplies no assun^tions about different members' evaluation of working 
places in the objective (welfare) function of their household. Vector, 
is defined 
In Equation 10.12 e^qsresses the marginal change in the household 
welfare that is induced by the marginal diange in the welfare of a 
(number 1) meinber of this household; and £ is the s component vector 
The dencminator of the fraction in Equation 10.12 denotes the 
marginal change in the welfare of individual 1 as a result of a marginal 
change in his working conditions. This is e3q)re8sed in the last term 
of Equations 10.2a where 
(10.12) 
corresponding to G^. 
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.(1) . (10.13) 
-  - •  
lha prineipla of diminishing marginal pleasure (utiUty) appears 
for person 1 as 
< 0 • (10.14) a 
^Fei^lljl 
(2.") 
The matrix jC stands for the marginal welfare changes of all family 
members (except person 1) and it is (s - 1) by r in dimensions. A typical 
element of this matrix for the k-th individual who performs a job of 
j-th type in the large cooperative enterprise is given by 
4% * 
Ifc® and matrices are interpreted similarly. A like procedure 
is applicable for leisure. In Equatim 10.16 the vector d denotes the 
evaluation of a person of his own leisure. In Equation 10.1? vector 0 
denotes the household's evaluation for the vector d; in symbols 
d. = (10.16) 
and 
%k ' * (10.17) 
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Constraints 
The more realistic model contains leisure constraints 
"^1 - (I • I '•il • I'll • I %1 * 'V - ° 
# 
'k - » * I % * : \k * : * 'k) - ' 
# 
* 
«, - (I I'.i. * I * : :'i. * : ' 
Wiere I stands for the unit vector» 
A set of maximum constraints is also required for various forms of 
emgployment* This set does not include the work in homeplot faming since 
there is no institutional iq>per boundary on the number of hours of home-
plot (or household) wox^c* There is a **choiee*^ upper limit for homeplot 
work Introduced by Equation 10*8a* 
In every non-homeplot form of eiqployment» it is highly possible that 
there Is an upper boundary on the number of hours which can be worked 
per annum* %ls is particularly Important where a cooperative member is 
assigned to work in the plant cultivation section of the large collective 
enterprise (as discussed in Chapter VI and napped in Figure 6.2). A 
member of a plant cultivation brigade is usually ^ ^unemployed* during 
a large part of the year. At the same time, another cooperative member 
woricing in intensive livestock operations or In a machine repair shop 
or in the cooperative administration is regularly enç>loyed throughout 
the year# usually working the official 46 hours per week. 
The maximum constraints on woric hours are expressed in this model by 
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(10.18) 
(10,20) 
(10.19) 
Ësqiresslon 10.18 stands for the upper boundary on the work whidi Is 
supplied by a cooperative menber of the 1-th household to the large 
collective enterprise. Expression 10.19 denotes the maximum constraints 
on the work of a parson who belongs to the 1-th household and as a non-
member srqaplles labor to the large enterprise. This case covers s - 1 
persons and r kinds of work. Expression 10.20 defines the maximum labor 
constraints on non-cooperative enployment and refers to s persons and 
r* jobs In Its general form. All the three maximum constraints are 
Intrinsically formulated as per annum quantities. 
In order to maximize Expression 10.1a subject to all the relevant 
constraints formulated by Expressions 10.6, 10.8a and 10.18, 10.19, 
10.20, the following condition are to be satisfied 
Optimization and Household Equilibria 
"•*1^  ^ * ^1 *11  ^ * A - Xj -  ^0, (10.21) 
(10.22) 
OCx 0, (10.23) 
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D,, . \ £ 0 . (10.25) 
Each of the five Expressions 10.21 through 10.25 Is a aamplB expression 
for eaeh of the Independent variables. In this set each of the sample 
expressionst save the first one. Is Identical to the others In Its 
structure. Expression 10.21 Is exceptional since there Is only one 
variable In that set, being the cooperative member's employment In the 
large collective enterprise. The ^'s are identified with the general 
tints constraint placed by the elementary recreation needs on each 
individual* Ihe à is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the 
minimum labor supply required from the cooperative member in question. 
The are identified with the maximum constraint on work hours where 
that is relevant. 
The optimisation model set up this way seems to be satisfactory 
to predict relevant rational behavior on the part of the cooperative 
household. 
Case 1^ 
Among typical cases, one arises when* 
—' a cooperative member woi4cs more than his minimum labor require* 
ment in the large collective enterprise; 
— either there is no instutitlonal upper limit on his woi^c hours 
or his total woric does not amount to that many hours in the 
large collective enterprise; 
— he does not supply labor outside his cooperative organisation 
but he works on his homeplot farm vhere is no upper limit on 
the work hours; 
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—. this cooperative member naturally has a positive amount of 
leisure time. 
In such a situation described (and called Case 1), the equi­
librium relationships are given by 
+ 6 aj ^ - A « 0 (10.26) 
1 1 11 1 
ax"') * Ê -A .0 
j 1 jl 1 
"i ®u - \ - 0 • 
%e three equations in Expression 10.26 may also be written as 
a*"' • é • 6 =. dj . (10.26») 
Case 1, the individual member of a cooperative» worics both in 
the large collective enterprise and on his own homeplot fan», and he 
also enjpys leisure time* Ihe values of the monetary return on his 
labor are and 0%^; the values of non»monetaiy returns are the ts?© 
terras involving ^ and the term involving The equilibrium situ­
ation is sinqply characterized by saying that the value to the household 
of different employment must be equated at the margin. This result 
reads directly from Equation 10*26a* 
Case 2 
A new situation arises lAere 
— the cooperative mendier encounters the maximum constraint 
on his vozHk performed in the large collective enterprise 
(for exaiq)le, he is assigned to work in plant cultivation 
there); 
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— he works on his homaplot farm, too; 
— while there is, of course, no maximum constraint on the 
positive magnitude of his leisure time. 
The single significant difference here (in coa^arison with Case 1) 
is that a new negative term appears in the first equality of the equi­
librium conditions 
^ a^l) " \ ' 0 (10.27) 
*^1 ^11 ' \ ® • 
Equations 10,27 can also be expressed as 
\ *11^  - hii ' * s "îr ' "il ' 
or 
^ a|J^ >(axj^^ + = d^ • (10.27b) 
Ihs last tsTSi on the left-hand side of the first line of Equations 
10.27 and also In Expression 10.27a is a negative term in evaluating 
coUeotive (large-scale) cooperative enqxloyment. This term signifies 
that the marginal value of collective cooperative engiloyment to the 
given household is greater the marginal value of working in other 
erqployment including the homeplot farming. If the cooperative member 
were given the opportunity, he would sloq)ly woz4c more hours In the 
large-scale collective enterprise. 
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ÇSSll 
A third casa occurs when the cooperative member works only the 
numbers of hours required from him by the General Assembly 
and has other engaloyownt* In other words, this is the case when A 
is non-zero in the corresponding conditions based on Ehqpression 
10*21. Ihe new situation changes the top line in Ebqoression 10*26 
or 10*27 into 
+ 6 .(1) + A- Aj = 0. (10*28) 
The remaining two lines would be same as in Expression 10*26 or 
10*27» and therefore, are not repeated here* But is essential to give 
the relevant new relationships which replace Eqiressions 10*26a and 
10*27b 
"4^^ • \ "l ®11 • 
Ejgpression 10*28 looks very much like 10*2? except that the first 
constraint appearing is positive* In Case 3 the minimum labor require­
ment exists in tenus of an effective constraint since Ej^resslon 10*28a 
indicates that the value of the last unit of work performed in the 
collective cooperative employment is less than the marginal value of 
other employment for the cooperative household* 
Cases for family members 
A single alteration of the above three cases can consider all the 
possible cases for family members lAo are not a member of the cooper­
ative* Cases 1 and 2 are essentially identical with those for other 
219 
family membera* The oruoial point is that the same individual has 
multiple eiq)loyment from two essentially different sources* Li one 
of these en^loyaent opportunities the individuals are constrained by 
the nature of the job (for example, plant cultivation) or by the law 
to wox4c «nly certain maximum hours# But some individuals desire (or 
need) to vox* more and, thus, take a second job# 
Additionally, if an individual obtains diminishing marginal 
welfare from his wox4c in one enployment, he may vork in another job 
selected on the basis of his own welfare evaluation# 
Recreation value of honeplot farming 
Particularly in the case of the homeplot farm, the monetary 
retuni on labor could be zero and people would still work there for 
the sheer recreational value, for leisure# Ihis behavior is probably 
observed only among those idio have other employment, sufficient non-
labor income, or lAo are not self-sxqiporting* 
Under the above conditions it is not unrealistic to conceive the 
existence of a honeplot "farm** simply because people attach a suffi­
ciently large recreation value to their homeplot activities although 
these give no explicit monetary reward. 
The Economic Welfare Function of Cooperative Households 
Di a general sense, the welfare of a household (or of an individ­
ual) is its (his) perceived well-being# For this very general concept, 
considering the decision unit and its total environment in confie te 
interaction, there has been reserved the tern "social welfare function#" 
Fûrthensore, Equations 10,1 and 10.1a listed only a part of econmnic 
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varlableg affecting the total (social) welfare of cooperative house­
hold, Even a more general function of economic welfare would directly 
incorporate the quantities consumed* This chapter has not considered 
these. 
There are, however, a great number of relevant non-decision 
variables (from the viewpoint of a household) whldi effects its well-
being and/or influences the optimal choice among its decision vari­
ables* These are the variables which do not vaxy with the independent 
variables of Equations 10*1 and 10*la* Objective functions eaqaressed 
in those two equations can be conceived as being embedded in a more 
general (larger) function that may be called the economic welfare 
function of a cooperative household* The rest of this function consists 
of non-decision variables for the household and is expressed by 
ml (W,1, WJ, F-, F-, . <10.29) 
The first three variables have been encountered in Chapter VII 
(In Expression 7*3)* Their meaning remains the same in Expression 
10*29* Welfare payments and social services evidently affect the well-
being of the benefited household* Symbol stands for the amenities 
accompan3ring the collective cooperative en^loyment whlëi amenities 
do not vary with a person's work hours* This variable could include 
the pleasant atmosphere of the so-called cooperative democracy where 
a cooperative member has an explicit role in determining resource 
allocation, income distribution and in determining his wox4c and home 
environment* WoHcing conditions in their usual sense are also reflected 
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by this variable. ïha tens F** is similarly defined for non-cooperative 
ea^loysent* In the latter case, of course, one would not have certain 
advantages of cooperative membership especially vith respect to partic­
ipation in managerial and entrepreneural decisions. 
Variable symbolizes the public goods provided by the cooper­
ative of the i-th household. Some of them are available only to cooper­
ative members or to cooperative households but many of them are provided 
to the vhole cmmunity in lAldi the cooperative is located, such as 
parks, play-grounds, cultural and sport facilities, or even flood control 
and quite a few other things of this nature lAioh are really cooper*^ 
atively created public goods. The variable "0*^ is a like variable for 
the public goods provided by the government, representing the Interests 
of the ^ ole society. 
The variable denotes the provision of the homeplot land and 
also the cooperative services connected with household farming. It is 
essentially a vector describing the quantity and quality of the land 
as well as the productive, marketing and managerial services provided 
by the la%%e collective enterprise. As discussed in Chapter VI and VII 
homeplot farming is a rather unique economic phenomenon and it is of 
great importance for people preferring agricultural cooperatives. 
The symbol 1^ denotes the implicit share of the given household 
in the large-scale collective investments. Lqplicitly it would be a 
vector of anticipated investments over some time horizon and is ex­
tremely important in determining the future well-being of cooperative 
households. Their future income streams directly depend on the quantity 
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and nature of eoUeotlve Investments originating from cooperative 
profits via collective decisions* 
!Ihe term represents the interests and well-being of all the 
other households in the cooperative idiich the i»th household belongs 
to* Pg is a similar variable for the welfare of all people in the 
society* These two variables denote that if the welfare of other house­
holds would improve with no deterioration in the welfare of the 1-th 
household» then the latter household would consider its well-being 
enhanced* In other words, the first-order partial derivative of 
and Qe Is positive with respect to où. 
Finallyt the complete economic welfare (objective) function can 
be set up for a cooperative household by combining Expressions 10* la 
and 10*29 
(10*30) 
and 
>0. (10.31) 
< " f dijl. 4' K' " I ".!• T' "è' F'"' 
te'tg. HP,!. V«e'2s> ' (10*32) 
lAere 
= the coa^lete economic welfare fonction of the i-th cooper* 
tive household* 
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Die separating bar stands between the decision variables (first group) 
and the non-decision variables (second group)* Die latter are beyond 
the decision-making scope of a cooperative household unit and they do 
not vary directly with the labor supply of the given household* 
Labor Supply in the Short-run and in the Long-run 
The derivation of labor si:Q>ply curves is fairly single in the 
framework of the model presented* The labor supply of a cooperative 
household responds paranetrioally to the household evaluation terms# 
Any labor demanding organisation, ^Aether it is the large colleotive 
enterprise or a non-oooperative employer, can vary the wage rate and/or 
it can change the amenities associated with the e]ig)loymsnt* A cooper­
ative farm oan offer, for exaiq>le, day care in summer for diildren and 
effect the last but one term of Expressions 10«8a (the obligatory house­
hold duties) in order to free time for housewives to be eaployed In 
peak work seasons* Since some household duties are indispensable and 
form a parameter in essence, they cannot be considered as an independent 
variable* 
By wage and nonwage variations, the large collective enterprise 
and any other firm can establish a labor supply function*^ 
^Varying Holdren's (50, 51) term one may speak of wage and nonwage-
offer variations* He defines styling, product quality, sales promotion, 
and advertising as nonprice-offer variations since these may also be 
varied by a seller in addition to varying the price. 
Holdren (51) essentially postulates roughly circular areas of sales 
coverage for certain retail stores. The store attracts its customers by 
varying the price and nonprice aspects of its offer. As the store readies 
out farther, it enlarges Its cir^e. Its territorial increment is multi­
plied fay population density and other demographlo factors determining 
the demand function for the store* 
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Some variables listed In Expression 10*29 affeot the labor 
supply by Influencing household member's choice between labor and 
leisure* Both cooperative and social public goods may provide parti­
cular services such as better transportation which makes work easier 
as in the case of diminishing household duties discussed before. 
A particular set of variables of Expression 10*29 would also 
operate to make households prefer cooperative membership and large-
scale collective en^loynent* These variables are F^, HP^» 
and (^* An increase in any of the latter variables would enhance the 
value of cooperative membership and would increase the labor st^ply 
to the large collective operation on the part of Individual households* 
Generally in this groiq> there are only two variables idildi can be 
manipulated by a non-cooperative empl(^r; these are W* and F*** It 
would appear that the cooperative organization may have "more strings 
to its bow" in terms of attracting members and enqoloyees than other 
eiqployers* 
Almost uniquely the large collective enterprise does affect its 
long-run labor supply by providing education grants on the account of 
variable to its members' diildren and practically supports every 
member to get vocational training* One might even suggest that a 
cooperative organization can also influence the long-run labor supply 
by better and cheaper housing facilities whidi evidently affect the 
birth rate* 
It should be emphasized that the work-leisure choice is affected 
by many of the variables of Expression 10*29 in a more or less indirect 
225 
but extremely Important fashion* As education is enhanced by expend­
itures on public goodst people-to-people interaction may be is^rored 
in many other aspects. As more and more of the public services direotly 
connected with education and recreation are provided, the quality of 
leisure is also increasing* Pe<q>le should become more secure in their 
economic future as expenditure on the welfare funds and on collective 
investments are enhanced* It is difficult to overemphasise the isçor-
tanoe of the non-decision variables of the conqplete economic welfare 
function (described by Equation 10*32) in things and feelings that 
make for a really good life* 
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CHAPTER XI. COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
It would be possible to set up a unified economic welfare function 
for the cooperative farm as an organizational unit* The large collec­
tive enterprise would be depleted as allocating its profits among in­
vestments, members* shares (dividends)» cooperative welfare funds, 
cooperative public goods, and provisions to homeplot fanning*^ At the 
same tine each cooperative member's objective (welfare) function would 
be amalgamated with each other member's objective (utility) function 
by means of voting and bargaining processes* The unified economic 
welfare function, to be maximized, would inqsly some configuration of 
the above named variables* It is not the purpose of this study to 
Inquire deeply into the nature of a unified cooperative welfare func­
tion but rather to derive an objective function for both portions of 
the cooperative farm that mi^t have long-run applicability* 
Di this chapter it will be assumed that the amount of Investment 
gets determined for any point of tins and that homeplot fara inputs 
other than members* own labor are also determined for each time* Given 
investment in both the large collective and the small homeplot portions, 
one can be sure that maximization of the present value of the total 
cooperative fam organization would maximize its social surplus value 
produced (defined alternatively by Equations 7*29 and 7«30)* In order 
to avoid the problem of discounting all future costs and returns, it 
In many cases the provision of homeplot lands and services 
contributing to hcmeplot farming compotes for future cooperative profits 
rather than for current profits* 
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Is conceivable that a one-period analysis is undertaken with the period 
sufficiently long to cover the entire ftxture time horizon, or a typical 
period is selected some time in the future* Thus, the problem at hand 
can be reduced to one of maximizing one-period profits %Aere all Inputs 
are variable* 
An extremely important two-fold consideration must be built into 
the unified long-run cooperative model* For a variety of reasons, 
members* labor should be priced at the alternative wage rate* If musbers* 
labor is not priced at all and is not allocated according to an optimal 
farm plan, then the result will be inefficient resource use, suboptimal 
output mix and insufficient rentability, as pointed out in Chapter IX* 
Furthermore, an Incompetent cooperative management could pay the members 
less than their alternative wages and thus could hide the fact that the 
collective enterprise was failing to make a viable profit. D: order to 
avoid this, cooperative labor input will be calculated at its alternative 
wage in the model* 
For exactly the same set of reasons, the foregoing allument must 
be Applied to cooperative capital input* In order that the cooperative 
management be accountable to the membership as well as to society as a 
whole, and in order to preclude inefficient resource allocation, botii 
cooperative labor and cooperative capital must be computed at what they 
would return to society in other economic pursuits outside cooperative 
farming* 
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Maximization of Social Surplus Produced by a Cooperative 
At every point in time the cooperative firm —> as an organisational 
unit — has a finite amount of land, labor and capital to allocate. Ad­
ditionally, it purchases inputs from other producers and/or may hire 
workers and eiq>loyees* %der these conditions, the objective function 
becomes 
Mbx Tr= PQ - IW# - Kr* - VY , (11.1) 
idiere W* is the opportunity vage rate, r* denotes the alternative rate 
of returns on capital, and PQ, VY are essentially the same as before, 
(ihe former stands for gross return; the latter denotes expenditures 
on purchased variable Inputs in this case.) 
The quantity of outputs is subject to the side relation representing 
the production function 
Q = Q (A, L, K, Y) , (11.2) 
Khere A denotes land and L symbolizes labor input. A typical equation 
referring to a single output is given by 
qj « qj (A, L, K, Y) . (11.3) 
The three restraints are given by Expressions 11.4, 11.$, and 
11.6 as 
A** " A ~ 0. (11.4) 
L®-L-0. (11.5) 
K° - K 2"0. (11.6) 
The «aximum for this system occurs when the following five 
conditions are met 
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aq . 
Pj - 0 * (11.7) 
9q 
- V» - A, £ 0 ; (11.8) j 31 
89, , / 
Pj - r* - Aj •— 0 ; (11.9) 
Pj - V 6 0 ; (11.10) 
qj-0. (11.11 ) 
Di the above set of expressions is associated with land, Ag with 
labor and with capital. These A*8 may be interpreted as the shadow 
price (rent) of lands labor, and capital respectively. A greater-than-
zero value for any A denotes that the corresponding factor is exhausted 
by the optimal plan* 
If any output (q^) is produced (i.e. the inequality holds in 
Expression 11.11), then the corresponding terms equal zero in Expres­
sions 11.7 -11.10 (i.e. the equality holds there). If output j is con­
sidered to be produced and Expressions 11.7 through 11.10 are rewritten 
in equality form, the following results will be obtained 
aq. 
Pj : (11.12) 
Pj ISiT = T* + *2 * (11.13) 
230 
Pj = Ï . (11.15) 
The interpretation of Equations 11.12 and 11.15 is straightforward. Khe 
former states that the marginal value product of land must be equal to 
the shadow price (rent) of the land in equilibrium, "Die latter ex­
presses the conventional profit-maximization conditions that the marginal 
value product of any purchased input equals its price in an optimum 
situation; it says that a net-revenue-maximising firm utilises purchased 
inputs up to the point where the values of their marginal products are 
equated to their prices. 
Equation 11.13 says that the marginal product of cooperative labor 
equals the sum of the alternative wage rate and its shadow price (^). 
Since only a limited quantity of labor is available to the cooperative 
farm, the ii^licit wage must theoretically include some alternative 
factor (A2) in addition to the opportunity wage rate (v*). This alter­
native factor 0^) may of course be zero if the quantity of cooperative 
labor is not exhausted. 
A large positive A2 Indicates that there is too little labor 
available in the given cooperative for efficient utilization. In other 
words, net national product and/or total nmt social surplus could be 
increased if labor were transferred from other economic sectors into 
this cooperative. IfA2 is just *barely* positive, it means that the 
cooperative labor force is fully utilized and that cooperative members 
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are earning just their alternative wage rate* 
Similar considerations exist for Equation 11*14. A positive 
means that the rate of return on cooperative capital exceeds the rate 
of capital retuin obtainable elsewhere in the econonqr, therefore, the 
cooperative members in question are earning profits greater than the 
rt:tum to capital in other pursuits* To maximize net national product 
and/or total social surplus, one should transfer capital into such a 
cooperative organization* 
Ihe Implications of Honeplot Farming 
Homeplot farming has not been incorporated into the developing 
model so far* It would have been Included if the household welfare 
function of Chapter X explicitly contained the assumption that the non­
monetary, recreational value of homeplot works might exceed the monetary 
value of fringe benefits (F value) associated with any other employment* 
Furthermore, for social policy reasons cooperative members should not 
be precluded from working as many hours as they would like on their own 
homeplots* If this special proviso were missing, the model builder could 
say* the social net surplus is maximized on the cooperative fazn (in­
cluding all the homeplots) when the conditions of Expressions 11*7 
throu^ 11*11 are mat, with the additional proviso that Expression 11*7 
would be identical for the large collective enterprise and for the home-
plot "sector" (as well as among homeplot farms). In both portions of the 
cooperative farm organization, labor and capital would also be bound by 
Expression 11*8 and 11,9 equally, and in addition Expressions 11.10 and 
11.11 would now be binding on homeplot farming as well* 
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With the adopted proviso that cooperative members may work as 
much as they like on their own homeplots, the model under consideration 
must accept somewhat different conditions* 
Equilibrium without recreational value for homeplot activities 
In the first case, one may assume that the strongest motivation of 
a homeplot holder is to produce farm products for his own use and for 
sale in such a fashion as to maximize returns on his inputs. If there 
is no recreational value attached to homeplot fanning, then Equations 
11.12 through 11.14 will be applied in the i-th homeplot farm in some­
what modified form as 
Equation 11.12a states the equilibrium condition that a land unit 
assigned to the i-th member's homeplot should earn at least as high 
a rent as it does in the large collective enterprise. Hie case is 
exactly the same for large-scale capital services utilized by the home-
plot farms (Equation 11.14a); likewise for labor supplied to homeplot 
farms Including the cooperative members* own labor (Equation 11.13a)* 
To state the above arguments differently and explicitly, the 
cooperative farm organization would have to be irrational (inefficient 
(11.12a) 
(11.13a) 
Ï 
(11.14a) 
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in the Paretian sense) if there were no recreational or other non­
monetary value attached to homeplot activities and the two sets of 
conditions stated by Expressions 11,7 through 11.11 and by Equations 
11*12a through 11.14a were not met. 
Optimum with recreational (non-monetary) value 
The optimum or efficiency conditions ara vastly different if the 
cooperative members want to maximize their individual welfare (utility) 
on their homeplot by producing for their use and/or for market; at the 
same time they also desire getting recreational value or other non­
monetary satisfaction from their homeplot farm activities. In this case 
the equilibrium conditions are 
39 j . \ 
(U.12b) 
Pj > r* + A* 9 J - 3 
Pj "ai;" ' (11.13b) 
39 j/ \ 
Pj V* + Ag . (11.16) 
It is worthwhile to consider Expression 11.16 first because the 
preceding three are explained more easily after this last one has been 
discussed. In Expression 11.16 the implicit money wage for homeplot 
work can be less than the inçlicit wage rate obtained in the large 
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collective enterprise* "Hie reason for this is the fact that cooperative 
members* welfare evaluation (utility) attached to hoiaeplot work — per 
hour — is greater than their satisfaction (utility) associated with 
any other work in the large collective enterprise. 
If the situation just now depicted prevailed and inputs on horoeplot 
farms were calculated as they are in the large collective firm» then more 
labor would be combined with other inputs on homeplots than in the col­
lective enterprise. In such a case, the returns to land, to capital, 
and to labor other than cooperative members* own labor, are inpllcitly 
larger in the homaplot farm portion of the cooperative farm than in the 
large collective portion. (Ihe latter conditions are given by Expressions 
11.12b, 11.13b and 11.14b.) 
Homeplots for recreation 
A third case depicted in Chapter VI is also conceivable — at least 
in the remote future — lAiere cooperative members want homeplots exclu­
sively for recreation or merely because it makes them feel good. In the 
framewoi^ of this model, the cooperative could with all due logic vote 
to assign homeplots and even provide free or low-priced services (covered 
from the collective profits, of course) to homeplot activities regard­
less of vdiether any market-valued output, either for self-provision or 
for sale, were produced on members* homeplots. 
Possible Conflicts between Cooperative Management and Members 
Practical evidence as well as theoretical considerations suggest 
that there may be significant conflicts between cooperative members and 
cooperative managers (both with or without membership) with respect to 
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the allocation of capital. 
Ihe salary and social prestige of cooperative managers, and their 
own feelings of self-worthiness, are highly correlated with running a 
fast growing, profitable enterprise* Sometimes capital rationing might 
be In the direct, short-run Interest of cooperative members In order 
to force a greater rate of return; but it can never be in the Interest 
of the management (especially, of the salaried managers) because that 
would mean operating a smaller and/or less rapidly extending enter­
prise. 
Another inherent conflict expresses Itself repeatedly In connection 
with homeplot farming* Management would always be inclined to oppose 
allocating any resource (land, feed, seed, etc.) and service to home-
plot farming since these curtail the productive capacity available for 
ths largo collective operations at any given time* On the other hand. 
It seems to be In the direct Interest of the management that cooperative 
members as individuals be as dependent on the large collective enterprise 
as possible. In this respect management may count on members' homeplot 
farming. 
There also exists another interconneotedness between the two por­
tions of the cooperative farm and most managers usually apply a larger 
weight there. Most periods of peak activity (especially autumn har­
vesting and cultivation of wine-grape plantations) are the same on the 
homeplots as in the large collective enterprise. This phenomenon 
motivates the cooperative managei-s to restrict and reduce the scope 
of homeplot farming. It is not self-evident at all how managers' 
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Interest and success can be enhanced by the existence and coordinated 
development of proper-slged homeplot farms# Thus there may always be 
present an essential conflict of Interests and this Is one of the 
problems that must be settled by voting and bargaining processes (whicdi 
finally lead to a conceptual unified economic welfare function of the 
cooperative farm as a whole). 
Cooperative members are constrained by the fact that better manage­
ment responds directly to its own better opportunities « In order to 
obtain and retain the best possible management, the cooperative members 
would be voluntarily restrained in their desire to expand homeplot 
faming and to Increase their individual shares from profits — such as 
dividends cooperative welfare benefits, and cooperative public goods —> 
at the eaqpense of the collective investments* 
All these Inherent conflicts of interests may well be moderated, 
although not cozpletely eliminated* if each cooperative manager obtained 
cooperative membership* 
Conflicting Social and Cooperative (Group) ]hterests 
Several sources of conflicts emerge between the cooperative members 
as a (more or less) coherent group and society as a Wiole* 
Personal income and capital supply 
Given the number of cooperative aiembers, it is the immediate inter­
est of the cooperative meinbership to get as high a return for labor 
input as possible* This might appear to be the members* interest con-
coming cooperative capital, but it would be a misinterpretation* Co­
operative members are not really interested in the rate of return per 
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unit capital» The cooperative membera as a group are Intereatad In 
their total earnings titd.csh would be, of course, consistent with maxi­
mizing their implicit wage. But to maximize their implicit wage, the 
cooperative members would utilize successive capital inputs until it 
resulted in zero marginal productivity, if capital were unlimited and 
costless. Thus there exists a balancing factor in such a sense that a 
cooperative group wants to utilize exactly that quantity of capital 
whidi maximizes total earnings out of the social net surplus produced* 
However, members' earnings are limited with respect to their profit-
share constituent directly by capital needs since it is from the profit 
that cooperative capital must come. 
Dk any case, the cooperative members would naturally like to get 
as high an ia^lloit wage plus profit-share as is commensurate with 
maintaining such a desired status over a long period of time. The correct 
answer might be the quantity of capital investment that equates the 
marginal value product of cooperative capital with the social rate of 
return on capital (r*). It would be a sheer accident if, in the absence 
of borrowing ability on a skillfully planned capital market, there would 
be utilized exactly the quantities of capital which equate their internal 
rates of return with the social rate of return. 
Prices and income distribution 
Clearly it is also in the immediate Interest of the cooperative 
groups to have the price of what they sell as high as possible and the 
price of what they buy as low as possible. At the same time, the central 
authority must exercise a proper control over these (and other) group 
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motivations In the social Interests of efflolency and equity.^ 
Too high prices for farm product — regardless of Income distribu­
tion objectives — would allocate excessive capital and labor to agri­
culture* If farm prices are too low, then the result is just the oppo­
site. dearly» neither Is in the long-run interest of the whole society 
because net national product and national income are reduced by both 
policies* 
In the interest of the irtiole society* cooperatives must be prevented 
from becoming people's (i.e, members') monopolies In their economic 
behavior* Considering both possible deviations, the economists should 
advise the policy makers that the rate of return on cooperative capital 
and the "cooperative wages** of labor be kept at the alternative (con^-
rable non-cooperative) level of both of these* This could be done in a 
fashion which does not negate cooperative (group) initiative and indi­
vidual ingenuity or anything of that kind* 
If a cooperative is more officient (for example, because of ap­
plying cost-saving technologies) than other farms utilizing approximately 
the same natural and economic resources, it should be permitted to re­
tain its extra income. "Oils is not against the social interest at all, 
8specially where more and cheaper feed is really needed as in Hungary* 
But if more fertile land, advantageous location and other non-controllable 
resources result in apparently higher returns to the cooperative farm, 
^ïhe problems of efficiency and equity are discussed from various 
aspects of theory and policy by Heady and Kaldor in their lectures at 
ISO* 
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the excess should be taxed away* Ai the other hand, cooperatives oper­
ating under extremely unfavorable natural conditions (on pure sandy 
soils. In mountain areas, etc.) deserve special attention and definite 
economic support on the part of society*^ In other words, natural 
"gifts" and natural "handicaps* should be equalized in favor of an 
equitable income distribution* At the same time, cooperative "grit" must 
be regarded properly* 
Relevant efficiency and equity considerations lead directly to the 
current problems of price policy and central planning lAlch are gener­
ally embedded in economic policy and particularly in the new, reformed 
economic mechanism of Hungaiy* 
The Reform of Econonio Mechanism 
The system of nev mechanism introduced to the Hungarian econony 
on January 1, 1968 meant essential modification of the system of central 
placing and pricing* This economic reform was, at the same time, a 
social and political reform* During its preparation, the attention of 
various political power factors and individuals was focused mainly on 
the efficiency and welfare aspects connected with the reform* Ch the 
other hand, the reform profoundly affected the structure of preferences, 
both personal and institutional, which was based on earlier economic 
conditions* 
Hungazy this gro^p of cooperatives is given tax allowance, 
investment credits in various forms, and in addition, if necessary, 
temporary subsidies to provide a guaranteed level of annual personal 
income* 
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learning from experience In eoonomlo planning 
In the main, the national economic plan Is an economic policy 
conception relating to a certain time pezdod» expressed by coaqplex 
programs of actions# It is only possible to act efficiently and with 
foresight on the basis of coordinated plans and programs. 
Learning from experience in economic planning has led the Hungarian 
ec o n o m i c  t h e o r i s t s  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n c l u s i o n s ^  ( 6 ,  J 2 ) t  
1* At the time of the so-called personal cult (prior to 1953) the 
ruling theory was that the most important priorities should be deter­
mined by one or a few persons* As a consequence, analysis of the main 
economic policy interrelations, the setting of alternative variants, 
and research on the Interdependent decision-making factors were disre­
garded# Hence applicatlcm of modem planning methods was out of the 
question# 
2# This arbitrary way of making decisions led to incorrect economic 
concepts idiich disregarded the proper medianlsm of modem economic proc­
esses* 
3# Ihe speedy setting up of the planning apparatus brought about 
the excessive concentration of government administrative activities 
and, consequently, an immense planning bureaucracy emerged* 
4, Ihe planning bureaucracy became engrossed in the detailed elab­
oration of minute and formal decisions having no primary importance* 
^Among the Hungarian economists specialized in economic policy and 
socialist planning Nyers (18), Bognar (6, 7, 8), Friss (32, 33)# Vajda 
(81) and Komai (59) are best known abroad* 
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5c Economic difficulties were not attributed to wrong economic 
policy concepts but to the assumption that the planning was not suf­
ficiently detailed. 
During the last decade the theoretical concepts of planning have 
changed to a very large extent# The main essence of the present concept 
is that political leadership enlists the nation's eminent experts in 
working out the economic plans in order to improve the system of economic 
administration* and invites them and the planning institutions to submit 
proposals (variants)» ^ ile reserving the right to choose among alter­
native variants» In this way there have been created the situations 
discussed by Kaldor (55) as "selection of efficient programs,* 
Ihe present concept of socialist planning focuses attention on 
efficiency and welfare (especially on the real income and the living 
standard) aspects of the economy. The questions of interconnection between 
economic sectors and branches are also ençhasized. The immediate goal 
is to prepare plan variations lAlch facilitate central economic decisions 
only concerning those problems which are relevant at the national level* 
"Rie recent theory of central planning alms at the correct solution of 
nation-wide problems. Simultaneously» instead of an "overgeneralized** 
improvement it alms at finding a clear-out optimum solution for the chosen 
task. 
Of the recently applied mathamatlcal methods utilizing experiences 
and concepts from abroad as well as theoretical works of Hungarian 
^The problems of food economy and agricultural policy are analyzed 
mainly by Erdei (21), Dlmeny (15)» Kazareczki (57)» Csizmadla (14), 
M&rtan (65)» Csendes (10), Vagi (80) and Laszlo (63). 
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economist8« the following should bo listedt 
(a) Various planning models» including operation-researdi models» 
lAloh can help in finding optimum economic-policy solutions and measures; 
(b) economic models with well-defined parameters, mainly to improve 
forecasts; 
(c) comprehensive programming models concerning single industzdal 
branches or complex firms (farms); 
(d) input-output models irtilch help the planners co-ordinate the 
production of different branches and Ùius ensure equilibrium; 
(e) a simple growth model of the Harrod-Domar t3rpes for the determi­
nation of the Aythm of growlis is applied according to nhidi the growth 
rate depends upon the investment quota (ratio of investments in the 
national income) and the capital-output coefficient (investments needed 
for the unit-increase of national income); 
(f) production functions determining the growth rates of branches 
by representing the Impact of Investments of a given branch on the 
output of other branches. 
It goes without saying that the different classical equilibria of 
the national economy (expressed» for example, as the balance of budg­
etary revenues and public expenditures) will play a considerable role 
in future planning* It is even more true concerning the equilibrium 
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply (which are often named 
purchasing power and commodity fund in the technical terms of planning), 
Ihe elaboration of material balances (covering 36O cosoaoditles) and 
detailed plans of technical supply is, of course, continued* 
Ihe economic role of a socialist government Is partially based on 
its strong income redistribution effect* Social welfare, public edu­
cation, the development of culture and of the infra-structure » rests 
^Among the Hungarian ai^thors of mathematical econraics, Komal 
(59), Ganczer (3^), Sebestyen (72, 73) and Csaki (9) may be mentioned 
here* 
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In this redistributiont as does the sophisticated network of the 
resear<âi and developmental programs including regional and urbani­
zation plans# It is the reservoirs of income redistribution from which 
individuals and various social strata want a share» with or without 
justification. 
Price system and socialist price policy 
The Hungarian reform of the economic mechanism atten^ted to 
gradually set up a price system in which most prices are determined 
by the market mechanism. Ihis is a consequence of the twin principle 
which served as a foundation for the reform, namely, that 
— there can be achieved a more purposeful economic development 
with better utilising national economic planning by the state; 
= there can be obtained a more efficient economic organization 
by utilizing the market medianism in the framework of a centrally 
planned economy* 
Accordingly, the economic reform created a connectim between the 
national economic plans and the market in a novel manner. The former 
policy of narrowing down the assertion of market phenomena gave to the 
deliberate utilization of the market as a regulator. Now the position 
was taken that the progress of the economy should be promoted not 
mainly by administrative price constructions but with the aid of price 
mechanisms adequately indicating the economic processes taking place 
in the market (12). 
The extent to which the price mechanism asserts itself depends 
on the structure of the national economy. It is asserted most completely 
2!A 
in the '*puro* market model and is moat limited in the "pure* planned 
model* The latter in ita extreme form goes so far as to eliminate the 
market, and here prices provide only a basis for acoounjU^» Okie should 
be distinguish clearly between market price, vhich regulates market 
processes, and accounting prices vhidi are completely independent of 
market relations# %e may also define three separate forms of the latteri 
1. Die constant price and plan price applied in statistics and 
planning with the intention of making the production outputs of various 
periods comparable by eliminating the effects of price changes. 
2* Fictitious price, which embraces the various forms of computed 
price systems based on inputs such as the value-proportionate price 
system or the shadow price system based on optimum calculations» 
3# Ifitemal accounting prices which are Intended to promote cooper­
ation within the firms* 
In the planned national economy of Hungary the market price appears 
also in three different foms* A narrowing scope of government-fixed 
prices is established for basic raw materials, staple foods, and some 
Important consumer goods* A maximum price or a directive price is set 
on a considerable portion of the other products* The prices of the third 
group are free; that is they are made a matter of agreement between 
buyers and sellers* Fixed and maximum prices are primarily applied to 
finished products, while within the framework of direct cooperation 
(contract) between firms and on the market of agricultural products, 
a wider scope is given to the third category of prices negotiated by 
buyers and sellers* 
2k5 
In a socialist economy, price is considered as a means of economic 
oalculations as well as a means of regulating demand and income* As 
Csikos-Nagy (13) enphasized, these functions are closely connected with 
the triple task of national economic policy* 
1* to ensure an optimal rate of economic growth; 
2* to maintain conditions of economic equilibrium and stabili^; 
3* to make sure that there is a regular rise in the standard of 
living together with en equitable income distribution. 
Komai (60) properly emphasised that the price system connects 
individuals with each other, acts on them, influences their decisions; 
thus its effects cannot be analyzed without models of human behavior. 
Di this vein the models of some Hungarian economists as well as those 
of their predecessors — von Neumann, Leontief, Khantorovidi and others 
— have a considerable role not in formulating the price theory, but 
in analyzing the real processes of the economy* 
Ttie reforms of the economic mechanism in Hungary and in other 
socialist countries are interpreted by marqr economists (at home and 
abroad) as a transition from the model based on central mandatory 
instructions to a decentralized market model* In the author's opinion 
the recent economic changes taking place in these countries can be 
better defined as a transition from a socialist-economic model with 
barter^type features to one with clear-cut market-economy character­
istics* 
In Hungary the economic reform was followed by the reform of the 
national science policy* ihe next step is going to be the reform of 
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the state and local government administrative structure» In the prepa­
ration of this refoiŒ the starting-points are to give correct and oper­
ational answers to the following questionss How far should the power of 
government extend? What are the methods and instruments power may or 
must use9 and how can this activity be co-ordinated with the interest 
of the Individual citizens and various social strata and with public 
opinion? The reform of the administrative structure indicates that the 
present government lays equal stress on initiative and on equilibrium 
in the political life of Hungaiy# 
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CHAPTER XII. SUMMARY AHD CONCLUSIONS 
Summary and Conclusions of this Study 
The core objective of this study has been to analyze the historical 
development and socio-economic determinants of cooperative farming, to 
derive optimum solutions that may characterize the cooperative form of 
farm organization by reflecting its economic ends and capacities. This 
study is concerned with the objectives and interests of the large-scale 
collective enterprise, with those of the individual cooperative members 
(households), and also with the objectives and constraints of the cooper», 
ative organization (decision) unit as a whole. Current economic prob­
lems of the author's country, Hungary, have directly motivated this 
study* 
Chapter I serves as introduction, providing the background and 
major objectives of this recent study. 
Part One, including four chapters, sets the sta^e by describing the 
transformation and recent organizational structure of Hungarian agri­
culture. 
Chapter II discusses the agrarian reform of 19^5 and concludes that 
together with the enormous latifundia system, most of the quantifiable 
problematic gaps disappeared but "the ill effects of minifundia" star­
ted to show up shortly afterwards. 
Chapter III analyzes the socialist transformation of Hungarian 
agriculture which took place in the period of 1948-1961, largely during 
the last two years, and characterizes the portion and role of state, 
cooperative and private sectors in the economy as well as the changes 
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in the level of economic development# 
Chapter IV focuses on the scale-return iitçlications to the land 
reform and on the scale-size aspects of the socialist transformation. 
This chapter shows the radical changes in farm size and in the number 
of farm decision (management) units and concludes that the recent farm 
organization is best characterized by the 208 state farms having 4,623 
hectare cultivated land and 756 workers as an average, and by the 
2,840 farmers* cooperatives possessing 1,672 hectare land and 379 mem­
bers as an average. 
Chapter V sets up objectives and constraints — in a simplified 
programming framework — which might implicitly have existed at the 
time of the land reform and during the socialist transformation. This 
chapter may also serve as a mathematical summary of the whole Part 
One of this study* 
Part Two consists of two chapters and scrutinizes the major 
socio-economic characteristics of farmers* cooperatives and also de­
velops various cooperative models. 
Chapter VI elaborated a coriçjrehensive survey on the dual character 
of the farmers* cooperative as a social organization, on the one hand, 
and as an economic organization, primarily a business firm (farm enter­
prise), on the other; cooperative members being both partners (co-
owners) and laborers (employees) simultaneously. This chapter also argues 
that the cooperative farm includes two constituent parts* the large-
scale collective firm and the small-scale homeplot farms of cooperative 
members (the latter being owned and largely individually operated). This 
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chapter draws the conclusion that the large collective enterprise is 
to be considered as a special type of business firm associated with 
collective decision-making at the top level and characterized by the 
principle of the so-called cooperative democracy (self-management) from 
the viewpoint of state control, 
Ih Chapter VII a general behaviorial model of cooperative farming 
has been formulated, then — as the central construction — a linear 
programming model of the farmers* cooperative has been set up and is 
followed by a simple cooperative model placing emphasis on investment 
and technology# At the end of this chapter a separate section provides 
a relatively large set of identities that quantify the economic cate­
gories prevailing in socialist cooperative farming. This chapter con­
cludes that mathematical programming models may serve as a basis for 
further research orientation in the economic theory of cooperative 
farming. 
Part Three, incorporating four chapters, discusses cooperative 
optimization at three levels: the large collective enterprise; the 
individual cooperative members (households); the cooperative organization 
as a whole. 
Chapter VIII is concerned with the general theoretical and methodo­
logical aspects of cooperative optimization. Following a short review 
of technical literature, this chapter discusses alternative cooperative 
objectives and production functions. It sets up a non-linear program­
ming modal together with a linear programming example (in algebraic 
form). In this chapter the major conclusions state that systematic 
250 
programming approaches can be applied to the rather complex problems 
of cooperative optimization and mathematical programming may serve as a 
powerful tool of various optimization procedures» especially with re­
spect to the large-scale collective enterprise. 
Chapter DC deals with large-scale collective firm optimization in 
the framework of six cooperative models* 1* the pure enterprise model 
which maximizes net profit (similar to socialist state farms or private 
commercial farms); 2. the cooperative model of the family-farm type 
which maximizes the returns on members' labor input as a residual in­
come (the difference between gross revenue and total non-labor costs); 
3* the intensity model with the objective of maximizing output per land 
unit; 4. the maximum output model for total value-product maximization 
with given resource endowment; 5» the "efficiency" model with cost-
minimization or "cooperative-wage* maximization objectives; 6, the 
growth model aiming at cooperative capital value maximization in mul­
tiple time periods. This chapter provides algebraic examples for co­
operative optimization with different objective functions# Specifically 
it gives double optimization treatment — by applying both the marginal 
and programming approach in order to derive numerically conçarable 
solutions — to the first and the second cooperative models* 
Chapter X views the economic objectives of the cooperative house­
hold. It sets up an objective function containing the decision variables 
open to the cooperative household and discusses the pay-offs of various 
employment choices. In addition to the constraints which are iirpinging 
on the labor supply alternatives. In this chapter the economic welfare 
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(objective) function of the cooperative household is maximizedj subject 
to relevant constraints, and, finally, some properties of short-run 
and long-run labor supply functions are briefly discussed» 
Chapter XI is concerned with cooperative equilibrium and economic 
policy* It formulates an objective function with lonp-run applicability 
for both the collective and homeplot portions of the cooperative farm. 
In this chapter the social surplus (total profit) produced by a cooper­
ative is maximized, and homeplot farm activities are considered in three 
variations. First, the latter are Riven only market evaluation (monetary 
value); next, both market and recreational (non-monetary) values are 
applied; and third, homeplot activities are treated exclusively as rec­
reation and leisure. After listing conflicting interests between the 
cooperative management and cooperative members, as well as between co­
operative groups and the whole society, this chapter analyzes recent 
economic-policy problems of Hungary in light of the reform of the 
economic mechanism (introduced in 1968) which essentially modified the 
previous system of central planning and pricing. This section concludes 
that the recent economic changes taking place in the Eastern European 
countries may be best defined as a transition from a socialist-economic 
model with barter-type features to one with clear-cut market-economy 
characteristics* 
Chapter XII provides a summary of the study and concludes that its 
objectives have been achieved» 
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Concluding Remarks 
The history of science shows that most relevant theories like 
major discoveries were developed by several people almost simultaneously» 
It is an open question whether Newton or Leibnitz discovered differential 
and integral calculus, but it is positively known that Pascal and Fermât 
were also pretty close to this discovery. Why? Because productive re­
lations and particularly social conditions of the time indicated the 
need for a new physics. On the other hand, the new physics associated 
with Galileo, which put movement at the center of physics, demanded a 
new mathematics to measure movement. And this need, this "demand,* set 
several men on the road to finding a new mathematics. As we know, 
Newton or Leibnitz found it, but very likely many others also looked 
for it at the same time. 
In recent years, the Eastern European countries introduced numer­
ous major and minor economic reforms. These reforms expressed the efforts 
of experts and scholars engaged in the field of the social sciences. 
Scientific criticism and new theoretical approaches played an impor­
tant part in disclosing the changes which became necessary. Advances in 
the understanding of economic theory provided a set of answers to ques­
tions that had arisen from social needs. At present, it is impossible 
to show who made the first steps toward the discovery of the "new* 
economic principles. (]h the so-called Western World, Heberman's 
article received the loudest echo.) 
Properly understanding and developing the economic theory of co­
operative farming can provide particular answers to relevant questions 
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reflecting social needsc From Iowa to Siberia all sorts of people, among 
them devoted economists who live in Samuelson's (77, p* XIII) "golden 
age for analytical economics* want to satisfy this need# The coopera­
tive form of farm organization provides special tasks for agricultural 
economists in our days lAen as Heady (^3 ) formulates % 
*Farming has catapulted from an occupation based on family-
transmitted art and historic experience to a highly advanced 
scientific activity resting on continuously changing capital 
technologies and extending to the future. Its scientific 
complexity now approaches or surpasses the engineering charac­
teristics of many industrial activities»* 
Pascal said that after having finished his work he generally found 
out what he should have begun with# Perhaps many economists of my country 
are in a similar situation and are rewriting their "papers,* sparing 
neither trouble nor pain# The major requirement for doing this is given 
by Shakespeare» "the readiness is all#* If this study stimulates fresh 
ideas and further research, and inspires readiness for new voyages of 
discovery, it will have entirely achieved its innermost purpose# 
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